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vAbstract
This thesis examines the selection of immigrants and their impact on the receiving
economy.
After an introductory first chapter, I present an analysis of Borjas model of se-
lection extended to multiple locations. In this extension, selection is determined by
earnings’ dispersion alone only for the most and least disperse locations. Therefore, it
highlights that, what determines selection, is the ranking of locations rather than the
relative dispersion of earnings between home and destination. Using interstate US
migration, I provide stochastic dominance relations on pre-migration earnings that
support the implications of the model. These give a stronger test for selection than
selection on means.
The third chapter presents evidence on the effect of immigrants on aggregate
labour productivity in the UK. I exploit variation on past settlement of natives across
industries and regions to estimate the effect of immigrants on labour productivity. My
estimates show that increasing the relative supply of immigrant labour has a positive
effect on labour productivity. I show that part of this effect works through accumu-
lation of capital stocks and provide evidence suggesting that immigrants trigger the
development of technologies that complement them. Thus, I show that altering the
labour mix produces effects that go beyond simple differences in marginal products
and affects the accumulation of other inputs and technologies.
In the fourth chapter, Greta Morando and I exploit cross-cohort variation within
majors and universities to estimate the effect of foreign peers on native students.
We show that increasing the share of EU students lowers the probability of entering
a university major. But, conditional on university and major, foreign peer effects
on educational and early labour market outcomes are mild. Therefore, our research
shows that there are no large foreign peer effects in higher education. However, it
also suggests that there is scope for foreign students affecting natives’ outcomes by
shaping the universities and majors natives attend.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
An increasingly large number of individuals live and work outside their country of
birth. This has led, over the last twenty years, to the immigrant population share
in developed countries doubling and reaching 14% of the total population by 2019.1
Unsurprisingly, immigration and its consequences have become a central issue for
academics, policymakers and the general public.2
The economic literature has recognised the importance of migration, at least, as
early as Ravenstein (1885). In the modern literature, one of the most influential
papers on migration economics is Borjas (1987) work on selection of migrants. Borjas
uses the occupational framework introduced by Roy (1951) and models migration
decisions as an earnings maximization problem. The main implication of his model
is that earnings dispersion alone determines the direction of selection. High-skilled
workers move to disperse locations that give them a better chance to increase their
earnings and low-skilled workers choose more equal locations to insure themselves
against extreme bad earnings draws (Parey et al. 2017).
Since Borjas (1987), immigrant self-selection has received widespread attention.
For example, migrant selection from Mexico to the US has been the subject of intense
debate (Ambrosini and Peri 2012; Chiquiar and Hanson 2005; Fernandez-Huertas
Moraga 2011; Kaestner and Malamud 2014; Orrenius and Zavodny 2005). A com-
mon element to most of the migrant selection literature that followed Borjas (1987),
is that it uses a two-location model. This is true even when studying migration phe-
nomena where workers face multiple destinations (e.g. Belot and Hatton 2012; Borjas,
Kauppinen, et al. 2018; Feliciano 2005; Fernandez-Huertas Moraga 2013; Parey et al.
2017). Borjas, Bronars, et al. (1992) is, to the best of my knowledge, the only ex-
ception. In their study of interstate migration, Borjas, Bronars, et al. (1992) present
a Roy model of selection with perfect transferability of skills. This perfect transfer-
ability of skills simplifies the model, but it is a restriction regarding Borjas original
1According to United Nations data.
2As a public issue, immigration has gained salience across the political spectrum (Dancygier and
Margalit 2019) and this, ultimately, translates into public policy (Facchini et al. 2016). For example,
in the UK, immigration has played a key role in one of the UK biggest policy changes, leaving
the European Union (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017). This growing interest in immigration gives a
compelling argument to study its causes and consequences.
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model that one may not want to impose. Particularly when studying international
migration.3
In the second chapter of this thesis, I present an analysis of Borjas’ model extended
to multiple locations and general transferability of skills. I show that this extension
of the model predicts positive (negative) selection to the most (least) disperse loca-
tion. This highlights something that gets overlooked in the two-location model, what
matters for selection is the ranking of locations in terms of earnings dispersion. This
is in contrast with the most common interpretation in the literature that interprets
the selection mechanism as given by relative earnings dispersion between home and
destination. As a result, this interpretation of the selection mechanism guides, in
some way, most of the analysis framed within the Borjas model. For example, Belot
and Hatton (2012) regress measures of worker quality on differences in returns to
education at home and destination. And Abramitzky and Boustan (2017), in their
review of immigrant selection, note that some literature (Feliciano 2005; Grogger
and Hanson 2011; Jasso et al. 2004; Kennedy et al. 2015) finds positive immigrant
selection to the US independently of differences between home and destination.
That the home location plays no role in selection through differences in dispersion
has the following intuition. In most models of migration (e.g. Dahl 2002; Kennan
and Walker 2011) the home location is defined as a preference, or location amenity,
shifter. This is, the home location does not enter the earnings equation or, in any
case, only displaces the location of the net earnings distribution. This is also true in
Borjas’ model. Then, given that selection is driven by relative returns to skill and
these are not affected by the home location, the home location must play no role in
selection.
Although home location plays no special role on whether there is positive or
negative selection, it affects the intensity of selection. However, this is intuitive and
results from using earnings obtained at home to measure skill. To see the intuition,
let me give an extreme example. Imagine that all workers are ex-ante equal, then the
dispersion of earnings in the home location is zero, everyone earns the same wage,
and there can be no-selection.4 If workers have heterogeneous skills, then there can
be selection and the dispersion of earnings at home will be non-zero. In addition,
the more heterogeneous the skills of workers are, the greater the degree of selection
can be. Moreover, in the model, if one substitutes earnings at home for some other
measure of skill, the effect of earnings dispersion at home on the intensity of selection
disappears. This shows that the effect of home location earnings dispersion is given
by how one measures skill, not the mechanism of selection.
When exploring the implications of my multiple locations Borjas’ model, I fol-
low Borjas, Kauppinen, et al. (2018) and study stochastic dominance relations be-
tween earnings distributions. This has two advantages when compared with selection
3See the extensive literature on immigrant downgrading following Chiswick (1978). See also the
review by Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2015).
4This is inside the one price Roy model. In other set-ups it is possible to generate wage dispersion
with ex-ante identical workers (e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002).
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on mean earnings. First, stochastic dominance relations produce simpler expres-
sions when dealing with multiple locations. Second, stochastic dominance produces a
stronger test for the implications of the model. This is because, first order, stochastic
dominance implies ordering of means. However, the opposite is generally not true.
To test the implications of the model, I use US interstate migration. This mi-
gration phenomenon gives me the best testing laboratory possible. This is because,
when moving across states, workers do not face policy constraints. This is in contrast
with most international migration where skill-based admission may contaminate the
underlying pattern of selection.5 Moreover, interstate migrants stay within the scope
of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, from where I get the data for
my analysis. This avoids, or at least limits, representativeness concerns that are,
otherwise, an issue on international migration (Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007) and al-
lows me to observe characteristics and earnings of movers before they move. Finally,
earnings differentials across states are significant and long-lasting (Dahl 2002). Thus,
there is scope for the selection mechanism described by Borjas’ model taking place.
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation and the Current Popula-
tion Survey I classify states according to their earnings dispersion and characterize
immigrant selection using pre-migration earnings. The empirical evidence I provide
matches quite well the selection pattern described by the model. Selection increases
with earnings dispersion at the destination location. Furthermore, the earnings dis-
tribution of those moving to the least disperse location never dominates the earnings
distribution of other migrants and the earnings distribution of those moving to the
most disperse locations is never dominated. This pattern holds for observed, predicted
and residual pre-migration earnings across sex and age groups.
Alongside migrant selection, a large branch within migration economics asks what
are the consequences of immigration for receiving economies.6 Earlier literature fo-
cused on the effects in the receiving labour market (e.g. Borjas and Tienda 1987; Card
1990; Grossman 1982; Hunt 1992; Johnson 1980; LaLonde and Topel 1991).7 Specifi-
cally, the earlier literature focused on the effect of immigrants on natives’ wages (see
also Altonji and Card 1991; Borjas, Freeman, et al. 1992; Butcher and Card 1991).
Since the early 1990s, the literature has spread in terms of outcomes studied. For
example, there are recent studies on the effect of immigrants on crime (Bell et al.
2013; Mastrobuoni and Pinotti 2015), attitudes towards migration (Dustmann and
Preston 2007; Viskanic 2017), public services (Preston 2014; Wadsworth 2013), real-
estate (Sa´ 2014) and education (Hunt 2017; Machin and Murphy 2017). Nonetheless,
the effects of immigration on the receiving labour market are, still, the central issue
(e.g. Dustmann, Fabbri, et al. 2005; Dustmann, Frattini, et al. 2013; Dustmann,
5There is some evidence that immigration policy has been shifting towards promoting high-skilled
immigration (see Boucher and Cerna 2014, and other papers in the same special issue.).
6Spengler (1958) may be one of the earliest examples of this literature.
7An, earlier, exception is Reder (1963). He discusses the effects of post-war immigration on
investment, output per capita, labour supply and income distribution.
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Scho¨nberg, et al. 2017; Hatton and Tani 2005; Manacorda et al. 2012; Ottaviano and
Peri 2012).8
In the third and fourth chapters of this thesis, I contribute to this literature by
estimating the effect of immigrants in two, relatively, unexplored outcomes. In my
third chapter, I investigate the effect of immigrants on labour productivity in the
UK. Immigration and productivity are growing concerns for British policymakers
(see ministerial white papers BEIS 2017; Home Office 2018). However, there is little
evidence of the effect of immigration on productivity. Aleksynska and Tritah (2009),
Boubtane et al. (2016), and Ortega and Peri (2014) provide cross-country evidence
showing that immigration has a positive effect on labour productivity. A similar
conclusion is reached by Peri (2012) using data from the US and by Ottaviano, Peri,
and Wright (2018) using service sector data for the UK. However, Paserman (2013)
finds negative effects on Israeli manufacturing firms and Kangasniemi et al. (2012)
provide mixed evidence for Spain and the UK.
My third chapter contributes to the literature by estimating the average effect
of immigrants on labour productivity in the UK. Using variation on past-settlement
of immigrants (Altonji and Card 1991; Card 2001) across regions and industries,
I estimate the effect of altering the relative supply of immigrant labour on labour
productivity. My estimates show that increasing the relative supply of immigrant
labour by ten percentage points rises output per worker by 6.7%. Evaluated at the
average, this is a £5,610 increase in annual output per worker.
To better understand the reduced-form estimate, I introduce a Constant Elastic-
ity of Substitution production function which I use to decompose the reduced form
estimate. I show that the reduced-form effect is composed of differences in marginal
returns between immigrant and native labour and the changes immigrants induce
on other inputs. Thus, a key insight from my decomposition is that reduced-form
estimates of the effect of immigration on output and labour productivity depends
on the mix of inputs. Therefore, it warns against extrapolating estimates across
time, country, sectors or levels of aggregation as the input mix varies across these
dimensions.9
To gauge the importance of effects on other inputs on the reduced form effect, I
estimate the effect of immigration on capital stocks, native labour, and native skill
mix. My estimates show that immigrants have a positive effect on capital stocks,
native labour and native skill mix. However, the positive effect of immigration on
labour productivity goes beyond effects on these inputs. Controlling for capital and
native skill mix, I estimate that immigrants have a positive and significant effect
on labour productivity. Increasing the relative supply of immigrant labour by ten
percentage points increases labour productivity by 5%.
Given the persistence of the positive effect of immigration on labour productivity,
8See also chapters 3 to 6 in Borjas (2014) and the review by Card and Peri (2016).
9See figure 3.1, table 3.1 and evidence provided by Dustmann, Scho¨nberg, et al. (2016).
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
I explore whether it works through differences on relative marginal returns or if im-
migrants may trigger the development of technologies that complement them. Using
my decomposition of the reduced form effect I show that, for a wide range of pa-
rameter values, the evidence I provide is consistent with immigrants encouraging the
development of technologies that complement them. This positive effect is consistent
with Acemoglu (1998, 2002) model of endogenous technical change. In Acemoglu’s
model, as long as immigrant and native labour are gross substitutes, increasing the
relative supply of immigrant labour increases the supply of technologies that com-
plement immigrants. To provide further evidence about whether this mechanism
is at place, I compare estimates from two production function estimators with the
reduced form effect controlling for other inputs. Assuming that factor augmenting
technologies are constant, my production function estimate produces an immigrant
marginal effect that is only positive when I allow for effects through capital stocks.
This is in contradiction with the reduced form effect and further suggest that im-
migrants have an effect on technologies that complement them. Moreover, when I
compare this production function estimate with a polynomial approximation, that is
consistent with endogenous technical change, I find that the approximation produces
a larger and positive marginal effect. This suggests, again, that immigrants trigger
the development of migrant labour augmenting technologies.
My work on the effect of immigration on labour productivity, therefore, shows
that changing the labour mix produces effects that go beyond differences in marginal
products and into effects through other inputs and, possibly, technologies. This fits
well within the existing literature. Clemens et al. (2018) produce suggestive evidence
pointing to endogenous technological change as a result of immigrant restrictions.
Hornbeck and Naidu (2014) show that reductions in the availability of cheap labour
lead to the introduction of technology to substitute it. Moreover, Hornung (2014)
and Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) show that immigrants can boost the diffusion
and development of innovations. Finally, Hunt (2017), Llull (2017), and Ransom and
Winters (2016) show that immigrants shape natives’ educational decisions.
The fourth chapter of this thesis goes, precisely, into that last effect. Do im-
migrants change educational outcomes of natives? However, differently from Hunt
(2017), Llull (2017), and Ransom and Winters (2016) that study the effect of changes
on the aggregate stock of immigrants; Greta Morando and I ask what is the effect
of sharing university and major with foreign peers on educational and early labour
market outcomes of native students. Our research is motivated by an ever-growing
number of international students in higher education that makes the effects of in-
ternational students in the receiving country and, particularly, on native students
key for policy (see MAC 2018). This is because higher education is a key stage for
the future labour market performance of workers. At this stage, the universities and
colleges that individuals attend (Arcidiacono 2004; Belfield et al. 2018; Walker and
Zhu 2008, 2018) and the educational outcomes they achieve (Feng and Graetz 2017;
Jaeger and Page 1996; Jones and Jackson 1990) have an impact on future labour
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market outcomes.
There is substantial literature on the effect of peers on individuals’ outcomes.10
However, the literature on foreign peer effects is still small and has focused on lower
levels of education. Ballatore et al. (2018) find negative foreign peer effects on lan-
guage and math performance of second graders.11 In contrast with this, Geay et al.
(2013) show that, in England, the negative effect of foreign peers on natives is be-
cause of selection and that foreign peers produce a zero effect. Moreover, in their
study of foreign peers on Israeli natives, Gould et al. (2009) find an overall no effect
that, however, hides a negative effect for disadvantaged students. Finally, Ohinata
and Van Ours (2013) study the effect of foreign peers on Dutch students finding only
mild effects.
At higher education, Anelli, Shih, et al. (2017) study the effect of foreign peers on
the probability of graduating in a science, technology, engineering and mathematics
(STEM) major at a university in California. Their evidence shows that foreign peers
have a negative effect on the probability of graduating in a STEM major. However,
this has no negative effect on natives’ earnings as immigrant peers displace native
students into high earning social science majors. Also in the US, but using aggregate
data, Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) provide evidence showing that increasing the
share of immigrants in a cohort has a negative effect on the probability of STEM
graduation for women. Finally, Chevalier et al. (2019) study the impact of linguistic
diversity at a British university finding no effects on English-speaking students.
We add to the literature by estimating foreign peer effects in higher education on
native educational and labour market outcomes for the whole of England. The main
identification problem that we face is that certain institutions may attract particular
native students and also attract foreign students (Ohinata and Van Ours 2013). We
deal with self-selection into university and majors by using variation across cohorts
within university and major. However, we show that this variation alone is not good
enough to estimate the effect of foreign peers. This is because universities have ex-
ante information about the quality of prospective students. Then, under capacity
constraints, an increase in the number of prospective students, as given by a larger
number of foreigners, increases the average ability of accepted students. We show that
this is the case for EU students who share with natives the same cap on the number
of subsidized students allowed to be enrolled by each university.12 This produces
that rising the share of EU students increases average ability of enrolled natives.
However, non-EU students have no significant effects on average native ability. The
same asymmetry holds for group size. Increasing the share of EU students does not
produce any change in the size of the group, but increasing the share of non-EU
increases group size.
10See Sacerdote (2011) review of the literature on education peer effects.
11Brunello and Rocco (2013) also provide evidence of negative effects but at the aggregate level.
12This was imposed by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) (see Machin
and Murphy 2017).
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Thanks to the quality of our data we can overcome this initial selection problem.
This is because we observe a measure of natives’ ability, their Universities and Colleges
Admissions Service (UCAS) score. We show that, after conditioning on ability and
group size, variation across cohorts within university and major is uncorrelated with
a large set of pre-determined individual characteristics that are likely predictors of
educational achievement.
The evidence we provide shows that there are only mild foreign peer effects and
that these are heterogeneous across the ability distribution. The strongest foreign peer
effects that we find are on the distribution of grades, in particular, on the probability
of graduating with an upper- or lower-second for top ability students. We show
that these effects on grades are not consistent with a grading-on-a-curve mechanism
where foreign peers mechanically displace native students. Foreign peers, therefore,
modify the human capital accumulation of native students. However, these effects
are very mild. For example, the largest effect we find shows that a one percentage
point increase on the foreign peer share reduces the probability of graduating with
an upper second for top ability natives by .30 percentage points.
In terms of early labour market outcomes, we also find mild and typically sta-
tistically non-significant foreign peer effects. If anything, foreign peers increase the
probability of natives working after graduation by reducing the probability of them
going into further education; increase the probability of working in professional oc-
cupations and have a positive impact on wages of top ability natives.
Our research, therefore, is consistent with existing evidence providing mild foreign
peer effects (Anelli, Shih, et al. 2017; Chevalier et al. 2019). However, it also suggests
that foreign students may have an effect on the universities and majors that natives
end up attending. This can, potentially, have a greater impact than foreign peer
effects.
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Abstract
Since Borjas (1987) seminal paper, the Roy model has been widely used to study
immigrant self-selection. Particularly, the baseline two-location model has been a
popular frame for self-selection research, even in situations where immigrants may
face a larger choice set. I present an analysis of Borjas’ model of selection extended
to multiple locations. This extension shows that earnings dispersion alone determines
selection only for the most and least disperse locations. Therefore, it highlights
that, what determines selection, is the ranking of locations rather than the relative
dispersion of earnings between home and destination. Using US internal migration, I
provide evidence supporting the implications of the model.
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2.1 Introduction
A long-standing empirical observation is that migrants are not randomly drawn from
their population, they are selected in terms of their skills.
Seminal work in Borjas (1987) uses Roy (1951) occupational choice framework
to explore this phenomenon. In the baseline model, individuals choose between two
locations and decide where to work based on the returns to their skills and moving
costs creating a selection mechanism that is entirely characterized by relative earnings
dispersion or skill premium. Higher (lower) earnings dispersion at destination leads
to positive (negative) selection. Thus, the selection mechanism behind this pattern
can be thought of as low skilled individuals taking insurance from the more com-
pressed distribution at the destination and high skilled taking advantage of improved
opportunities in a more disperse location (Parey et al. 2017).
Recently, migrant selection has received renewed interest and several papers, most
notably on Mexico-US migration, have tested the implications of the Borjas (1987)
framework. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) find medium to positive selection of Mexican
migrants to the US, what is evidence against Borjas selection model as Mexico is
a more unequal country than the US. However, later revision (Ambrosini and Peri
2012; Fernandez-Huertas Moraga 2011, 2013; Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007; Kaestner
and Malamud 2014) provide evidence supporting the implications of Borjas’ model.
Outside Mexico-US, Parey et al. (2017) use data on German graduates and provide
evidence supporting the implications of the model. Borjas, Kauppinen, et al. (2018)
provide further evidence in support of the Borjas using Danish data.
Several papers in the literature (e.g. Belot and Hatton 2012; Feliciano 2005;
Fernandez-Huertas Moraga 2013; Parey et al. 2017) use the two-location model when
studying selectivity of immigrants across multiple locations. A common interpreta-
tion of the main implication of the Roy model is that ”if the home country’s income
distribution is more unequal than in the ...[destination], immigrants will be negatively
selected...” (Feliciano 2005, p. 133). This interpretation guides, in some way, most of
the analysis framed within the Borjas model. For example, Belot and Hatton (2012)
regress measures of educational selectivity on differences in relative returns to edu-
cation between home and destination location. My extension of the Borjas model
including more than two locations highlights that selection is not driven by relative
earnings dispersion between home and destination but by the ranking, in terms of
earnings dispersion, of locations within the choice set. With more than two locations
and unrestricted transferability of skills, my extension of the Borjas model predicts
positive (negative) immigrant selection into the most (least) disperse location.
In the two-location model, the ranking and home-destination relative dispersion
are equivalent and leads to the interpretation given in the literature. However, analy-
sis of selection within the Borjas model looking at home-destination relative dispersion
implicitly assumes that immigrants only consider these two locations. Although that
could be the case in some migration phenomena, for example, Mexico-US, it can be
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restrictive for other where individuals are likely to decide among a wider range of
alternatives. For example, US interstate migration (Kennan and Walker 2011) or
emigration across European countries (Rojas-Romagosa and Bollen 2018).
Using US inter-state migration, I test whether migrant selection follows the pat-
tern implied by my extension of the Borjas model. This migration phenomenon gives
a perfect scenario to test the implications of the Borjas model as there are no border
constraints that could contaminate the pattern of selection and individuals can be
tracked even if they switch locations. This reduces measurement error, for exam-
ple, due to illegal migration (Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007), and allows observation
of pre-migration characteristics. Furthermore, when engaging on internal migration,
US workers face a large choice set, as highlighted by Kennan and Walker (2011), that
matches well the set-up of my extension of the Borjas model. Finally, US local labour
markets exhibit heterogeneity in their earnings distribution and such differences are
long-lasting (Dahl 2002). Therefore, the selection drive presented in Borjas (1987) is
at place.
For testing, I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
and Current Population Survey covering the period 1984 to 2013. Following Borjas,
Kauppinen, et al. (2018), I cast the implications of the model in terms of stochastic
dominance, which provides a stronger test than selection on means. In line with
the model’s predictions, I show that immigrants moving to the most (least) disperse
location are positively (negatively) selected in terms of pre-migration earnings and
immigrants to other locations show, somehow, intermediate selection. I show, also in
line with the model, that the degree of selection increases with dispersion at the home
location. Thus, I contribute to the literature by showing that a multiple location Roy
model without imposing perfect transferability of skills (see Borjas, Bronars, et al.
1992) holds meaningful implications, at least for the least and most disperse locations,
and that the implied pattern of selection is observed in the data.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Seminal work in Borjas (1987) departs from the framework introduced in Roy (1951)
and develops a two location model where individuals chose freely to migrate depend-
ing on earnings at origin and destination. The central implication of the baseline
Borjas model is that, given appropriate assumptions about the relationship between
migration costs and skill, selection is completely characterized by the relative disper-
sion of earnings.1 With sufficient skill transferability, higher earnings dispersion at
destination leads to positive selection and the opposite to negative.
1The baseline Borjas model assumes that migration cost and earnings are orthogonal so costs
don’t determine selection. Kaestner and Malamud (2014) provide some empirical evidence on migra-
tion costs and selection. Borjas (1991) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) introduce extensions with
non-constant costs. In equation (2.1), one can let the amenity value be a random variable, if it is
independent of skill then it won’t change the implications of the model. Allowing for dependence
between skill and amenities, one can produce arbitrary patterns of selection.
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Recent work in Borjas, Kauppinen, et al. (2018) shows that the baseline Borjas
model has not only implications for selection on mean skill but also for stochastic
dominance. However, they keep the choice set constrained to two locations, origin
and destination. Although this can be an adequate reduction for some migration
events, e.g. Mexico-US, it seems too constrictive for settings with multiple competing
destinations. Here, I explore the model when one allows for an arbitrary number of
locations and provide conditions under which there is stochastic dominance.
To present the model, assume that individuals’ utility from working in location l
depends on local amenities µl and wages wl
Uil = µl + wil (2.1)
where for simplicity I assume that local amenities are deterministic and, critically, I
impose a multivariate normal distribution on the vector of wages w ≡ [wl].
Individuals are utility maximizers and choose to locate in the labour market hold-
ing the highest utility, leading to the following policy rule for location l
Mil ≡ 1[Uil − Uik > 0 ∀ k 6= l] (2.2)
To characterize selection, let z be a measure of worker skill in the sense that the
covariance vector Cov(w, z) has all strictly positive elements.2 As in Borjas, Kaup-
pinen, et al. (2018), I am interested in the implications of the model for stochastic
dominance of migrants’ skill. Thus, I want to derive under which conditions
F (z|Ml = 1) ≤ F (z) ∀ z
with
F (z|Ml = 1) < F (z) for some z
(2.3)
Thistle (1993) shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for stochastic dom-
inance is that the negative moments are strictly ordered. Therefore, the stochastic
dominance relation stated in (2.3) will hold if
mz|Ml=1(−t) < mz(−t) ∀ t > 0 (2.4)
where m(.) is the moment generating function. Let me define two new vectors, one
holding standardized wage differences
w−l =
[
wl − w1
V ar(wl − w1) , . . . ,
wl − wl−1
V ar(wl − wl−1) ,
wl − wl+1
V ar(wl − wl+1) , . . . ,
wl − wL
V ar(wl − wL)
]
and the other holding amenity differentials standardized with the variance of the wage
differences
2In the literature, there are multiple examples of skill measures. For example, Fernandez-Huertas
Moraga (2011) uses pre-migration earnings, Parey et al. (2017) use predicted earnings and Belot and
Hatton (2012) use education.
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∆µ−l =
[
µl − µ1
V ar(wl − w1) , . . . ,
µl − µl−1
V ar(wl − wl−1) ,
µl − µl+1
V ar(wl − wl+1) , . . . ,
µl − µL
V ar(wl − wL)
]
Then, an individual is observed in location l if the L−1 inequalities, w−l > ∆µ−l,
are satisfied. This implies that one is interested in the distribution of (z,w−l) when
w−l is truncated from below. Given normality of the random variable (z,w−l), the
moment generating function of the marginal truncated distribution can be readily
obtained from results in Tallis (1961)3
mz|Ml=1(t) = e
αt+σ2t2/2 ΦL−1(∆µ−l − ρ−lt)
ΦL−1(∆µ−l)
(2.5)
Where ΦL−1 is the mass under the right hand tail of a L− 1 dimensional normal
density, α and σ2 are the mean and variance of z and ρ−l is the vector of correlations
between z and w−l. When these correlations are all zero the moment generating
function in (2.5) reduces to that of a standard normal and with two locations it
is the moment generating function provided in Arnold et al. (1993) and used in
Borjas, Kauppinen, et al. (2018). It follows from (2.4) and (2.5) that the truncated
distribution dominates the population if
ΦL−1(∆µ−l + ρ−lt) < ΦL−1(∆µ−l) (2.6)
Thus, when all elements of ρ−l are positive (negative) the truncated distribution
dominates (is dominated) by the population independently of differences in local
amenities. In turn, the sign of these correlations is determined by the covariance
vector of the skill measure and wages that has kth element
Cov(z, wl − wk) = σρzkσk
(
ρzlσl
ρzkσk
− 1
)
(2.7)
Where ρzl is the correlation between the skill measure and wages in location l
and σl is the standard deviation of wages in location l.
4 When skill transferability is
homogeneous across locations (ρzl = ρ ∀l) the sign of the correlations in ρ−l is deter-
mined by pair-wise comparison of skill prices across locations. Under these conditions,
equations (2.6) and (2.7) imply that the skill distribution of those choosing the most
(least) disperse location dominates (is dominated by) the population skill distribu-
tion. Thus, the implications for selection are analogous to Borjas (1987) canonical
with a two location set-up, where the Borjas model implies positive selection into
the market with the largest wage dispersion. However, working with more than two
locations highlights one insight: it is not the ratio between the returns at destination
with respect to home what determine selection, but the ranking of the destination
3Tallis (1961) provides the moment generating function of an L-dimensional normal, one needs
to allow one of the truncation points go to minus infinite to get (2.5).
4Differences on wages standard deviations can also be interpreted as differences on skill prices
for some unit variance normally distributed skill.
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within the choice set. To see this, let the skill measure be the wage obtained at the
home location, z = wh. Then
Cov(wh, wl − wk) = σhρhkσk
(
ρhlσl
ρhkσk
− 1
)
(2.8)
It follows from (2.8), that the home location plays a role on the direction of
selection if there is heterogeneous transferability of skill across locations but not
through differences in dispersion or returns to skill, i.e. through σh. Suppose that all
locations are equally disperse, then the kth element of the covariance vector is
Cov(wh, wl − wk) = σ2ρhk
(
ρhl
ρhk
− 1
)
(2.9)
and all L − 1 covariances in ρ−l will be positive (negative) if the chosen location l
is the one with the highest (lowest) transferability of skills. This is intuitive. If a
worker has a good initial wage draw, she has an incentive to move to the location
that preserves it. On the other hand, if a worker has a first wage that is low, she
has an incentive to move into a location where the previous wage does not strongly
determine the current one, so she can get a fresh start.5
If skill transferability is assumed to be homogeneous across locations (e.g. Borjas,
Bronars, et al. 1992), then wage dispersion at the home location plays no special role
in determining the direction of selection. Under homogeneous skill transferability the
kth element of the covariance vector is
Cov(wh, wl − wk) = σhρσk
(
σl
σk
− 1
)
(2.10)
Now the L−1 covariances are all positive (negative) if the chosen location, l, is the
one with the highest (lowest) wage dispersion. It is clear from equation (2.10) that
wage dispersion at the home location, σh, plays no special role in determining the
direction of selection. Nonetheless, a higher wage dispersion at the home location will
increase the degree of selection as it enlarges the elements of ρ−l. However, this effect
of home earnings dispersion is given by me measuring skills with earnings at the home
location. If instead I use an homoscedastic measure of skill, as in (2.7), the effect of
home earnings dispersion disappears. In equation (2.11) what increases the degree of
selection is the dispersion of the skill measure. This is intuitive. If all workers are
the same, i.e. σ = 0, there can be no-selection. Moreover, the most heterogeneous
workers are, i.e. the larger σ is, the most intensive selection can be. Thus the effect
of home earnings dispersion in (2.10) is just an artefact of how I measure selection
and not a result of the selection mechanism.
Cov(z, wl − wk) = σρσk
(
σl
σk
− 1
)
(2.11)
5In this discussion I rule out strange cases where ρhl < 0.
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2.3 Data
To test the implications of the theory, I use data from the Survey of Income and
Program participation (SIPP)and IPUMS-CPS (Flood et al. 2015) covering the period
1984-2013.6 The SIPP is a sample of partially overlapping panels, all of them designed
to be representative of the whole US. The duration of these panels goes from two to
four years, although some panels were discontinued before reaching the two year
mark. In my analysis, the main advantage of using the SIPP is that it keeps internal
movers within scope, allowing me to observe people moving and record characteristics
of movers before they move. This is critical for me as I use pre-migration measures
to test migrant selection. In addition, the SIPP covers multiple cohorts and a long
window of time, therefore, I also add to previous results in the literature (Borjas,
Bronars, et al. 1992) using a particular cohort by showing whether the implications
of the theory hold across multiple cohorts and periods of time.
Although there is a panel for each year between 1984-2013, I do not use data from
panels 1984 and 1989. This is because I select observations into my estimation data
conditioning on being US-born and not being enrolled in education. In panel 1989,
there is no available information about migration history including state or country of
birth and panel 1984 does not provide information about current school enrolment.7
From the original sample, I select observations for individuals who gave a valid
interview, proxy included, are 18 to 64 years old, not self-employed, not enrolled in
full-time education, have never been in the army and were born in the US. When I
observe an individual enrolled in further education, I keep later observations if she
leaves further education. I also eliminate from my estimation sample individuals
that are living, at some point, in a non-individually identifiable state. These are
Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wyoming.8 Although I take these states into account when ranking locations. This is
possible because I use CPS to produce location-specific earnings dispersion estimates.
When I merge individual characteristics with their migration histories, some ob-
servations are not matched.9 These unmatched observations are due to individuals
that were not present at the designated sample wave when migration histories were
recorded. This can be because they left the survey, did not enter it yet or could not
be contacted at that particular wave.10 I disregard all observations without matched
migration histories as these provide information about birth place.11
The resulting sample contains 264,813 individuals with an average of 29 obser-
vations per individual and a total of 13,339 interstate mobility events from which I
6I have used SIPP core and topical files, extraction programs and data dictionaries from NBER
http://www.nber.org/data/survey-of-income-and-program-participation-sipp-data.html
7Panel 1989 was discontinued after three waves and topical modules were never released.
8I display state groups in table 2.6.
9For all panels but 1985 migration history questions were carried at wave 2. For panel 1985 this
information was gathered at wave 4.
10For further information see Westat and Mathematica Policy Research (2001) chapter 13.
11How birthplace information is recorded varies across waves, see appendix 2.6.2. And the same
is true for other variables, see appendix 2.6.2 for the homogenization I use.
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eliminate 1,732 of them because I do not observe any pre-migration earnings and 2,390
that correspond to individuals moving to the State where they were born. To check
the representativeness of the SIPP data, in figure 2.1, I display one-year migration
rates drawn from SIPP and CPS.12 Interstate migration rates have been decreasing
for the last 30 years and this is apparent in both SIPP and CPS. However, the CPS
data displays a sharp drop in year 2006 when imputed observations are not disre-
garded. Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) investigate the causes of such a drop
and conclude that it can be mostly attributed to a methodological change on the
missing value imputation procedure. When I drop imputed values, the data displays
a much smooth decreasing behaviour, comparable with the one observed in SIPP.13
Figure 2.1: One-year interstate migration rate
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2.3.1 Migrant Definition
I define as a mover those individuals for whom current state of residence differs from
the previous one. The use of States to define alternatives in internal US migration
is not new to the literature (e.g. Borjas, Bronars, et al. 1992; Dahl 2002; Kennan
and Walker 2011) and it gives me an exhaustive and mutually exclusive division of
mainland US that is stable across time. Furthermore, states are typically large enough
that local labour markets do not cross state borders and the data shows that is across
12Construction of moving rates from SIPP require some work. See appendix 2.6.1 for an explana-
tion of the procedure.
13IPUMS provides with an imputation flag from 1995 onwards. Before 1996 imputation rates were
marginal (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2017).
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states and not at lower levels where labour motives dominate migration events (table
2.10).14 Importantly, the use of States to delimit mobility events makes my results
comparable with previous previous work on internal US migration selection (Borjas,
Bronars, et al. 1992) and allows for easier replication as different datasets provide
publicly available state identifiers but no smaller geographical areas (see Molloy et al.
2011).15
Within those that move across states, there is a marked age profile in terms of
mobility motives (figure 2.2). Those movers that are 25-55 years old tend to report
moving across states due to new job or job transfer. For older movers the dominant
reason is housing reasons, or family reasons if above 60, and for younger movers the
dominant motive is family reasons with a clear decreasing profile between age 16 and
25. In the analysis, I take this into account and produce estimates with all 16-65
working individuals and 25-55 only.
That few individuals declare having moved to look for work or due to job lost
suggest that a large proportion of those who move due to job related reasons have
engaged on non-local job search and, therefore, it is feasible to obtain ex-ante wage
information at other locations. This is supporting evidence for a minimal condition
for selection in the Borjas model: movers must know the distribution of wages at
other locations.
14Nonetheless, states may cover multiple labour markets and some interstate migration events
may not involve labour market changes (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2017; Molloy et al. 2011).
15Other definitions of locations in the US migration literature include Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area (e.g. Bishop 2012; Gabriel and Schmitz 1995) and distance based measures (Ham
et al. 2011).
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Figure 2.2: Moving Reason Age Profile
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Note: Pooled 1984-2013 CPS data, excluding 1995. In CPS an individual is defined as a migrant if
one year ago she was living in a different state, with the exception of year 1995 where the time
interval refers to five years prior to the interview (see Faber 2000). Those that move across states
only.
Finally, what is more convoluted to define is the population against which one
will compare the characteristics of movers. The usual procedure in the literature
(e.g. Borjas, Bronars, et al. 1992; Fernandez-Huertas Moraga 2011; Parey et al. 2017;
Spitzer and Zimran 2018) is to take a window of time, often times defined by the
sample window, on which if an individual is observed moving she is classified as a
migrant and otherwise as a stayer. Although, this is an undeniably interesting exer-
cise, it does not quite match the layout of the model. Those that are not observed
moving do not represent the population form which migrants are drawn and can be
potentially much different if selection is strong. Actually, recovering the distribution
of skills in the population can be a daunting challenge when there are many possible
destinations, even with a highly parametrized framework as the Borjas model.16 In-
stead of trying to recover the population distribution or using the population at risk
of migration (as referred by Spitzer and Zimran 2018), I compare skill distributions
of movers across destinations. This has the advantage of distributions been directly
recoverable from the data and matches perfectly the layout of the model. In section
2.2, I show that the distribution of skills for movers to the least disperse location
is dominated by the population while the distribution of those moving to the most
disperse location dominates the population. Then, to test the implications of the
16Dahl (2002) provides a semi-parametric estimator to recover the population first moments that
he uses to estimate differences in returns to education across US states in a multiple market Roy
model.
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model, I can just compare the distribution of skills for those moving to the least dis-
perse location with the distribution of those moving to more disperse locations and,
if the model gives a sufficiently good description of the selection mechanism, I should
observe that selection turns positive as I increase dispersion at destination.
2.3.2 Measuring Skill and Dispersion
I follow Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2011) and use pre-migration earnings measured
at the last observation before migration as my measure of migrant skill. From pre-
migration earnings I derive three measures of skill: predicted earnings, pre-migration
standardized residuals and the aggregation of the two. To compute predicted earnings
and residuals, similarly to Borjas, Bronars, et al. (1992), I use the following wage
equation
witj = βxit + γt + ωj + itj (2.12)
Where x contains a constant, a quadratic on age and dummies for sex, race,
highest education level attained, industry, and occupation. δ and γ are year and
state dummies. I control for occupation and industry because individuals specialize
within these, as one can observe in tables 2.1 and 2.11 where movers tend to find a
job within the same industry or occupation as their last pre-migration job.
Table 2.1: Occupation Transitions of Movers
(Row Proportions)
Current Occupation
Previous Occupation Manager High/Medium Skilled Low Skilled Farmer
Manager 0.914 0.069 0.016 0.000
High/Medium Skilled 0.044 0.921 0.033 0.002
Low Skilled 0.028 0.089 0.876 0.007
Farmer 0.050 0.067 0.117 0.767
A possible concern is that the OLS estimates of returns to characteristics from an
equation like (2.12) may be biased due to immigrant selection. However, estimators
in the literature correcting for migrant selection (Dahl 2002; Parey et al. 2017) return
estimates that are close to OLS. Thus I use OLS estimates from specification (2.12)
to obtain a measure of predicted, βx, and residual, , pre-migration earnings. In the
case of residual earnings, I follow Borjas, Bronars, et al. (1992) and divide them by
the earnings variance of the state where the earnings were generated to account for
differences in variance that are given by differences in unobservable skill pay-off across
locations. Then, using the standardized measure of residual earnings (∗), I construct
standardized pre-migration earnings as w∗ = βx + ∗, this is my third measure of
skill.
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Another concern when using earnings to measure selection is whether they may be
modified by or in anticipation of migration (Fernandez-Huertas Moraga 2011; Spitzer
and Zimran 2018). Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2011) and McKenzie et al. (2010)
test whether there are earnings drops right before migration, similar to those in the
program participation literature (Ashenfelter 1978), without finding any significant
changes. In unreported results, I tested whether the difference between the earliest
observation of earnings and the last observation before migration are significant. I find
non statistically significant differences after controlling for experience and calendar
year effects.
To rank locations I follow the model tightly and use earnings dispersion. I pro-
duce dispersion estimates using data from IPUMS-CPS because in the CPS all states
are individually identified, while in the SIPP some states are grouped together. This
implies that only with CPS data I can effectively rank all states according to their
earnings dispersion. From the CPS I compute within year and state earnings dis-
persion and residual-earnings dispersion from a wage equation controlling for sex,
ethnicity and education. Whether I choose to use earnings or residual-earnings to
measure dispersion does not make much difference in terms of empirical results. This
is expected given the strong correlation between the two measures. Nonetheless, what
makes a difference is the temporal aggregation. Taking the average of the yearly earn-
ings dispersion estimates for each state and regressing raw pre-migration wages on the
dispersion ranking produces a strong positive estimate. Moving up one position in the
ranking of the destination location correlates with a .4% increase on pre-migration
earnings. However, the effect reduces to .1% if I rank locations according to yearly
dispersion estimates instead of averages of yearly estimates (table 2.2). Measurement
error may explain why I see smaller estimates when I rank location by year dispersion
instead by decade or whole sample averages. This is because averaging observations
across time may reduce the extend of measurement error and, therefore, the impact
of attenuation bias.
The selection effect on wages is robust to controls for sex, ethnic group and age.
Although it reduces to .2% when I introduce controls for whether the individual has
no education, has completed up to 4th grade, has a high school diploma or is a degree
graduate. Additionally, controlling for industry and occupation reduces the selection
effect further but only when ranking locations according to yearly dispersion or decade
averages.
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Table 2.2: Rank of Destination and Pre-Migration Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rank (fixed) .004∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Rank (decade) .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .001∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Rank (year) .001∗ .001∗∗ .001∗∗ .001∗∗ .0001 −.0001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Observations 9,217 9,217 9,217 9,217 9,217 9,217
Controls
Sex N Y Y Y Y Y
Ethnicity N N Y Y Y Y
Age N N N Y Y Y
Education N N N N Y Y
Industry N N N N N Y
Occupation N N N N N Y
Note: Each estimate in the table comes from an independent regression. Clustered standard
errors by previous state in paranthesis. All columns include fixed effects for state of origin
and year. Characteristics and earnings measured at last observation before migration. p < .1
., p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 ***
Changes in the magnitude of selection effects estimates from column (4) to (5) in
table 2.2 suggest that selection on observables might be stronger in terms of education,
with mild or no selection in terms of sex, age and ethnicity. That is exactly what
I observe when looking at those characteristics across location groups delimited by
earnings dispersion (table 2.12). Individuals with a degree are over-represented among
those moving to the most disperse group of locations (G5) as compared with those
moving to the least disperse location group (G1, the baseline in table 2.12). The same
is true for those in managerial occupations moving into the most disperse group of
locations. In terms of sex and ethnicity I do not find statistically significant selection.
Throughout my analysis of stochastic dominance in section 2.4 I aggregate loca-
tions into groups according to earnings dispersion. I do this because otherwise sample
sizes become too narrow as to be able to draw any meaningful inference. In particu-
lar, I aggregate locations into groups using earnings dispersion according to table 2.3.
Reducing the number of possible destinations from 51 to 5 gives me sufficient sample
size to test the implications of the model in terms of stochastic dominance.
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Table 2.3: Dispersion groups
Group Definition
G1 if dispersion is below 20th percentile
G2 if dispersion between 20th-40th percentile
G3 if dispersion between 40th-60th percentile
G4 if dispersion between 60th-80th percentile
G5 if dispersion above 80th percentile
Within dispersion groups as defined in table 2.3, locations are not clustered ge-
ographical or in terms of average earnings (figure 2.3). In the most disperse group
(G5) there are states from the west coast (California), south (New Mexico, Texas
and Louisiana), the east coast (Virginia, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut and
Massachusetts) and northern states (Michigan). Some of these states, those in the
east coast, are also at the top in terms of average earnings, while others, the south,
are at the bottom. This within group variation in terms of geographical location and
average earnings helps on making sure that the selection patterns observed in the
data are not driven by state characteristics other than earnings dispersion.
Figure 2.3: Ranking of Locations
(a) Dispersion Groups
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5
(b) Average Earnings
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5
Before going into testing stochastic dominance relations, I test whether the selec-
tion patter that emerged in terms of average earnings in table 2.2 is still present when
I aggregate locations into groups. In table 2.13, I regress pre-migration earnings on a
set of dummies for each of the dispersion groups. As when using rankings, I observe
that as the dispersion of the destination location increases average earnings mono-
tonically increase. Also, as in table 2.2, introducing controls for education reduces
the extend of selection and this gets further reduced when I control for occupation
and industry. Thus the selection profile implied by the model is still there in terms
of average earnings when testing it across earnings dispersion groups.
Finally, an implication from the theory that gets overseen is that earnings dis-
persion of the location where skills are measured, in this case the previous location,
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do not play a role in determining the direction of selection, but it does affect the
intensity of selection. Higher dispersion at the previous location creates a stronger
degree of selection, see (2.8). In table 2.4, I regress pre-migration earnings on the
rank of the destination conditioning on dispersion of the home location. What I ob-
serve is precisely the pattern implied by the theory. Positive selection increases as the
earnings dispersion increases and the magnitude of the selection effect increases with
dispersion of the previous location. For example, for those that were in a location in
the least disperse group (G1), a one position increase in the ranking of the destination
location increases wages by .1%. The same increase in the ranking of the destination
location produces a selection effect of .5% for those moving from a location in the
most disperse group (G5).
Table 2.4: Selection Interacted with Location Group of Origin
Home Location Dispersion Group
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5
Rank .001 .002 .003∗ .004∗∗∗ .005∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Observations 639 1,394 1,606 2,257 3,321
Note: Each estimate in the table comes from an independent regression.
Clustered standard errors by previous state in paranthesis. All columns
include fixed effects for year. Characteristics and earnings measured at last
observation before migration. p < .1 ., p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 ***
2.4 Stochastic Dominance
To provide a formal test of the model implications I use Davidson and Duclos (2013)
restricted stochastic dominance test. Davidson and Duclos (2013) test departs from
most of the previous literature on testing for stochastic dominance as it posts a null of
non-dominance. Aside from its simplicity, testing a null of non-dominance effectively
ranks the distributions under study. However, for continuous distributions the null
of non-dominance can never be rejected at the tails of the distribution. This leads to
a test of restricted stochastic dominance over an interval [z−, z+]. In my application,
I set z− to be the 5% quantile and z+ the 99% and test whether I can reject the
null of non-dominance when comparing the distribution of pre-migration earnings
of migrants moving to the least disperse location group against each other location
group. This is
F (z|j ∈ G1) ≤ F (z|j ∈ Gk) (2.13)
against the alternative hypothesis
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F (z|j ∈ G1) > F (z|j ∈ Gk)
at various z in the interval [z−, z+] for each location group (k) other than the least
disperse one. In what follows, I present figures comparing the distribution of skill
measures of those moving to the least disperse group and all other groups, jointly
with bootstrap p-values for Davidson and Duclos (2013) restricted dominance test.
In figure 2.4, I present evidence of selection in terms of pre-migration standardized
earnings. In all sub-figures, I present the distribution of pre-migration standardized
earnings for those moving into the least disperse location in a dashed red line and
the distribution of those moving into the location group that I am comparing in
solid blue. Jointly with these two distributions, I provide bootstrap p-values for the
point-by-point null in (2.13) constructed with 500 replication samples for each point.
The bootstrap samples are drawn using empirical likelihood probabilities constrained
under the null as described in Davidson and Duclos (2013).
When I compare the distribution of pre-migration earnings of those moving to the
least and second least disperse location (figure 2.4a) the null of non-dominance can
only be rejected at small and discontinuous points of the distribution. This means
that there is no evidence of dominance between these two distributions. However, as
I increase the dispersion of the destination location the dominance relations implied
by the model become apparent. The earnings distribution of those moving into the
third least disperse location group dominates the distribution of those moving to
the least disperse location from the 70% quantile and up. This threshold decreases
to around the 20% quantile when looking at those that move into the second most
disperse group and close to the 10% quantile when comparing movers to the least
disperse group with movers to the most disperse group. The data, therefore, displays
the selection pattern predicted by the model: the earnings of those moving to the
most disperse location dominates the earnings of those moving to the least disperse
and for those locations in the middle there is somehow intermediate selection. As
noted by Borjas, Kauppinen, et al. (2018), selection in terms of stochastic dominance
provides stronger evidence for the implications of the model than selection in terms
of average wages. This is because stochastic dominance implies ordering of the first
moments but not the opposite.
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Figure 2.4: Pre-Migration Earnings CDF
(a) Group 2
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(b) Group 3
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
−1
.77
−1
.26
−0
.74
−0
.23 0.2
9
0.8
0
1.3
2
1.8
3
2.3
5
2.8
6
(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration earnings of those moving into the least dis-
perse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point, p-value of
Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
The same selection pattern on pre-migration earnings is displayed by the data if
I select those that are 25-55 years old, figure 2.7. Individuals in this age range, as I
show in table 2.2, are the ones most likely to be moving due to labour market motives.
Furthermore, selection is driven by both male, figure 2.8, and female, 2.9, movers.
For females positive selection at the top of the pre-migration earnings distribution is
only found for those moving to the most disperse location group. Females moving
to the third least disperse exhibit positive selection but only, roughly, between the
50-90% quantiles and for females moving to the second most disperse group selection
happens, roughly, between the 70-90% quantile. For male movers, I observe the same
pattern as with the whole population, although p-values are more volatile.
Another possible way on which one could use Davidson and Duclos (2013) re-
stricted dominance test, is to search for the longest interval, [z−, z+], on which one
can reject the null of non-dominance at a given significance level. This is interesting
because it implies that the closer the bonds of the rejection interval are to the bottom
and top of the joint support the more power the test has (Davidson and Duclos 2013).
When carrying this test the null is over the maximum statistic in the interval [z−, z+]
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max
z∈[z−,z+]
(F (z|G5)− F (z|G1)) ≥ 0
In table 2.5, I present p-values for this null for various intervals. Comparing the
distribution of earnings of movers to the least (G1) and second least disperse (G2)
location groups shows that there is no clear ordering of the two distributions. There is
no interval on which the null of non-dominance can be rejected. A similar conclusion
is true for comparison of the least disperse group with the third least disperse group
(G3). Although, in that case, the null of non-dominance can be rejected to the right
of the median. For the most (G5) and second most disperse (G4) groups, the null of
non-dominance can be rejected from the median to the 99% quantile. To the left of
the median the null of non-dominance can be rejected at the 90% confidence level over
the interval [.3, .5] for the second most disperse group and over the interval [.2,.5] for
the most disperse group. Thus the nested test confirms what was already found with
the point by point test: the distribution of earnings for movers follows the selection
pattern implied by the theory.
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Table 2.5: Rejection Regions
Pre-Migration Earnings
F (z|G1) ≤ F (z|G2) F (z|G1) ≤ F (z|G3)
Right of the Median Right of the Median
[0.5, 0.6] [0.5, 0.7] [0.5, 0.8] [0.5, 0.9] [0.5, 0.6] [0.5, 0.7] [0.5, 0.8] [0.5, 0.9]
{0.184} {0.134} {0.124} {0.096} {0.058} {0.066} {0.056} {0.044}
Left of the Median Left of the Median
[0.4, 0.5] [0.3, 0.5] [0.2, 0.5] [0.1, 0.5] [0.4, 0.5] [0.3, 0.5] [0.2, 0.5] [0.1, 0.5]
{0.104} {0.410} {0.416} {0.328} {0.250} {0.682} {0.658} {0.530}
Around the Median Around the Median
[0.4, 0.6] [0.3, 0.7] [0.2, 0.8] [0.1, 0.9] [0.4, 0.6] [0.3, 0.7] [0.2, 0.8] [0.1, 0.9]
{0.164} {0.336} {0.312} {0.300} {0.232} {0.654} {0.662} {0.536}
F (z|G1) ≤ F (z|G4) F (z|G1) ≤ F (z|G5)
Right of the Median Right of the Median
[0.5, 0.6] [0.5, 0.7] [0.5, 0.8] [0.5, 0.9] [0.5, 0.6] [0.5, 0.7] [0.5, 0.8] [0.5, 0.9]
{0.010} {0.068} {0.042} {0.030} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000}
Left of the Median Left of the Median
[0.4, 0.5] [0.3, 0.5] [0.2, 0.5] [0.1, 0.5] [0.4, 0.5] [0.3, 0.5] [0.2, 0.5] [0.1, 0.5]
{0.008} {0.076} {0.284} {0.506} {0.000} {0.000} {0.008} {0.112}
Around the Median Around the Median
[0.4, 0.6] [0.3, 0.7] [0.2, 0.8] [0.1, 0.9] [0.4, 0.6] [0.3, 0.7] [0.2, 0.8] [0.1, 0.9]
{0.006} {0.044} {0.254} {0.500} {0.000} {0.000} {0.008} {0.082}
Note: Bootstrap p-values from 500 replications in braces.
A relevant question is whether unobservable or observable characteristics drive
selection, as this is informative about transferability of observed and unobserved
skills. My estimates of selection on average wages in table 2.2 and 2.13 suggest that
both play a role, as controlling for observable characteristics reduces the extend of
selection but does not eliminate it completely.
To study selection on observables, in figure 2.5 I display analogous plots to the ones
I produced for pre-migration earnings but using pre-migration predicted earnings from
specification (2.12). Thus what I compare is the distribution of an index composed of
individual characteristics (sex, race, education, occupation and industry) weighted by
their returns at the national level. As in the case of pre-migration earnings, selection
increases with dispersion at destination. When I compare predicted earnings of those
moving to the least disperse location with those moving to the second least disperse
the null of non-dominance cannot be rejected at any point. For those moving to the
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third least disperse group there is a small region where the null can be rejected at
the 90% confidence level. This region gets enlarged when I compare those moving
to the second most disperse location and even further for those moving to the most
disperse location. For those that move into the most disperse location there is positive
selection from the 10% quantile up to, roughly, the 85%.
That selection in terms of observables follows the pattern implied by the theory
was already suggested by results in table 2.12, where I showed that those moving
to the most disperse location tend to be university graduates working in managerial
occupations. Results in figure 2.5 confirm the pattern.
Figure 2.5: Pre-Migration Predicted Earnings
(a) Group 2
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(b) Group 3
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration Pred of those moving into the least disperse
locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point, p-value of David-
son and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
Finally, the pattern of selection implied by the model is also observed in terms
of residual earnings. The distribution of residual earnings for those moving to the
least and second least disperse location are fairly similar. Rejection intervals are
small an discontinuous, although the p-value for the null of non-dominance drops
from about the median and up. This changes when I compare the distribution of
those moving to the third least disperse location group. For this sub-set of movers,
their residual earnings distribution dominates the distribution of movers to the least
disperse location from the 70% quantile and up. However, selection of those moving
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to the second most disperse location is at the middle of the residual distribution:
between the median and, roughly, the 85% quantile. For those moving to the most
disperse location group I can reject the null of non-dominance at the 95% level from
the 40 to 85% quantile, and at the 90% level from the 10% to the 85%.
As in the case of pre-migration and predicted earnings, the pattern of selection
implied by the Borjas model can be observed in residual earnings and it holds for the
whole sample (figure 2.6), those that are most likely to move due to labour motives
(figure 2.13), males (figure 2.14) and females (figure 2.15).
Figure 2.6: Pre-Migration Residuals
(a) Group 2
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(b) Group 3
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration Resid of those moving into the least disperse
locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point, p-value of David-
son and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
2.5 Conclusion
Since Borjas (1987) seminal paper on migrant selection, a sizeable part of the lit-
erature within migration economics has been dedicated to the study of immigrant
selection. Most of the existing literature testing the implications of the Borjas (1987)
model use a two-location model even in situations where immigrants may face a larger
choice set. I extend on the baseline Borjas model and include an arbitrary number
of competing locations. I show that, without imposing more structure than in the
baseline model, the theory still holds meaningful implications for the least and most
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disperse locations. For these, the extension implies that the earnings distribution of
migrants moving to the least (most) disperse location is dominated by (dominates) the
population distribution. For locations not ranked at the extremes, selection depends
on a combination of location specific average earnings and migration costs. Selec-
tion is, therefore, partially determined by the ranking of locations within the choice
set, instead of differences in dispersion between home and destination as typically
interpreted in the literature.
To provide empirical evidence, I use data from US interstate migration drawn
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. US internal migration is of
interest in its own right given that between one to four percent of the population move
states every year during my period of study. But, most importantly, the use of within
country migration implies that there are no border constraints and that individuals
remain under scope when they move. The absence of border constraints is critical to
test the model, as often times countries put in place skill-based border schemes that
will contaminate the underlying selection mechanism. Furthermore, that movers stay
within scope improves representativeness of the data for migrants and allows me to
observe measures of worker skill before they actually move.
I show that positive selection on average wages increases with earnings dispersion
of the destination state, and is stronger for those leaving from a state with large
earnings dispersion. These two patterns are predicted by the model. Moreover, given
that the implications of my extension are expressed in terms of stochastic dominance
relations, providing a stronger test for selection than averages, I test whether these
dominance relations are observed in the data. For this, I rank all states according to
their earnings dispersion and use Davidson and Duclos (2013) restricted stochastic
dominance test. I find that the distribution of pre-migration earnings of those moving
to the least disperse locations never dominates the distribution of movers to other
locations and is dominated by those moving to the most disperse location. This is
the pattern implied by the model and is driven by both observables, measured using
predicted earnings as a function of education, occupation, industry, sex and ethnicity;
and unobservables, measured with residual earnings. Furthermore, the pattern holds
for males, females and those between 25-55 years old that, I show, are the ones most
likely to move due to labour market motives.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 SIPP and CPS moving rates
To make SIPP migration rates comparable with CPS I apply a procedure similar to
the one applied in Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017). I compare the state FIPS
code in the first interview month with the FIPS code in the same month a year after,
if these differ then the individual is classified as a migrant. Due to the rotational
design of SIPP there are months in which some rotation groups are not interviewed
and I drop them. Additionally, due to the overlapping design in place until panel
1996, there might be years with observations from two panels. If that happens I
take the average of the two. I follow the same steps for subsequent years. Note that
individuals who move and return to the initial location within a given observational
year are classified as non-migrants. Finally, I perform the sample selection on the
date the migrant identifier is assigned, i.e. end of the observational year, making the
sample selection comparable with the one I perform on the CPS data.
2.6.2 Changes on Recorded Information
Across SIPP panels there are different changes on which and how information is
recorded. For those variables that I have found differences I proceed as follows.
Birth place
The universe for asking about birthplace in panels 1986-1993 are those 15 and older
who have moved at some point. For 1985 and 1996 onwards the universe are those 15
and older independently of whether they have moved or not. For individuals in panels
prior to 1996, other than 1985, that appear as not in universe I assign as birth location
the state identifier at the time of the interview asking migration history questions,
this is typically the reference month of the second wave. For panels 1985 and 1996
onwards there is no change to be made as I have selected into my sample only those
who are 18-64. Even with this imputation some observations still have missing birth
place.
State of Residence Identifiers
To protect confidentiality, some states with small sample sizes are grouped together
in some panels
Table 2.6: State Groups Across Panels
State Grouping Panels
Maine, Vermont 1985-2001
North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming 1996-2001
Alaska,Idaho,Montana,Wyoming 1985-1993
Iowa,North Dakota,South Dakota 1985-1993
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Highest Education Attained
For panels 84 to 93 there is no variable directly recording highest education attained.
I use information given by HIGRADE: What is the highest grade or year of regu-
lar school this person attended? and GRDCMPL: Did he/she complete that grade
(HIGRADE)?.17 If the grade is not completed then I assign the immediate lower
education level. The educational classification provided in panels 1984 to 1993 is
Table 2.7: Highest grade or year of regular school 1984-1993
Label Value Re-Coded
Under 15, did not attend or 0 0
attended only kindergarten
Elementary 1-8 1
High School 9-12 2
College 21-26 3
Later panels, 1996-2008, provide a more detailed disaggregation. To make both
comparable, I aggregate the educational groups provided in panels 1996 to 2008. For
this I follow the school level organization given in U.S. Department of Education
(2008) and apply the following criteria:18
17Variable’s names suffer modifications across panels. These refer to the 1993 panel.
18Labels for the re-coded values are given in table 2.7
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Table 2.8: Highest degree received or grade completed 1996-2008
Label Value Re-Coded
Under 15 -1 0
Less Than 1st Grade 31 0
1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th grade 32 0
5th Or 6th Grade 33 1
7th Or 8th Grade 34 1
9th Grade 35 1
10th Grade 36 1
11th Grade 37 1
12th grade, no diploma 38 1
High School Graduate 39 2
(diploma or GED or equivalent)
Some college, but no degree 40 2
Diploma or certificate from a vocational, 41 2
technical, trade or business school beyond high school
Associate degree in college* 42 3
(occupational/vocational program)
Associate (2-yr) college degree 43 3
(academic degree)
Bachelor’s degree 44 3
(e.g. BA, AB, BS)
Master’s degree 45 3
(e.g. MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA)
Professional School degree 46 3
(e.g. MD(doctor), DDS(dentist), JD(lawyer))
Doctorate degree 47 3
*In panels 2004 and 2008, 42 is merged into 43
Race
How race is recorded also varies across panels. I homogenize this characteristic by
creating three broad groups White, Black, and Other.
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Table 2.9: Race
2004-2008 1984-2001 Re-Coded
Label Value Label Value Label Value
White alone 1 White 1 White 1
Black alone 2 Black 2 Black 2
Asian alone 3 Asian or 4 Other 3
Pacific Islander
Residual 4 American Indian, 3
Eskimo or Aleut
2.6.3 Table Appendix
Table 2.10: Moving Reason by Type of Move
(Current Population Survey)
Between States Within State Difference Total
Family reasons 0.279 0.250 0.029***
{8045} {6719} {1326} 16090
New job or job transfer 0.162 0.324 -0.163***
{4663} {8722} {-4059} 9326
To look for work or lost job 0.029 0.057 -0.028***
{830} {1526} {-696} 1660
For easier commute 0.085 0.031 0.054***
{2442} {824} {1618} 4884
Retired 0.002 0.005 -0.002***
{66} {128} {-62} 132
Other job-related reason 0.023 0.038 -0.015***
{656} {1028} {-372} 1312
Housing reasons 0.354 0.199 0.155***
{10216} {5346} {4870} 20432
Other reasons 0.068 0.097 -0.029***
{1949} {2604} {-655} 3898
Total 28867 26897 1970 57734
Note: 1984-2013 CPS data, excluding 1995. Those that move between states or within state across
counties only. Significance symbols for two-sided differences in proportions: + p < .1, * p < .05, **
p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 2.11: Industry Transitions of Movers
(Row Proportions)
Current Industry
Previous Industry Agriculture Construction Finance Manufacturing Mining Public Administration Services Trade Transportation
Agriculture 0.760 0.031 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.010 0.125 0.031 0.000
Construction 0.005 0.853 0.005 0.029 0.005 0.010 0.034 0.045 0.013
Finance 0.002 0.004 0.886 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.029 0.011
Manufacturing 0.005 0.013 0.008 0.864 0.000 0.001 0.057 0.041 0.012
Mining 0.027 0.054 0.000 0.054 0.838 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000
Public Administration 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.877 0.044 0.022 0.022
Services 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.000 0.006 0.911 0.040 0.008
Trade 0.004 0.015 0.010 0.030 0.001 0.002 0.069 0.852 0.017
Transportation 0.000 0.007 0.005 0.020 0.000 0.004 0.054 0.039 0.871
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Table 2.12: Differences in Characteristics
Across Destination Dispersion
G2 G3 G4 G5
Education
No-Education -0.344 -0.190 -0.394. -0.427.
(0.288) (0.324) (0.212) (0.258)
Below High-School 1.080 -0.470 -1.956. -2.026*
(0.955) (1.114) (1.091) (1.018)
High School 0.437 -0.309 0.956 -9.361***
(2.298) (1.999) (1.669) (2.120)
Degree -1.174 0.968 1.394 11.814***
(2.244) (2.339) (1.927) (2.441)
Sex
Male 1.946 2.275 1.588 0.947
(1.445) (1.450) (1.269) (1.288)
Ethnicity
White -1.205 -1.806 -0.887 -2.331.
(1.091) (1.141) (1.360) (1.207)
Black 1.129 1.842* 1.062 1.952.
(0.954) (0.913) (1.050) (1.089)
Aisan 0.436 0.315 -0.421 -0.066
(0.501) (0.523) (0.515) (0.558)
Other -0.361 -0.351 0.246 0.445
(0.296) (0.338) (0.368) (0.319)
Occupation
Managers -1.549 1.463 1.000 8.128***
(1.814) (1.982) (1.612) (1.723)
High/Med. Skilled 0.942 -1.406 0.746 -1.719
(1.953) (2.025) (1.981) (1.819)
Low Skilled 0.631 0.351 -1.258 -5.455***
(1.704) (1.538) (1.368) (1.381)
Farm Workers -0.024 -0.408 -0.488 -0.954**
(0.377) (0.309) (0.311) (0.303)
Note: Differences in proportion with respect to least disperse location group.
Clustered standard errors by previous state in paranthesis. Characteristics
measured at last observation before migration. p < .1 ., p < .05 *, p < .01
**, p < .001 ***
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Table 2.13: Wages and Dispersion Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
G2 0.010 -0.001 -0.003 0.006 0.012
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026)
G3 0.029 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.020
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030)
G4 0.038 0.029 0.029 0.025 0.026
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023)
G5 0.116*** 0.109** 0.110*** 0.063* 0.047.
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.025)
Fixed Effects
Sex N Y Y Y Y
Ethnicity N N Y Y Y
Education N N N Y Y
Industry N N N N Y
Occupation N N N N Y
Obs. 11632 11632 11632 11632 11632
Note: Differences in wages with respect to least disperse location group. All
columns include fixed effects for previous state, year and their interaction. Clus-
tered standard errors by previous state in paranthesis. Characteristics measured
at last observation before migration. p < .1 ., p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 ***
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2.6.4 Figure Appendix
Figure 2.7: Pre-Migration Earnings CDF
25-55 Year Old
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(b) Group 3
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration earnings of those moving into the least dis-
perse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point, p-value of
Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Figure 2.8: Pre-Migration Earnings CDF
Males
(a) Group 2
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(b) Group 3
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration earnings of those moving into the least dis-
perse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point, p-value of
Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Figure 2.9: Pre-Migration Earnings CDF
Females
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(b) Group 3
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration earnings of those moving into the least dis-
perse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point, p-value of
Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Figure 2.10: Pre-Migration Predicted Earnings
25-55 Year Old
(a) Group 2
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration predicted earnings of those moving into the
least disperse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point,
p-value of Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Figure 2.11: Pre-Migration Predicted Earnings
Males
(a) Group 2
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration predicted earnings of those moving into the
least disperse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point,
p-value of Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Figure 2.12: Pre-Migration Predicted Earnings
Females
(a) Group 2
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration predicted earnings of those moving into the
least disperse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point,
p-value of Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Figure 2.13: Pre-Migration Residuals
25-55 Year Old
(a) Group 2
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(b) Group 3
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration standardized residuals of those moving into
the least disperse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point,
p-value of Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Figure 2.14: Pre-Migration Residuals
Males
(a) Group 2
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(b) Group 3
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration standardized residuals of those moving into
the least disperse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point,
p-value of Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Figure 2.15: Pre-Migration Residuals
Females
(a) Group 2
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(b) Group 3
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(c) Group 4
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(d) Group 5
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Notes: Red dashed line is the CDF of pre-migration standardized residuals of those moving into
the least disperse locations. The black line is the point-by-point bootstrap, 500 replications per point,
p-value of Davidson and Duclos (2013) stochastic dominance test. Dashed grey line at .05
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Immigration and Labour
Productivity:
Evidence from the UK
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Abstract
Understanding the effects of immigrants in their receiving economies is a main issue
in the labour economics literature and the agenda of policymakers. This is specially
true for the UK where immigrant labour shares have more than doubled over the
last 15 years. Using data from the UK Labour Force Survey and regional accounts,
I investigate the effect of immigrants on a relatively unexplored margin, labour pro-
ductivity. I show that immigration has a positive effect on output per worker. A ten
percentage point increase on immigrant relative supply increases output per worker
by a 6.7%. This reduced form effect is composed of differences in marginal returns to
immigrant labour and the effect of immigrants on capital, native augmenting tech-
nologies, native labour and native skill distribution. I show that immigrants have
a positive effect on capital stocks, native labour and skills of natives. Nonetheless,
the positive effect of immigrants on labour productivity goes beyond effects on these
inputs. In this direction, comparison of two alternative production function esti-
mates, one of them allowing for endogenous native augmenting technologies, suggest
that immigrants trigger the development of technologies that complement migrant
labour.
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Chapter 3. Immigration and Labour Productivity:
Evidence from the UK
3.1 Introduction
With immigrant labour shares more than doubling over the last 15 years, immigration
is a central issue in the UK. This has motivated the rise of a rich literature that studies
the effect of immigration in various aspects of the British economy. For example,
the literature has studied the effect of immigrants on the labour market (Dustmann,
Fabbri, et al. 2005; Dustmann, Frattini, et al. 2013; Hatton and Tani 2005; Manacorda
et al. 2012; Wadsworth 2010), public services (Preston 2014; Wadsworth 2013) and
attitudes towards migrants (Dustmann and Preston 2007; Viskanic 2017). However,
there is little evidence on the effect of immigrants on native labour productivity.
The scarcity of evidence on the effect of immigrants on labour productivity con-
trasts with the centrality that both have for British policymakers. For example, the
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has noted the im-
portance of promoting productivity on ”raising living standards, providing funds to
support ...public services and improving the quality of life for all ...citizens” (BEIS
2017, p. 6). Going further, the British Home Office links immigration and produc-
tivity as it has made clear its intention to put forward an immigration system that
promotes productivity(Home Office 2018).1
I contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the effect of immigrant
labour on aggregate production and labour productivity in the UK. To produce ev-
idence, I combine data from the UK Labour Force Survey with regional accounts
provided by the Office for National Statistics. Combining data from these sources, I
create a panel of output, employment and capital stocks across regions and industries
from 1998 to 2014. With these data, I estimate reduced-form effects of immigrants
on labour productivity.
A common concern when studying immigrant effects is that changes in immigrant
stocks and flows are likely endogenous (e.g. Altonji and Card 1991; Card 1990, 2001;
Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright 2018; Peri 2012). In my set-up, it is likely that economic
shocks jointly determine production levels and demand for immigrant and native
labour. If these shocks don’t produce parallel effects on immigrant and native labour,
for example, because of different responses of native and foreign workers (Dustmann,
Glitz, et al. 2010), they will generate an endogenous relative supply of immigrant
labour. Or, equivalently, a spurious correlation between immigrant-native labour
ratios and labour productivity. I follow a well-established tradition in migration
economics (e.g Bell et al. 2013; Dustmann, Frattini, et al. 2013; Ottaviano, Peri, and
Wright 2018; Peri 2012) and use previous settlement of immigrants to instrument
current stocks.
Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (1990) pioneered using past immigrant settle-
ment as an instrument. The relevance of this instrument is supported by evidence
1Another signal of the policy relevance of the effect I explore, is that this paper originates from
a Migration Advisory Committee commission to investigate the effect of immigrants on labour pro-
ductivity. This commission fitted more broadly as part of Government consultancy to the Migration
Advisory Committee in the context of the UK leaving the EU.
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showing that immigrants locate in areas where workers from their country of origin
are located (see Bauer et al. 2007; Jaeger 2007; Munshi 2003). However, the instru-
ment isn’t free of validity concerns. Borjas (2014, p. 86) notes that past settlement
of immigrants may respond to economic incentives at the time, implying that serial
correlation in economic conditions may render the instrument invalid. In this line,
Cadena and Kovak (2016) and Jaeger (2007) show that immigrants respond to eco-
nomic incentives, making serial correlation a threat to validity. I address this concern
in two ways. First, I use previous stocks of immigrant labour at the industry-region
level measured ten years before the starting of my estimation sample. If the corre-
lation process is stationary, dependence on past conditions will vanish as time goes
on. Second, in combination with the instrument, I introduce a comprehensive set
of region, industry and year fixed effects. With these fixed effects, in my preferred
specification, identification comes from variation within industry and region across
time. Causal interpretation, therefore, relies on shocks within industry-region not
being strongly serially correlated.2 This is possible because I project past immigrant
stocks at the industry and region level using national level growth, what gives me
variation in the instrument within industry and region. Using this empirical strategy,
I find that a ten percentage point increase in the relative supply of immigrant labour
produces a 6.7% increase in output per worker. When evaluated at the average labour
productivity, this implies a £5,600 increase in annual output per worker.
To better understand what the reduced form estimate actually estimates, I intro-
duce a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. This technol-
ogy produces output combining immigrant and native labour and these two inputs
may have different productivity levels and constant, but otherwise unconstrained,
elasticity of substitution. In the short run, the reduced form effect of immigrants
on output depends on the relative supply of immigrant labour, its marginal product
and the effect on native labour. This, therefore, calls for caution when extrapolat-
ing reduced-form estimates from other countries or even other periods and levels of
aggregation, as they depend on the distribution of immigrant and native labour.
Once one moves from the short run, immigrants can also influence output through
changes induced in other inputs, as, for example, the skill distribution of natives (Hunt
2017; Llull 2017), development of new technologies (Peri, Shih, et al. 2015) or the
accumulation of capital. I use the CES framework to decompose the reduced form
effect estimate of immigration on output. Using data on capital stocks and skill
distribution of natives, I show that immigrants have a positive effect on both.3
2Here not being strongly correlated means that recovery from industry-region specific shocks
must take, at most, ten years.
3The positive effect of immigration on the skill distribution of native workers is consistent with
evidence for the UK in Dustmann, Frattini, et al. (2013) showing that immigrants depress the wages
of natives at the bottom of the wage distribution and have a positive effect at the top. Given that
low-skilled workers tend to be at the bottom of the wage distribution, the evidence in Dustmann,
Frattini, et al. (2013) suggests that immigration may alter incentives to accumulate skill. This is
also consistent with evidence from the US in Hunt (2017) who shows that immigrants have a positive
effect on the educational achievement of natives, with a stronger effect for children of low-educated
parents.
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The effect of immigrants on output through technologies that complement native
labour is more complex to study. This is because these technologies are typically not
observed. Instead of directly studying the effect of immigrants on native augmenting
technologies, I provide suggestive indirect evidence. Using my decomposition of the
reduced form effect I show that, for a wide range of production function parameters,
the evidence I produce is consistent with immigrants triggering the development of
technologies that complement them. This is consistent with the endogenous techno-
logical change framework developed by Acemoglu (1998, 2002) showing that, when
inputs are gross substitutes, increasing the relative supply of one input creates in-
centives to develop technologies that complement it. The literature (Manacorda et
al. 2012; Ottaviano and Peri 2012) provides evidence of gross substitution between
immigrant and native labour. Although available estimates are not free of concern
(see Dustmann and Preston 2012; Dustmann, Scho¨nberg, et al. 2016), the general
understanding is that available substitution estimates are underestimated.
Other than through the reduced-form decomposition, I produce further suggestive
evidence for the effect of immigrants on native augmenting technologies by comparing
production function and reduced form estimates. To start with, I estimate the CES
production function restricting native augmenting technologies to be constant. This
estimate produces a marginal effect of immigrants on labour productivity that is
only positive when allowing effects on capital stocks. This is not consistent with my
reduced form estimates controlling for capital stocks, as they show that, controlling
for capital and native skill supply, there is, still, a positive and significant effect of
immigrants on labour supply. Specifically, rising immigrant relative supply by ten
percentage points increase labour productivity by 5%. Therefore, it suggests that the
production function is misspecified and that native labour augmenting technologies
depend on relative immigrant supply. This is further supported by my comparison
of the structural estimates with alternative production function estimates using a
polynomial approximation. Where the latter is compatible with Acemoglu (1998,
2002) endogenous input augmenting technologies. The polynomial approximation
produces marginal effects that are positive and always larger than their structural
counterparts. Therefore, it further suggests that immigrants trigger the development
of technologies that complement them. However, this piece of evidence should be
taken with caution, as the null of equality of marginal effects can only be rejected for
a small set of points.
In terms of existing literature, my work closely relates to research in Boubtane et
al. (2016), Ortega and Peri (2014), and Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2018). Boubtane
et al. (2016) and Ortega and Peri (2014) provide cross-country evidence, including
the UK, showing that immigration has a positive effect on labour productivity. I
add to their work in that I exploit variation across industries and regions within the
UK. This implies that my estimates are representative for the UK, what is important
given that reduced-form estimates depend on the precise input mix and this varies
across countries, regions and industries.
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Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2018) investigate the effect of immigration on British
service firms, showing that immigration has a positive effect on labour productivity.
The effect of immigration on the service sector can be quite different from the average
effect of immigration on aggregate labour productivity. For example, Ottaviano, Peri,
and Wright (2018) highlight the possible role of immigrants on providing knowledge
or connections with their home country and the impact this may have when selling
services that are country specific, such as economic consultancy. Nonetheless, these
knowledge and connections might be of lesser importance for industries producing
goods that do not strongly dependent on the market of destination or focus on the
interior market. My research, therefore, adds to Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2018)
in that my estimates reflect the average effect of immigrants on output and labour
productivity across the whole British economy.
More broadly my research relates to work for the US in Ottaviano and Peri (2006)
and Peri (2012) showing that immigration has a positive impact on labour produc-
tivity. Peri (2012) exploits a shift-share instrument and distance from the Mexico-US
border to estimate the effect of immigrants on various components of an output de-
composition using a CES technology combining high a low skilled labour. He reports
a positive effect in total factor productivity and the adoption technologies that aug-
ment the productivity of low-skilled labour. Ottaviano and Peri (2006), on the other
hand, explore the effect of diversity across American cities on wages and rents. They
provide evidence showing that increasing diversity has a positive effect on both wages
and rents, and argue that these are consistent with a positive effect on the productiv-
ity of natives. I add to Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Peri (2012) in that my baseline
estimates do not depend on any assumed functional for the production function nor
on assumptions about how wages, and rents, are set.
Finally, through estimation of the parameters of the production function, I also
contribute to the literature estimating elasticities of substitution between immigrant
and native labour (Card 2009; Manacorda et al. 2012; Ottaviano and Peri 2012).
My main contribution to this literature is that my estimates are robust to gaps
between contribution to production and labour remuneration. This is because I do
not maintain any assumption about how wages are set. This generalization is relevant
as a large body of evidence in the UK (Dustmann, Frattini, et al. 2013; Dustmann,
Scho¨nberg, et al. 2016) and elsewhere (Aydemir and Skuterud 2008; Eckstein and
Weiss 2004; Izquierdo et al. 2009) shows that immigrants earn lower wages than
comparable natives.4 My elasticity point estimates are between 2.6-6.1. This covers
estimates for the UK in Manacorda et al. (2012) and is below US estimates in Card
(2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012). However, it should be noted that I cannot
reject a null of perfect substitution.
4Dustmann and Preston (2012) and Dustmann, Scho¨nberg, et al. (2016) show how immigrant
downgrading can bias elasticity estimates obtained from wage differentials across education cells.
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3.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
I obtain measures of immigrant and native labour from the UK Labour Force Survey
(LFS). The LFS is the largest household survey in the UK and it is the source for
official measures of employment produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).
Initially implemented in 1973, the LFS started as a biennial survey, becoming annual
in 1984 and quarterly from 1992 onwards.
Since its introduction, LFS respondents are asked about a number of socio-
economic characteristics, including country of birth, employment status, region of
work, occupation and industry. This allows obtaining employment measures at dif-
ferent levels of detail and has made the LFS a popular survey to study the effect of
immigration on the British labour market (Dustmann, Fabbri, et al. 2005; Dustmann,
Frattini, et al. 2013; Manacorda et al. 2012; Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright 2018).
In my analysis, I combine data from all quarters between 1998 to 2014 to compute
average annual employment by immigrant status, region of work, occupation and
industry. In most of my analysis I define employment as worker headcount. However,
in section 3.3, I show that may main results are robust if I measure employment as
total hours of work and use predicted wages to weight the headcount measure.
Following existing literature on the effect of immigration on the British economy,5
I classify workers into native and immigrant status according to workers’ country of
birth. I start by classifying workers into nine groups: UK born, Irish, EU pre-2004
(excluding Irish), Eastern European, other European Economic Area, Asian, North
American or Caribbean, African and Other. From these nine groups I define natives
(UK born and Irish) and immigrants (all others).6 Once I classify workers according
to their country of birth, I use regions and industries to define markets as a region-
industry pair and aggregate total immigrant and native labour for each market. The
resulting sample of employment figures comprises thirty-one industries (table 3.6) in
each of the twelve regions used by the ONS, including Northern Ireland, Scotland
and Wales (figure 3.1), from 1998 to 2014.7 To this sample of employment, I add
my outcome of interest, gross domestic product, from ONS production side regional
figures covering the same period.8
Finally, to compute capital stocks I use ONS regional gross fixed capital formation
data covering the period 2000 to 2014. Because the available regional gross fixed
capital formation data is aggregated into eleven industry groups, I impute the regional
gross fixed capital formation from these groups into the thirty-one industries in the
employment data by using national level gross fixed capital formation. Specifically,
I impute gross fixed capital formation and compute capital stocks as follows. From
national gross fixed capital formation I obtain the proportional contribution of each
industry in each group and use these to allocate regional gross fixed capital formation
5For example, Bell et al. (2013), Dustmann, Fabbri, et al. (2005), Dustmann, Frattini, et al.
(2013), Manacorda et al. (2012), and Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2018)
6I classify Irish as natives due to their geographical proximity and historical ties.
7I disregard all employment from activities of households and extraterritorial organizations.
8All in 2013 pounds.
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figures across the thirty-one industries. After this, I compute initial capital stocks
in 1999 from national data assuming that industries across different regions operate
at the same capital-employment ratio. I combine the initial capital stock, the gross
fixed capital formation figures and national level depreciation rates to compute stocks
from 2000 onwards as previous capital stock plus current capital formation minus
consumption of capital. With this I produce capital stock figures for every market,
i.e. region-industry, for the period 2000-2014 that I add to the employment and
output dataset. The resulting dataset is a panel of markets for which I annually
observe the number of immigrant and native workers, output and capital stocks.
3.2.1 Descriptives
Most of the variation on immigrant employment happens across regions. London has,
by a large margin, the largest immigrant concentration. In 1998, in the LFS sample,
for every four native workers in London there was a foreign born worker. This is
well above the national average at fifteen natives per immigrant worker. Over the
period 1998-2014, immigrant-native ratios have been increasing in all UK regions.
This increase has been fairly even across regions over time, with persistently large
immigrant-native ratios in London and neighbouring regions, particularly the South-
East (see figure 3.1). Having said this, with an average annual growth of 8.5% and
11%, Northern Ireland and Scotland have been the UK regions with the largest growth
rate of immigrant relative labour supply. On the other side of the spectrum, London
with an average annual growth of 5% and Wales with 6% are the UK regions that have
experienced the smallest average annual growth. However, London has experienced,
by far, the largest year-to-year variation in terms of levels of workers. On average
around 60,000 additional immigrant workers entered the London labour force every
year between 1998-2014. That is 120% larger than in the South East of England, the
region with the second largest year-to-year variation, and sixteen times larger than in
Northern Ireland, the region with the smallest year-to-year level variation. Despite
this, immigrant geographical concentration has diminished over time. In 1998, 42% of
the total immigrant work force was concentrated in London. By 2014 this proportion
decreased to 34.6% of the immigrant workforce and most other regions experienced
an increase in their shares of the total immigrant workforce. Measuring immigrant
concentration across regions using the Gini index returns a measure of .55 in 1998,
declining to .47 by 2010, and stable thereafter.
The regional distribution of output per worker has some similarities with the
distribution of immigrant labour (figure 3.1). With annual average output per worker
at £83,283, London has a worker productivity 33% larger than the South East of
England and 90% larger than Wales, the regions with the second largest and the
smallest worker productivity. These regional differences have been stable across time.
For example, measuring regional inequality across time using the Gini index returns
an index that is always around .1 and has no clear time trend. Thus the UK presents
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larger regional inequality in terms of immigrant labour distribution than in terms of
output per worker and both have followed different time trends.
It is well known (e.g. Blundell et al. 2014; Pessoa and Van Reenen 2014) that
output productivity in the UK has stagnated since the beginning of the Great Reces-
sion. However, the picture across regions is heterogeneous. Output per worker was
growing in London between 1998 and 2007, rapidly decreasing between 2007 and 2009
and stagnant from then onwards. A similar pattern holds for the East of England,
Northern Ireland and Yorkshire and The Humber. But output per worker stagnation
seems to precede the Great Recession in most other regions (figure 3.4).
Figure 3.1: Regional Differences and Evolution
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In comparison with differences across regions, variation on immigrant labour rel-
ative supply across industries is less pronounced. Immigrant relative supply across
broad industrial groups range from, roughly, ten native workers per immigrant in
electricity and water supply to five natives per immigrant in manufacturing. This is
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shown in the first panel of table 3.1, where I use I to refer to immigrant labour and N
for native. With the exception of extractive industries, immigrant relative supply is
also homogeneous across industries and occupations (third and fourth panel in table
3.1.9 Although immigrants are, at least marginally, over-represented in high skilled
occupations in all industry groups except for manufacturing and services.
In terms of output per worker, differences across industries are larger than differ-
ences across regions. Average output per worker in real estate is at £858,646, this is
£725,349 per worker higher than in Electricity and Water Supply, the industry group
with the second highest worker productivity. However, as with regions, differences in
labour productivity across industries have decreased over time. For example, in 1998
output per worker in real estate was 4 times higher than in electricity, gas and and
air-conditioning supply; and 40 times higher than labour productivity in manufactur-
ing of textiles.10 The same figures reduce to 3 and 13 times in 2014. This reduction
in differences on labour productivity across industries was fully general, as indicated
by the Gini index declining from 0.55 in 1998 to 0.38 from 2012 onwards.
9I classify workers in one of the occupational groups by mapping four digit occupations into
National Qualification Framework levels. High skilled occupations correspond, roughly, to a bachelors
degree or higher. The occupational mapping was provided by the Migration Advisory Committee.
10Electricity, gas and and air-conditioning supply is included inside Electricity and Water Supply
in table 3.1. Textile manufacturing is included inside Manufactures.
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Table 3.1: Native-Immigrant Labour and Output
(Means and Standard Deviations, all in thousands)
Total Extractive Manufactures Eletricity and Water Supply Services Real Estate
I 7.810 1.395 2.669 1.343 15.332 2.318
{16.516} {1.826} {2.928} {1.440} {23.258} {3.750}
N 59.558 14.271 19.508 12.896 116.940 15.793
{75.123} {11.687} {15.409} {6.096} {86.457} {9.990}
I/N 0.147 0.129 0.180 0.108 0.125 0.112
{0.220} {0.215} {0.260} {0.129} {0.186} {0.113}
High Skilled Occupations
I 2.322 0.392 0.606 0.381 4.773 0.424
{6.920} {0.854} {0.827} {0.565} {10.135} {0.977}
N 15.600 1.583 4.547 2.908 31.701 2.752
{26.650} {2.365} {3.795} {1.824} {35.013} {2.137}
I/N 0.155 0.307 0.168 0.145 0.121 0.132
{0.494} {1.637} {0.352} {0.335} {0.163} {0.259}
Medium/Low Skilled Occupations
I 5.488 1.003 2.063 0.962 10.559 1.895
{11.936} {1.416} {2.510} {1.143} {16.944} {2.905}
N 43.958 12.688 14.961 9.989 85.239 13.042
{57.013} {11.023} {12.449} {4.898} {67.917} {8.192}
I/N 0.152 0.127 0.195 0.102 0.123 0.113
{0.296} {0.301} {0.385} {0.128} {0.201} {0.118}
Output per Worker
Native 94.747 57.460 65.969 147.649 55.210 949.631
{183.727} {33.667} {77.185} {87.201} {27.854} {412.327}
All 83.831 52.752 56.807 133.297 48.302 858.646
{166.970} {32.516} {74.169} {77.526} {19.056} {374.361}
Note: Pooled Sample. Extractive includes Agriculture, Mining and Quarrying. Standard deviations in braces.
3.2.2 Empirical Strategy
The existence of persistent differences on immigrant mix and output across markets
points towards fixed market-specific unobserved characteristics. Such unobserved
characteristics might attract inputs either from other markets or outside the UK
leading to endogenous input mix. As a naive example, if one compares output and
immigrant-native ratios in London and Wales, would arrive to the conclusion that
immigration has a positive impact on output and labour productivity. Nonetheless,
it is not hard to imagine that agglomeration economies (Ottaviano and Puga 1998)
might boost production at the same time that reduce the cost of immigration, for
example through lower transportation costs or denser immigration networks.
Accounting for fixed unobserved heterogeneity, therefore, is an important part
of the analysis in section 3.3. In my analysis, my first step is estimation of the
reduced form effect of immigrant-native mix on output, section 3.3. To see where my
identifying variation comes from let ymt be (log-)output in market m and period t.
My interest is on estimation of the output semi-elasticity (β) in the following equation
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ymt = β
Imt
Nmt
+ τm + νti(m) + ωtr(m) + mt (3.1)
Where i(m) and r(m) are the industry and region of the mth market and τ , ν
and ω are market, year-industry and year-region fixed effect. Estimation of (3.1)
with a fixed effect estimator implies that β is identified from within market variation
across time. Market fixed characteristics and time varying shocks at the industry
and region level are differenced out, implying that causal interpretation of the fixed
effect estimate of β from an equation like (3.1) relies on immigrant-native mix being
uncorrelated with industry-region-year specific shocks. In table 3.8, I display market
transitions from Understanding Society data.11 From year to year, 7.6% of natives
and 9.5% of immigrants change market, i.e. they change either industry, region or
both. Among those that move markets, the vast majority, above 80%, only change
industry. For both natives and immigrants around 4% of those that change industry
or region change both at the same time. This suggest that labour has a higher
mobility response to industry rather than region shocks. Nonetheless, the fact that
some workers change region and industry simultaneously means that there can be
endogenous responses to industry-region specific shocks. To deal with this source
of endogeneity I use the shift-share instrument pioneered in the migration literature
by Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001) and widely applied since then (for UK
examples see Bell et al. 2013; Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright 2018). The rationality
behind this instrument comes through the effect of networks, where workers that are
already settled in the receiving market provide connections to newcomers shifting
their moving costs.
To create the instrument, I use the annual LFS from 1985-1988 to compute the av-
erage stock of immigrants from each of nine country-regions of origin in each market.
By measuring the stock of immigrants ten years before the start of my period of anal-
ysis I aim to obtain variation that is independent from current economic conditions.
In this sense, in my set-up, validity of the instrument relies on industry-region-time
specific shocks not being strongly serially correlated, as all other region, industry,
market (i.e. region-industry), region-year and industry-year shocks are captured by
the fixed effects.
Once I have past employment stocks, I project them into the current year us-
ing employment growth from every country of birth at the national level. When
computing national growth employment, I produce a different growth figure for each
market. These differences across markets come from me leaving out employment
from the market on which I’m going to use the growth figure to project employment.
I use this leave-out projection to address validity threats derived from computing
projections that include own employment. This is because it could be the case that
11The LFS has a longitudinal dimension but is more limited in terms of temporal span and limits
the available information due to anonymity concerns.
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immigration from some country is driven by demand forces in a particular market,12
therefore, challenging the exogeneity requirement of the instrument. This would be
the case even if the base employment is independent from current economic conditions
(Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. 2017).
The combination of the leave-out projection and market specific settlement gives
me variation on the instrument across years within market. This variation is crucial
to identify the semi-elasticity (β) in (3.1) with the full set of fixed effects. Otherwise,
variation would be only at the market level and this is absorbed by market fixed
effects.
Finally, the aggregation of survey data into narrow markets may lead to measure-
ment error on the market’s employment measures and, thus, on the immigrant-native
mix.13 In the context of immigration wage effects, Aydemir and Borjas (2011) have
shown that attenuation does play a role when using aggregate figures and that its
impact grows fast as underlying sample sizes decrease. In a linear-on-parameters set-
up, as in (3.1), the IV estimator deals with both the endogeneity and attenuation
bias problem.
3.3 Immigrant Labour and Output
Here I present reduced form estimates of the effect of immigration on output. Ta-
ble 3.2 displays estimates from specification (3.1) where I progress from a baseline
specification that includes region, industry and time fixed effects, into a more com-
prehensive specification with market (region-industry), industry-year and region-year
fixed effects. Identifying variation for the parameter of interest is at the market level,
so all tables provide market clustered standard errors.
The left half of table 3.2 displays OLS estimates both without (columns (1) and
(2)) and with controls for total employment ((3) and (4)). All of the OLS estimates
show a negative, typically non-significant, effect of immigration on output that re-
duces in size when I include the interacted fixed effects. On the other hand, the IV
estimates on the right half of table 3.2, show a positive and significant effect. With
the full set of fixed effects, the IV estimates show that a ten percentage points in-
crease on immigrant relative supply increases output by a 9.8%. If evaluated at the
averages in table 3.1, it implies that an increase of 596 immigrant workers, i.e. a 7.6%
increase on the average immigrant stock, leads to a .98% increase on output. This
7.6% increase on immigrant employment is, roughly, equivalent to the annual growth
rate of the average immigrant stock observed between 1998 and 2014, see figure 3.6.
That increasing immigration increases output is unsurprising. This is because
increasing the relative supply of immigrant labour increases the stock of productive
12For example, during the 60s-70s Pakistani workers were driven into particular areas of UK by
the textile sector,(Finney and Simpson 2009, chapter 3).
13See figure 3.5 where I compare my LFS employment measures with employment from Workforce
Jobs. Workforce Jobs combines data from employers’ surveys, the LFS and administrative sources.
However, it cannot be used directly for my analysis as no information on nationality or country of
birth is provided.
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inputs as long as immigrants do not substitute native labour one-to-one and do not
crowd-out capital accumulation. Therefore, a more interesting question to explore in
the data is whether rising the relative supply of immigrants while keeping total labour
constant increases production. Thus, in columns (7) and (8) of table 3.2, I control
for (log-)total employment. The inclusion of (log-)total employment (log(I +N)) as
an additional control introduces an additional endogenous variable that I instrument
with the log of projected past employment. Both instruments, for immigrant relative
supply and total employment, exploit similar variation on past employment. Thus,
it is not surprising that the first stage becomes weaker. Nonetheless, in the preferred
specification with the full set of fixed effects, column (8), the F-statistic is above usual
rules of thumb. In regards to this, the rather large increase in precision between
columns (5) and (6) is due to the much better fit produced by the specification
with market specific fixed effects. For example, the market fixed effects account for
large structural differences on input levels between real estate in London and Wales.
Without these fixed effects these input differences create large residuals producing
larger standard errors. This can be seen by comparing standard errors in columns
(7) and (8). Once I control for total employment, the introduction of market fixed
effects does not produce that much of a difference in terms of precision.
The estimate in column (8) shows that increasing immigrant relative supply by ten
percentage points while keeping total employment constant increases output by 6.7%.
This effect is actually the effect of immigrants on labour productivity, as the estimate
from regressing output on immigrant-native ratios controlling for total employment
is identical to the estimate when the left hand side is output per worker. Differences
are only in terms of the estimated effect of increasing employment on output.14 At
the averages in table 3.1, increasing the relative immigrant labour supply by ten
percentage points increases output per worker by £5610.
14The effect of increasing employment on (log-)output per worker is just the effect of increasing
employment on (log-)output minus one.
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Table 3.2: Immigrant-Native Mix and Output
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
I/N -0.236 -0.080 -0.225 -0.102* 2.588* 0.978* 0.733* 0.670*
(0.205) (0.051) (0.156) (0.047) (1.190) (0.398) (0.300) (0.320)
log(N + I) 0.911*** 0.135*** 1.320*** 0.324
(0.076) (0.032) (0.102) (0.221)
First-Stage (I/N)
I˜/N 1.015*** 0.781*** 1.115*** 1.105***
(0.297) (0.164) (0.290) (0.221)
˜log(N + I) -0.083*** -0.429
(0.018) (0.223)
First-Stage (log(N + I))
I˜/N 1.015*** 0.781*** 0.465* -0.049
(0.297) (0.164) (0.206) (0.284)
˜log(I +N) 0.799*** 1.049**
(0.071) (0.328)
F-Stat 11.708 22.565 7.749 17.286
Observations 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310
Fixed Effects
Market N Y N Y N Y N Y
Region-Year N Y N Y N Y N Y
Industry-Year N Y N Y N Y N Y
Note: Market clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include year, region and industry fixed effects.
F-Stat is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) reduced rank statistic. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The effect of immigrants on output that I estimate in table 3.2 is robust to changes
in employment measures. In table 3.3 I replicate the estimates in table 3.2 measuring
employment using hours of work and weighting head-counts with individual specific
predicted wages. The use of predicted wages to account for underlying differences
in productive characteristics is standard in the literature (see Acemoglu and Autor
2011; Autor et al. 2008). To create the weights, I use British nationals in the first
quarter of 2012-2014 LFS to estimate a wage equation on a quadratic of age and
years of education. Then, for every individual in the LFS, I produce fitted wages
and use these to weight every individual observation when aggregating employment
head-counts.
With predicted wages the estimated effect is at a 5% increase on output per worker
per ten percentage points increase on immigrant labour relative supply. With total
hours of work the effect increases to 9.5% per ten percentage points increase on immi-
grant relative supply. These changes can be due to changes in scaling. Particularly,
one will expect these movements on the size of the estimated effect if immigrants have
more desirable skills, as measured by fitted wages, and tend to work less hours. This
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is because, in such case, any given increase on the head-count measure translates into
a larger (smaller) increase on the predicted wage weighted (hours) measure. Plotting
the three measures (figure 3.7) this is exactly what one observes. Immigrants tend to
have more productive characteristics and work less hours.15
Table 3.3: Immigrant-Native Mix and Output
(Alternative Employment Measures)
OLS IV
Wage Weights Hours Wage Weights Hours
I/N -0.043 -0.066 0.034 0.023 0.798** 0.544* 1.185** 0.954*
(0.050) (0.044) (0.071) (0.065) (0.297) (0.264) (0.457) (0.389)
log(N + I) 0.127*** 0.132*** 0.301 0.171
(0.032) (0.029) (0.215) (0.123)
F-Stat 24.769 16.623 21.971 14.580
Observations 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310
Fixed Effects
Market Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region-Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Market clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include year, region and industry fixed effects.
F-Stat is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) reduced rank statistic. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Finally, Jaeger, Ruist, et al. (2018) show that shift-share instruments, as the one
I use, most times estimate an effect that is a weighted combination of short- and
long-run effects. This is because the shift-share is not only a good predictor for
current immigrant stocks but also for past ones. Jaeger, Ruist, et al. (2018) propose
including lags of the immigrant stock instrumented with lags of the instrument to
separate these two effects. In table 3.9, I display IV estimates including one lag of
the immigrant stock. Without market, year-region and year-industry fixed effects,
my multiple instrument estimate shows that increasing the relative supply of current
immigrant labour increases output by 1.96%. The same increase on the lag produces
a .894% increase on output that, however, is not statistically significant. Once I
introduce market, region-year and industry-year fixed effects, the effect of current
immigrants reduces to .852% and is not statistically significant. Also, with the full
set of fixed effects the first stage is substantially weaker. The Kleibergen and Paap
(2006) reduced rank statistic is at 2.89, well below typical rules of thumb. Therefore,
my estimates in table 3.9 suggest that the effect I capture is not only driven by
long-run effects. However, they are not completely conclusive.
15Differences on hours could be due to miss-report of hours. This is because I measure total hours
instead of ours per-worker, if a larger proportion of immigrants tend to not report hours my hour
measure will underestimate the total work time they contribute.
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3.4 Decomposition of the Reduced-Form Effect
3.4.1 Short-run decomposition
Given the positive effect of immigrants on output that I estimate in table 3.2, the
question is what is the mechanism behind it. In the short run, the effect of immigrants
on output is given by changes in the immigrant-native labour mix and the extend of
the effect depends on the technology used to combine both types of labour and the
effect of immigrants on native labour.
To explore how the reduced form effect in (3.2) depends on the production tech-
nology, let output be produced by combining immigrant and native labour using the
following Constant Elasticity of Substitution Environment (CES)16
ymt =
1
ρ
log
(
∆ + (1−∆)
(
Imt
Nmt
)ρ)
+ log(Nmt) + ξmt (3.2)
This CES production function allows for relatively more productive native or im-
migrant labour (∆ 6= .5), forces a constant elasticity of substitution taking the form
1/(1 − ρ) and is subject to time-market specific shocks ξ. Assuming that this CES
production function provides a good description of the production technology, one
can explore what is included inside the reduced form estimate in table 3.2. Abstract-
ing from endogeneity problems and taking a second order Taylor expansion,17 the
estimate obtained from regressing output generated according to (3.2) on immigrant
relative supply has the following decomposition
βˆ ≈ (1−∆)E [I/N ]
ρ−1
(1−∆)E [I/N ]ρ + ∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
I/N Output Semi-Elasticity
+
Cov [log(N), I/N ]
V ar [I/N ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect of Immigrants on Native Labour
(3.3)
Equation (3.3) highlights two aspects of the reduced form estimate. First, it is
inherently local as it depends on the distribution of labour inputs and this changes
across time and location (see figure 3.1). Second, the extend of the effect of immi-
grants on output depends on the elasticity of substitution between immigrant and
native labour (determined by ρ) and the relative productivity of immigrant and na-
tive labour (∆). Given that immigrant labour is relatively scarce, in the sense of
E [I/N ] < 1, the effect of immigration on output becomes more positive as the elas-
ticity of substitution decreases. Moreover, independently of immigrant-native mix,
the effect of immigration on output increases if the economy becomes relatively more
efficient on using immigrant labour, i.e. if ∆ decreases.
16The CES framework has been used extensively in the migration literature (e.g. Manacorda et al.
2012; Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Peri 2012).
17The approximation is similar for the IV estimator, βIV ≈ ∑s ys Cov(s, z)Cov(I/N, z) where ys is the
output semi-elasticity of input s. This approximation can be extended to account for additional
controls by using the Frisch-Waugh theorem.
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In the short run, when only labour varies, immigration has a negative effect on out-
put if immigrants displace a sufficiently large amount of native labour.18 The second
summand in equation (3.3) is actually the OLS estimate from regressing (log-)native
employment on the relative supply of immigrant labour. If one runs that regression,
obtains the estimates displayed in table 3.4. OLS estimates of (log-)native employ-
ment on immigrant-native ratios show a negative effect of immigration on native
employment that would signal towards immigrants crowding-out native employment.
However, the IV estimator returns a positive effect indicating that immigrants pro-
mote native employment. Thus, comparison of OLS and IV estimates suggest that
immigrants sort into markets where native employment is decreasing, but they do
not crowd-out native employment.19
3.4.2 Long-run decomposition
Once one moves from the short-run, immigrants may shape other inputs. For ex-
ample, a larger immigrant labour force may modify incentives to accumulate human
capital by altering returns to skill (Llull 2017) and, therefore, modify the underlying
distribution of native skill.20 Immigrants can also promote development of new tech-
nologies that complement immigrant labour (Peri 2012; Peri, Shih, et al. 2015) or
allow faster capital accumulation through reductions in production costs (Ottaviano,
Peri, and Wright 2018). In such case, the positive effect of immigrants on output
per worker studied in (3.3) will also be a function of the effect of immigrants on na-
tive skill mix, technologies and capital. To see this, let me augment the production
function in (3.2) and write21
ymt =
(1− α)
ρ
log
(
∆mt
(
NLmt
Nmt
+ φ
NHmt
Nmt
)
+ (1−∆mt)
(
Imt
Nmt
)ρ)
+ (1− α) log(Nmt) + α log (Kmt) + ξmt
(3.4)
Where NH and NL are high and low skilled native employment, K are capital
stocks, φ is the relative marginal product of skilled labour and native augmenting
technologies (∆) may change over time and across markets. Inside this framework
the Taylor approximation of the reduced form effect takes the form
18The same holds for output per worker, although then the negative effect would work through a
sufficient negative effect on the share of native labour. When the left hand side is output per worker,
the second term in (3.3) is Cov(log(N/(I +N)), I/N)/V ar(I/N).
19Sorting could be produced by immigrants entering markets with stagnated or decreasing native
labour, but also by immigrants staying in markets that natives are leaving.
20See also the literature on the effect of immigrants on native wages (e.g. Dustmann, Fabbri, et al.
2005; Dustmann, Frattini, et al. 2013; Manacorda et al. 2012).
21For the sake of my exposition I do not include the skill differential φ for immigrants. But later
on, when I estimate the production function, I redefine I = IL + φIH .
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βˆ ≈ ∂y
∂I/N
+
∂y
∂NH/N
Cov[NH/N, I/N ]
V ar[I/N ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on Native Skill Mix
+ (1− α) Cov[log(N), I/N ]
V ar[I/N ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on Native Employment
+α
Cov[log(K), I/N ]
V ar[I/N ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on Capital Stocks
+
∂y
∂∆
Cov[∆, I/N ]
V ar[I/N ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on Native Augmenting Tech.
(3.5)
The second to third elements in (3.5) are the effects of immigrants on output
through changes in the skill mix of native labour, total native labour supply and
capital stocks. The size of the skill mix effect depends on the parameters of the pro-
duction function, the distribution of labour inputs and technologies and the effect of
immigration on native mix (Cov(NH/N)/V ar(I/N)). Obtaining the sign and magni-
tude of the effect of immigrants on the skill mix of natives, Cov(NH/N)/V ar(I/N),
is straight forward. In table 3.4, I provide both OLS and IV estimates for this effect.
The IV estimate shows that a ten percentage points increase on the relative supply of
immigrant labour produces a 1% increase on the skill supply of natives. This positive
effect of immigrants on native skill supply will have a positive effect on output if high
skilled natives are relatively more productive than low skilled natives, i.e. φ > 1.
Assuming that natives are paid their marginal contribution to production one can
recover φ from relative wages of natives in high and low skilled occupations.22 In the
sample, the average relative wage is at φ = 2.84.23 Thus immigrants rise output and
the productivity of native labour by increasing the skill supply of native labour.
The positive effect of immigrants on the skill mix of natives is consistent with
evidence in Dustmann, Frattini, et al. (2013) showing that immigrants in the UK
reduce the wages of natives at the bottom of the wage distribution and have a positive
effect for natives at the top. Given that unskilled workers tend to be at the lower
tail of the distribution, the evidence in Dustmann, Frattini, et al. (2013) suggest that
immigrants may reshape the relative returns to high skilled jobs, producing incentives
for natives to accumulate skills that allow them to move into these high skilled jobs.24
22The assumption of perfect competition in the labour market is, somehow, more credible for
native than for immigrant labour. This is because there is abundant literature (e.g Aydemir and
Skuterud 2008; Eckstein and Weiss 2004; Izquierdo et al. 2009) showing that immigrants earn lower
wages that comparable natives (see also Dustmann and Preston 2012; Dustmann, Scho¨nberg, et al.
2016).
23This is the average across markets and years of the average wage offered in skilled occupa-
tions over the average wage in unskilled occupations. I measure wages from gross weekly earnings
information contained in the Labour Force Survey.
24For the US, Llull (2017) shows that natives respond to immigration by adjusting their educa-
tional and occupational choices. Hunt (2017) provides evidence showing that immigrants entering
the US have a positive effect on educational outcomes of native children, where the effect is stronger
for children with low-educated parents.
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The effect of immigrants on capital stocks, Cov (log(K), I/N) /V ar (I/N), can be
easily estimated, too. In the last four columns of table 3.4, the IV estimate shows that
increasing the relative supply of immigrant labour by ten percentage points produces
a 5% increase in capital stocks and a 4% increase in per worker capital stocks. Thus
showing that immigrants also contribute to production through the accumulation of
capital.
Table 3.4: Immigrant-Native Mix and Input Supply
log(N) H/N log(K)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS IV IV
I/N -0.403*** 0.349+ 0.049+ 0.116+ -0.002 -0.009 0.522** 0.395**
(0.044) (0.201) (0.026) (0.061) (0.019) (0.019) (0.174) (0.137)
log(N + I) 0.045** 0.129
(0.014) (0.098)
F-Stat 22.565 22.565 31.362 22.720
Observations 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 5,567 5,567 5,567 5,567
Fixed Effects
Market Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region-Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Market clustered standard errors in parenthesis. F-Stat is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) reduced rank
statistic. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Because ∆ is not directly observable, testing the effect of immigrants on the
accumulation of native augmenting technologies is more convoluted. However, using
the decomposition in (3.5) and estimates in table 3.2 it is possible to obtain an
approximation of the effect of immigrants on native augmenting technologies. In
figure 3.2, I display an approximation for Cov(∆, I/N)/V ar(I/N) obtained from the
expansion in (3.5) at a set of values for ρ and E[∆] setting φ at the average high
skilled relative wage of natives.
It follows from figure 3.2 that, if native and immigrant labour are gross substitutes,
say at ρ = .6, rising the share of immigrant labour has a negative impact on native
augmenting technologies if, with equal labour shares, natives are, at most, 133% more
productive than immigrants, i.e. E[∆] ≤ .7. On the other hand, if immigrant and
native labour are perfect substitutes, i.e. ρ = 1, increasing the share of immigrant
labour has a negative effect on native augmenting technologies if, with equal labour
shares, natives are, at most, as productive as immigrants, i.e. E[∆] ≤ .5.
A negative effect of immigrants on technologies that complement native labour
is consistent with the endogenous technological change framework developed by Ace-
moglu (1998, 2002). Acemoglu (2002) shows that, when native and immigrant labour
are gross substitutes, i.e. ρ > 0, increasing the share of immigrant labour produces
a negative effect on the development of technologies that complement immigrant
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labour.25 Where the effect is driven by the market effect derived from the larger
number of workers that can benefit from using technologies that complement immi-
grant labour.
Figure 3.2: Immigrant-Technology Regression Coefficient
(at φ = 2.84)
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The decompositions of the reduced form estimator highlights that one can gain
further understanding about the effect of immigrants on output and labour produc-
tivity by estimating the parameters governing the production function. The existing
literature estimating parameters of production functions with native and immigrant
labour (Card 2009; Manacorda et al. 2012; Ottaviano and Peri 2012) use relative
wages to identify production function parameters. This has the advantage of deliver-
ing linear on parameters estimating equations. However, a vast literature reporting
wage gaps between immigrants and comparable natives (e.g. Aydemir and Skuterud
2008; Chiswick 1978; Eckstein and Weiss 2004; Izquierdo et al. 2009) suggest that
immigrants my not be paid their marginal contribution to production. In turn, this
implies that relative wages do not directly reflect the parameters of the production
function. Thus, instead of pursuing estimation of production function parameters
through immigrants’ relative wages, my aim is to learn something about the produc-
tion function directly from production data. For this let me rewrite the production
function in (3.4) as
25Acemoglu (1998, 2002) frames it as any two inputs.
3.4. Decomposition of the Reduced-Form Effect 71
ymt − log(N˜mt) =(1− α)
ρ
log (∆(xmt) + (1−∆(xmt))xρmt) + α log(Ktm/N˜mt)
+ ξmt
=g(xmt) + α log(Ktm/N˜mt) + ξmt
(3.6)
where N˜ = NL + φNH , x = (IL + φIH)/N˜ and I assume that φ is known or can
be recovered on a first step.26 Furthermore, that native augmenting technologies are
determined by the relative supply of immigrant labour, i.e. ∆mt ≡ ∆(xmt), follows
from the literature on directed technological change (see Acemoglu 1998, 2002).
The reformulation of the production function in (3.6) has the convenient property
that it produces a quasilinear function with an unknown function in a scalar variable.
I exploit this to produce two estimates. On one hand, I estimate g imposing the CES
structure and assuming exogenous native augmenting technologies, i.e. ∆(x) is a
constant. On the other, I estimate g using a linear equation with a cubic polynomial
on the relative supply of immigrant labour. This can be interpreted as a third order
Taylor series approximation for g, assuming that ∆(x) is a smooth function.27
As with estimation of the reduced form effect, endogeneity is still a concern when
estimating g. Here I exploit the same variation on past settlement of immigrants
across markets that I use for the reduced form. For the cubic polynomial approxima-
tion I use an IV estimator using powers of the shift-share instrument. In estimation
of g imposing the CES structure and ∂∆(x)/∂x = 0, I use a control function (see
Terza et al. 2008; Wooldridge 2015) non-linear least squares estimator.28
In table 3.5, I display estimates of production function parameters and marginal
relative contribution of immigrant labour, i.e.
ˆMRTS =
∑
m,t
(1−∆)
∆
(
Imt
Nmt
)ρ−1
∑
m,t 1
(3.7)
The non-linear least squares elasticity estimate is between .62-.84, depending on
the value of the relative marginal product of skilled and unskilled labour. At .84 this
estimate is close to Manacorda et al. (2012) estimate at ρ ≈ .872 and smaller than US
estimates in Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012).29 However, my confidence
intervals are broad and I cannot reject a null of perfect substitutes, i.e. ρ = 1. This
26For example, from relative wages of high and low skilled natives.
27The smoothness assumption of g could be relaxed by using a non-parametric estimator (Horowitz
2011). However, given that the validity of g relies on Acemoglu (1998, 2002) framework and this
produces a smooth function I will not gain much robustness.
28In a linear on parameters set-up, the control function approach returns estimates that are
analogous to usual two-stage least squares IV (Terza et al. 2008). However, in non-linear set ups the
two-stage least squares is generally not available.
29Sample sizes in table 3.5 are smaller than in previous tables because I must exclude markets on
which no immigrant worker is observed and capital stocks are only available from 2000 onwards.
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increase on the dispersion of the estimate, as compared with previous estimates in
Manacorda et al. (2012) where the 95% confidence interval is [.781, .962], can be given
by different sources of identifying variation. Manacorda et al. (2012) exploit variation
within education-age cells assuming that this is exogenous. I exploit variation within
markets using an instrumental variables strategy and this produces noisier estimates.
The relative productivity of native labour, ∆, is estimated above .5 for all speci-
fications but the one where I allow for free ψ. In this specification I set ψ to be the
relative wage of high skilled natives in the market in the given year. That ∆ > .5
means that, when immigrant relative supply is equal to one, natives are more pro-
ductive than immigrants. However, in none of my specifications I can reject the null
of equality of productivity. Moreover, the combination of gross substitution between
immigrant and native labour, differences in productivity and relative scarcity of im-
migrant labour leads to large differences in marginal products. However, again, these
differences are not statistically significant. I can not reject that the average immigrant
relative marginal contribution is equal to one.30
Table 3.5: Production Function Estimates
Control Function
φ = 1 φ = 2.84 Free φ
ρ 0.687 0.617 0.836
[ 0.306 , 1.099 ] [ 0.416 , 2.724 ] [ 0.312 , 1.796 ]
∆ 0.552 0.610 0.389
[ 0.230 , 0.910 ] [ 0.087 , 1.000 ] [ 0.074 , 0.915 ]
α 0.304 0.345 0.337
[ 0.232 , 0.429 ] [ 0.249 , 0.465 ] [ 0.279 , 0.479 ]
Immigrant-Native Relative Marginal Contribution
1.828 1.846 2.322
[ 0.609 , 6.301 ] [ 0.000 , 5.193 ] [ 0.269 , 8.121 ]
Observations 5100 5100 5026
Note: 95% Bootstrap confidence intervals, 500 replications. ∆ estimated through
a sigmoid transformation. All estimates include year, region and industry fixed
effects. The last column sets φ to be the relative native skill wage in every market.
Diffrences in sample sizes are due to missing relative wages.
Using my non-linear least squares estimates I can compute the marginal effect
of the relative supply of immigrant labour. In figure 3.3, I display this marginal
effect holding total labour and capital constant, solid line, and allowing capital to
move with immigrant relative supply using estimates from table 3.4, discontinuous
30The parameter that is most tightly estimated is the Cobb-Douglas output elasticity of capital,
α, that is estimated between .3-.34. This is larger than the IV estimate from the cubic polynomial,
0.15-0.31, and close to the value of .33 typically used in the growth accounting literature and in Peri
(2012) decomposition of the effect of immigrants on labour productivity in the US.
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line. At the average immigrant supply, vertical red line, the non-linear least squares
marginal effect of immigrants is, roughly, zero. This is holding total employment
constant, thus, it will imply a zero effect on output per worker. If I include the effect
on capital stocks, the marginal effect from the non-linear least squares evaluated
at the average immigrant relative supply is positive. This suggests that, if native
augmenting technologies are exogenous, the positive effect of immigrants on output
per worker works through the effect in other inputs.
To produce further evidence on whether this is the case, in table 3.10, I estimate
the reduced form effect controlling for capital stocks and native skill supply. The
baseline effect, first column of table 3.10, is the one estimated earlier in table 3.2. A
ten percentage points increase on the relative supply of immigrant labour increases
output per worker by 6.7%. Evaluated at the average this is a £5,610 increase on
output per worker. Controlling for capital stocks reduces the effect to 5% per ten
percentage points increase on the relative supply of immigrant labour. Evaluated at
the average this is a £4,270 increase per worker. Including additional controls for
the share of native employment in high skilled occupations marginally increases the
effect of immigrants on output per worker. This is due, surprisingly, to a negative
correlation between output per worker and the share of skilled native workers. In any
case, after controlling for other inputs there is, still, a positive and significant effect
of immigrants on output per worker. Specifically, around 76% of the baseline effect
remains. This further suggest that increasing the relative supply of immigrant labour
has a positive impact on the development of technologies that complement immigrant
workers.
Finally, in figure 3.8, I compare the marginal effect of immigrants, holding total
labour constant, from the non-linear least squares with the cubic polynomial approx-
imation. The cubic polynomial approximation produces marginal effects that are
always larger than the non-linear least squares. Given that the polynomial approxi-
mation does not restrict native augmenting technologies to be constant,31 this differ-
ence between the polynomial approximation and the non-linear least squares further
suggests that immigrants have a positive impact on the development of technologies
that complement them. However, this should be taken with caution. Bootstrap con-
fidence intervals are wide and I can only reject the null of equality over a small set of
points.
31And assuming that the CES production function is otherwise a good model for the actual
production technology.
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Figure 3.3: Relative Supply Immigrant Labour Marginal Product
(at φ = 1)
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3.5 Conclusions
With immigrant labour rapidly growing over the last 15 years immigration has be-
come central for British policy makers. I contribute to the current discussion of the
effect of immigrants in the British economy by estimating the effect of immigrants on
production and labour productivity.
Using data from the UK Labour Force Survey and regional accounts I show that
rising the relative supply of immigrant labour has a positive effect on output and
output per worker. To produce this estimate I exploit variation on past settlement of
immigrants across industries and regions in an instrumental variables estimator with
a comprehensive set of year, industry and region fixed effects. My baseline estimates
show that increasing the relative supply of immigrant labour by ten percentage points
increases output per worker by 6.7%. When interpreted at average levels this implies
an additional £5,610 per worker.
To explore the composition of the reduced form effect I introduce a Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. I show that the reduced form
not only depends on the technology been used but also on the joint distribution of
immigrant labour and other inputs, including the development of new technologies.
This highlights that reduced form estimates of the effect of immigrants on output
are inherently heterogeneous and warns against extrapolating results across periods
or countries. In this direction, I show that part of the positive effect of immigrants
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on output works through positive effects on the stock of capital, native employment
and the skill distribution of natives. Increasing immigrant relative labour supply by
ten percentage points increase native employment a 3.5%, the relative supply of high
skilled native labour by 1% and capital stocks per worker by 4%.
Using the decomposition of the reduced form estimate I show that, for a wide set
of parameter values, the evidence I present is consistent with immigrants triggering
accumulation of technologies that complement immigrant labour. This is in line with
the directed technological change literature (see Acemoglu 1998, 2002). Furthermore,
comparing production function and reduced form estimates I produce further, sugges-
tive, evidence on the effect of immigrants on the development of native augmenting
technologies. Specifically, estimates of the CES production function assuming that
native augmenting technologies are constant, produce a marginal effect of immigrants
on output per worker that is only positive when I allow for immigrant effects on cap-
ital stocks. This is not consistent with reduced form estimates where I control for
capital stocks, which display a positive and significant effect. Specifically, a ten per-
centage points increase on immigrant labour supply rises output per worker by 5%,
i.e. an additional £4,270 per worker. I interpret this as a signal of misspecification of
the production function. Particularly, against the assumption that native augmenting
technologies are constant.
To produce further evidence, I estimate a cubic polynomial approximation of
the production function that is consistent with the CES function with endogenous
technological change a´ la Acemoglu (1998, 2002). Marginal effects computed with
this specification are always larger than marginal effects from the CES specification
holding technologies constant. This further suggest that immigrants trigger the de-
velopment of technologies that complement them. However, this piece of evidence
should be taken with caution as I only reject the null of equality of marginal effects
over a small set of points.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Classifications
Table 3.6: Industries
Code Code Number Name
A 1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing
B 2 Mining and quarrying
CA 3 Food products, beverages and tobacco
CB 4 Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products
CC 5 Wood and paper products and printing
CD 6 Coke and refined petroleum products
CE 7 Chemicals and chemical products
CF 8 Basic pharmaceutical products and preparations
CG 9 Rubber and plastic products
CH 10 Basic metals and metal products
CI 11 Computer, electronic and optical products
CJ 12 Electrical equipment
CK 13 Machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified
CL 14 Transport equipment
CM 15 Other manufacturing and repair
D 16 Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply
E 17 Water supply; sewerage and waste management
F 18 Construction
G 19 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles
H 20 Transportation and storage
I 21 Accommodation and food service activities
J 22 Information and communication
K 23 Financial and insurance activities
L 24 Real estate activities
M 25 Professional, scientific and technical activities
N 26 Administrative and support service activities
O 27 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
P 28 Education
Q 29 Human health and social work activities
R 30 Arts, entertainment and recreation
S 31 Other service activities
T 32 Activities of households
U 33 Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies
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Table 3.7: Understanding Society Industries
Code Name
Agriculture and Forestry 1
Fisheries 2
Energy/Water 3
Mining 4
Chemicals 5
Synthetics 6
Earth/Clay/Ston 7
Iron/Steel 8
Mechanical Eng. 9
Electrical Eng 10
Wood/Paper/Prit 11
Clothing/Text. 12
Food Industry 13
Construction 14
Constr. Relate 15
Wholesale 16
Trading Agents 17
Retail 18
Train System 19
Communication/Entertainment 20
Other Trans. 21
Financial Inst 22
Insurance 23
Restaurants 24
Service Indust 25
Trash Removal 26
Educ./Sport 27
Health Service 28
Legal Services 29
Other Services 30
Volunt./Church 31
Priv. Househld 32
Public Admin. 33
Social Sec. 34
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3.6.2 Tables
Table 3.8: Market Movers
UK Born Foreign Born
Market Stayer Market Mover Market Stayer Market Mover Total
0.924 0.076 0.905 0.095
{11821} {970} {2042} {215} 15048
Conditional on Moving Conditional on Moving
Same Industry Different Industry Same Industry Different Industry
Region Stayer 0.000 0.891 0.000 0.870
{0} {864} {0} {187} 1051
Region Mover 0.068 0.041 0.093 0.037
{66} {40} {20} {8} 134
Total 11887 1874 2062 410 16233
Note: Data from Understanding Society waves 3 and 4 (2011-2014). All individuals with consecutive interviews, known
industry of work, region of residence and country of birth. Due to to data constraints the industrial classification is
slightly different of the one I use in the rest of the paper, see table 3.7
3.6. Appendix 79
Table 3.9: Output per Worker
IV estimates, lagged values
IV
(1) (2)
I/N 1.976* 0.852
(0.904) (0.566)
I/N(lag) 0.894 0.882
(0.612) (0.469)
First-Stage (I/N)
I˜/N 1.227*** 1.138***
(0.199) (0.137)
I˜/N (lag) -0.282 -0.614***
(0.190) (0.168)
First-Stage (I/N (lag))
I˜/N -0.493 -0.660*
(0.274) (0.273)
I˜/N(lag) 1.546*** 1.274***
(0.237) (0.180)
F-Stat 33.249 2.891
Observations 5,932 5,932
Fixed Effects
Market N Y
Region-Year N Y
Industry-Year N Y
Note: Market clustered standard errors in paren-
thesis. All regressions include year, region and in-
dustry fixed effects. F-Stat is the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) reduced rank statistic. * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 3.10: Output per Worker
Input Controls, IV estimates
Baseline With Capital Stocks With Capital Stocks
and Native Skill
I/N 0.670* 0.509* 0.533*
(0.320) (0.257) (0.261)
log(N + I) -0.676** -0.730*** -0.739***
(0.221) (0.185) (0.183)
F-Stat 17.286 20.556 21.355
Observations 6,310 5,567 5,567
Fixed Effects
Market Y Y Y
Region-Year Y Y Y
Industry-Year Y Y Y
Note: Market clustered standard errors in parenthesis. F-Stat is the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) reduced rank statistic. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
3.6.3 Plots
Figure 3.4: Output per Worker Evolution
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Figure 3.5: Workforce Jobs and LFS: Measures of Employment
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Figure 3.6: Immigrant Stock Evolution
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Figure 3.7: Immigrant-Native Ratios
(Comparison of Measures)
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Figure 3.8: Difference in Immigrant Labour Marginal Product
(at φ = 1)
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Note: The solid line is the difference between the marginal effect from non-linear least squares and
cubic polynomial. Dashed lines are 95% confidence levels from 500 bootstrap replications. For each
replication I compute the marginal effect of both estimators and its difference.
3.6.4 Data Preparation: Changes in Industries and Occupations
Coding
In 1991 the new SOC90 coding scheme was introduced in the LFS. In this year there
are two variables reporting occupation, one is KOS that was used until 1991 and
the other is SOC/SOCMAIN that uses the SOC90 coding scheme and is in place
until 2001. Thanks to this, I can create a mapping between the old coding and the
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new by cross tabulating the two variables using LFS 1991. As I am using aggregate
quantities I choose to employ a probability mapping between schemes. Furthermore,
some translations were imputed manually.32
In 2001 there is a new change and occupations were coded under SOC00. Dur-
ing this year both the old SOCMAIN variable and the new SOC2KM were coded.
However, only the latter is provided in the end of user quarterly datasets available at
the UK Data Archive, with no occupational information provided at all in the first
quarter. To overcome this issue, I use the last quarter of LFS 2000 and the second of
2001. Thanks to the panel dimension of LFS I can match observations that belong to
the same individual in both quarters, and identify those who have not changed jobs.
Then I use these observations to construct the mapping between occupational codes.
While creating this map I have imputed manually some one-to-one correspondences.33
Finally, in the first quarter of 2011 there is a new change and occupations are
now coded following SOC10. During this year in the end of user access datasets from
the UK Data Archive there are available two occupational variables, one codes under
SOC00, SC102KM, and the other under SOC10, SOC10M. Allowing me to create a
mapping.
With the three maps at hand I translate everything into SOC10 coding and then
use MAC’s NQF classification34 to put workers in one of the 4 different groups,
ranking 2, 3, 4 and 6. SOC 2010 occupations: (1171) Officers in armed forces, (2444)
Clergy, (3311) NCOs and other ranks, (3314) Prison service officers (below principal
officer), (3441) Sports players, and (3442) Sports coaches, instructors and officials;
are given no classification as these are not eligible for Tier 2 visas.
For industries there is a change between codes for the base years 1985-1990 and
my first year of study, 1998; and between 2008 and 2009. I use proportional mappings
from ONS and Dr. Jennifer Smith,35 to code pre 2008 LFS figures into SIC07. Due
to availability constraints the matching for years 1985-1990 is performed using two
digits industries while the matching for 1998-2008 is done using four digits.
32See the Do-files.
33See the Do-files.
34See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigration-rules-appendix-j-codes-of-practice-for-skilled-work
35Available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/jcsmith/sicmapping/
resources/proportional/.
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Table 3.11: NQF Classification and Major Occupation
NQF
2 3 4 6 Total
ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECRETARIAL OCCUPATIONS 0.720 0.240 0.040 0.000
{18} {6} {1} {0} 25
ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL OCCUPATIONS 0.033 0.443 0.377 0.148
{2} {27} {23} {9} 61
CARING, LEISURE AND OTHER SERVICE OCCUPATIONS 0.615 0.385 0.000 0.000
{16} {10} {0} {0} 26
ELEMENTARY OCCUPATIONS 0.931 0.069 0.000 0.000
{27} {2} {0} {0} 29
MANAGERS, DIRECTORS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS 0.000 0.286 0.200 0.514
{0} {10} {7} {18} 35
PROCESS, PLANT AND MACHINE OPERATIVES 0.905 0.095 0.000 0.000
{38} {4} {0} {0} 42
PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATIONS 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.986
{0} {0} {1} {69} 70
SALES AND CUSTOMER SERVICE OCCUPATIONS 0.778 0.167 0.056 0.000
{14} {3} {1} {0} 18
SKILLED TRADES OCCUPATIONS 0.175 0.825 0.000 0.000
{10} {47} {0} {0} 57
Total 125 109 33 96 363
Note: Totals and frequencies refer to number of four digit SOC 2010 occupations
Table 3.12: Occupations without NQF Match
Officers in armed forces 1171
Clergy 2444
NCOs and other ranks 3311
Prison service officers (below principal officer) 3314
Sports players 3441
Sports coaches, instructors and officials 3442
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Abstract
We estimate the effect of foreign peers on educational and early labour market
outcomes of undergraduate students. Using data on the universe of higher education
students in England, we estimate causal effects by exploiting cross-cohort variation
within major and institution. First, we show that increasing the share of EU students
alters the ability composition within peer group. This is due to EU students enlarging
the pool of individuals from which universities draw while operating under funding
constraints. After controlling for this selection at entry, we show that foreign students
have only mild effects on native educational and labour market outcomes and that
these are heterogeneous across the distribution of ability. Finally, we show that the
strongest effects that we find, which are those on grades, are not consistent with a
grading on a curve mechanism. This suggest that foreign students mildly shape the
human capital accumulation of natives.
88
Chapter 4. Foreign Peer Effects in Higher Education: Joint work with Greta
Morando
4.1 Introduction
Since Grossman (1982) seminal paper, economists have amply investigated the effect
of migrants on labour market outcomes of natives. However, the economic literature
has paid much less attention to the effects of migrants on the human capital of natives
(e.g. Hunt 2017; Llull 2017). We contribute to narrowing this gap in the literature by
studying the causal effect of foreign students on the human capital of native peers.
In particular, we study the effect that foreign peers have on native students’
higher education and early labour market outcomes. This is of policy relevance as
higher education is a critical point in the human capital accumulation of workers.
At this stage, individuals make career decisions in terms of which specialization to
follow and which institutions to attend that have long-lasting effects (e.g. Arcidiacono
2004; Belfield et al. 2018; Walker and Zhu 2008, 2018).1 Besides the institutions they
attend, the educational performance of students also impacts their labour market
outcomes. For example, Jaeger and Page (1996) find that individuals that hold a
diploma earn higher wages than workers with the same years of education but without
a diploma. These diploma effects exist all the way from high-school to doctoral degrees
and, for those that graduate, the grades they get have a positive relation with labour
market performance (Jones and Jackson 1990).2 In this vein, using data from a
British university, Feng and Graetz (2017) provide evidence showing that graduating
with a first class has a positive effect on industry and earnings of recent graduates.
Increasing the number of international students may increase competition for na-
tive students to enter certain institutions and sharing major with foreign students
may change the learning environment. For example, foreign students may change the
ability composition of the group with which natives compare themselves, leading to
natives changing their perception about their own ability and their effort provision
(Elsner and Isphording 2017; Murphy and Weinhardt 2018). Moreover, foreign stu-
dents may create a more diverse pool of skills that may help natives when engaging
in cooperative work.3 In addition, foreign students may slow down the development
of seminars and the skill accumulation of peers due to language barriers (Anelli, Shih,
et al. 2017) or increase competition for top grades when grades are awarded based
on relative position. All these mechanisms push in opposite directions and make the
investigation of foreign peer effects an eminently empirical matter.
Despite the potential economic importance of foreign effects in higher education,
this question has not been widely explored in the literature. We provide a complete
characterization of the effect of foreign students in higher education: from the effect
of foreigners on the composition of natives at entry in higher education to their effect
on natives educational performances and longer-term consequence on labour market
outcomes.
1See also Ehrenberg (2004) review of the literature.
2French et al. (2015) provide evidence on the correlation between high school grades and earnings.
3Similar to effects of skill mix on firm productivity (Iranzo et al. 2008).
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Given the characteristics of the financial system in higher education in the UK we
start by providing a theoretical model of how foreign peers affect students composition
at entry in higher education. In our context, this is simultaneously determined by
two elements which are whether non-natives students are from a country belonging
to the EU and the type of university considered. In England, home (i.e. British and
EU) and non-EU students face different funding constraints imposed by the funding
system. This is because universities are funded by the state through the Higher
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) that, during our period of study,
set caps on the numbers of subsidized students that each university can enrol. These
caps were binding as universities have to face monetary fines, offsetting direct gains, if
they enrolled students above the cap (see Machin and Murphy 2017). This creates an
asymmetry between home and non-EU students, as the later are only subject to visa
restrictions and capacity constraints of the institution.4 We show that this asymmetry
in the treatment of international students creates a heterogeneous foreign effect on the
enrolment of native students across selective and non-selective universities. Selective
universities are able to select the best students and this induces a negative foreign
effect on the number of natives enrolled from increasing the number of both EU and
non-EU prospective students. Non-selective universities, on the other hand, use non-
EU students to fill capacity and this creates an asymmetry. A larger number of EU
students crowds-out native students but a similar increase on non-EU has no effect
on natives.
We then empirically test whether our predictions are supported in the data. We
show that cross-cohort variation on foreign shares correlates positively with average
ability of incoming native students and negatively with the number of enrolled natives.
In non-selective universities both effects are driven by EU students. However, in
selective universities these effects are driven by both EU and non-EU students. This
is exactly what our mechanism predicts.
Without controlling for this selection at entry, one can only estimate an effect
that is a combination of selection plus foreign peer effects. This selection effect
is different from the self-selection effect that is the main concern in most of the
literature (e.g. Carrell, Fullerton, et al. 2009; Sacerdote 2001). Similar to Lavy and
Schlosser (2011), we argue that students may know the average number of foreign
students in a major, university or even in a major within a university. But are
unlikely to know, ex-ante, the number of students within a cohort in a university
and major. In this situation, exploiting variation across cohorts within university-
major deals with student self-selection. However, universities selecting students on
the basis of their ability makes cross cohort variation within university and major
non quasi-experimental.5 Hanushek et al. (2003) note the importance of controlling
for school selectivity and use a set of fixed effects, including individual fixed effects
to control for selectivity. Nonetheless, the inclusion of individual fixed effects may
4There have not been any changes on the student visa that we are aware of in the period considered
in the paper.
5This and capacity constraints explain the effect of EU peers on native average ability.
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not be without concerns. This is because individual fixed effects are estimated using
within individual variation on outcomes measured after interaction with the peer
group. Thus, there is no guarantee that one is not eliminating part of the peer effect.
One of the strengths of our analysis is that, thanks to the quality of our data, we are
able to control for selection using a measure of ability that pre-dates interaction with
peers. This measure is the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) tariff
score. The UCAS score is what universities observe in students’ UCAS application
and the main characteristic that they use when selecting individuals. Furthermore,
the UCAS score is composed of students previous educational outcomes and, as such,
is pre-determined by the time students enter in contact with the peer group.
We show that conditional on ability, cross-cohort variation on peer-shares is un-
correlated with a comprehensive set of pre-determined individual characteristics that
are likely predictors of educational attainment.6This provides strong evidence of the
share of foreign students to be as good as random, thus supporting the causality of
our estimates (Cools et al. 2019; Lavy and Schlosser 2011). Therefore we follow the
literature (e.g. Anelli, Shih, et al. 2017; Angrist and Lang 2004; Carrell, Hoekstra,
et al. 2018; Carrell, Malmstrom, et al. 2008; Cools et al. 2019; Lavy and Schlosser
2011) and exploit cross-cohort variation within university and major to deal with
student self-selection.7 For this, we use data on the universe of English undergradu-
ate students and construct foreign shares at the major (e.g. Economics) and higher
education institution level (e.g. University of Oxford). In our estimating equation,
university and major fixed effects eliminate spurious correlations given by stable char-
acteristics of universities and majors. Furthermore, university and major fixed effects
interacted with cohort fixed effects eliminate transitory shocks that are common to
either universities or majors. These account for shocks, for example, on labour de-
mand for specific majors that may drive the flow of international students at the same
time that shift the composition of native students (Taylor and Rampino 2014).
In addition, the other main challenge that one faces on estimation of peer effects
is reflection (Carrell, Hoekstra, et al. 2018). The reflection problem (Manski 1977)
is given by the joint determination of individual and peer outcomes. This relates to
the reverse causality problem (e.g. Miguel et al. 2004) and is given by the difficulty
of distinguishing the effect of peers on the individual from the effect of the individual
on her peers (Carrell, Fullerton, et al. 2009). In our set-up, however, reflection is not
a problem. This is because foreign status is determined before the focal individual
enters in contact with her peers.
In our analysis, we find mild foreign peer effects. Our estimates have magnitudes
that are typically smaller than half of a percentage point per percentage point in-
crease in foreign shares. Even more, for the average student, we find no statistically
significant effects on any of our higher education outcomes. These are: graduating,
6These include sex, ethnicity and socio-economic background.
7The other main branch of the peer effect literature uses random assignment of individuals to
peer groups (e.g. Anelli and Peri 2017; Carrell, Fullerton, et al. 2009; Lyle 2007; Sacerdote 2001).
See also Sacerdote (2011) review of the literature.
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dropping out, changing from a STEM to a non-STEM major,8 graduating with a
first, graduating with an upper second, graduating with a lower second, graduating
with a third, graduating with a lower qualification or failing to graduate.
Across the ability distribution, we show that foreign peers decrease the proba-
bility of graduating for native students at the middle-top of the ability distribution.
For these students, a one percentage point increase in the share of foreign peers de-
creases the probability of graduating by.014-.027 percentage points. This change in
the probability of graduating works mostly through foreigners increasing the proba-
bility of dropping out for natives above the ability bottom quartile. For these, a one
percentage point increase in foreign shares increasing the probability of dropping out
by.004-.015 percentage points.
We also find heterogeneous foreign peer effects on grades across the ability distri-
bution. Nonetheless, these effects can be mechanical if teachers grade on a curve.9
This is because, under grading on a curve, differences in the quality of foreign and
native students mechanically displace native grades. We explore formally this mecha-
nism and provide evidence showing that grading on a curve, alone, cannot explain the
effects we find. This suggests that foreign students mildly affect the human capital
acquisition of native students. In the theoretical model outlined at the beginning
of the paper we also illustrate how foreigners could affect natives effort provision in
their study, and consequently, their educational performances. We show that this
effect can be heterogeneous across students ability distribution and we conclude that
determining its direction is purely an empirical question. Our estimates indeed show
that foreign peer effects are heterogeneous across the ability distribution.
For a sample of students that graduate in higher education, we observe their labour
market outcomes six months after graduation.10 With this sample we estimate the
effect of foreign peers on the probability of continuing studying, working, working in
a professional occupation, having a graduate job and average earnings. We find mild
foreign peer effects. Increasing the foreign share by a one percentage point increases
the probability of working by.064 percentage points for native students at the top
of the ability distribution. Mostly by driving them out of postgraduate education.
Increasing the foreign share also increases the probability of working in a professional
occupation for all native students and has no effect on the probability of holding a
graduate job. Finally, increasing the foreign share by a one percentage point increases
natives earnings at the third and top ability quartiles by around .17%.
Finally, this paper aims to contribute to the current policy debate in the UK.
In 2017, around 82% of all higher education students in the UK were enrolled in an
English university and the UK is the second country in the world, after the US, in
terms of foreign students in higher education. About one-fifth of all students in the
8STEM stands for science, technology, engineering and mathematics.
9Under grading on a curve, teachers do not report actual grades. Instead, they transform the
actual distribution of grades to have some distribution of their choice.
10We show that the sample with matched labour market outcomes is representative of the popu-
lation of higher education graduates.
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UK higher education system come from outside the UK: 6% from the rest of the EU
and 13% from the rest of the world.11 This implies that exposition to foreign peers is
non-negligible for most native students. Furthermore, there is substantial variation
on the concentration of international students across different stages of education
and fields of study. For example, in science (non-science) subjects, international
students nowadays constitute 13% (16%) of undergraduate students, 26% (39%) of
postgraduate taught students, and 42% (42%) of postgraduate research students.12
This variation across majors, higher education institutions and time is crucial for our
identification strategy. In addition, the effect of foreign students in the UK is a matter
of current policy interest (MAC 2018). Our research, therefore, informs British policy-
makers about what could be the possible effects of changing foreign student rates in
British universities on natives educational and labour market outcomes. This is at
a time where foreseeable labour market restrictions and higher fees for EU students
may make it harder for the UK to keep up with mainland European competition.13
Our work contributes to the existing literature in several ways. We add to the pre-
vious literature estimating the effect of immigration on natives education (e.g. Betts
1998; Betts and Fairlie 2003; Hunt 2017; Llull 2017) and the effect of immigrants on
natives labour market outcomes (e.g. Butcher and Card 1991; Dustmann, Frattini,
et al. 2013; Manacorda et al. 2012; Ottaviano and Peri 2012) in that we provide the
effect of direct interaction with immigrants. In this literature, the effect of immigrants
works through general equilibrium arguments. Changes in the supply of labour, in-
duced by immigrants, shift the distribution of wages (Dustmann, Frattini, et al. 2013;
Manacorda et al. 2012) and these shifts change incentives to acquire human capital
(Llull 2017). Our work estimates a different margin of immigrant effects. Instead of
general equilibrium effects, we estimate the effect of sharing education with foreign
peers. This can be given by direct competition with foreign students or externali-
ties in education. The existing literature studying these margins is scarce. Anelli,
Shih, et al. (2017) study the effect of foreign peers on the probability of graduating
in a STEM major using data from an introductory math course in a Californian uni-
versity. They find that foreign students lower the probability of natives graduating
in STEM majors. However, this negative impact on STEM major graduation does
not produce negative effects on natives wages as they move into high earnings so-
cial sciences. Chevalier et al. (2019) use data from economic students in an English
university and show that increasing in-classroom linguistic diversity has no effect on
English-speaking students. Braakmann and McDonald (2018) consider all English
universities, but they focus on the impact of exposure to socio-economic diversity on
students educational outcomes. We add to Anelli, Shih, et al. (2017), Braakmann
and McDonald (2018), and Chevalier et al. (2019) in that our estimates provide the
average effect for the whole of England for a wider set of outcomes. Thus, by covering
11https://www.ukcisa.org.uk/
12(https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/students/where-from).
13The UK is already losing market share against other competitor countries such as Australia,
Germany or France (Universities UK 2018).
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multiple universities and degrees, we avoid possible external validity concerns from
using data from a single institution and field of study.
More generally, our work relates to the literature on foreign peer effects at lower
levels of education. The most relevant paper for us, as it studies foreign peer effects
in English primary schools, is Geay et al. (2013). They find a negative effect of
foreign peers on English natives that is driven by selection. Once selection is taken
into account they find a zero foreign peer effect. Our findings at higher eduction
are consistent with these findings. Gould et al. (2009) find an overall no effect on
Israeli student and a negative effect for disadvantaged Israeli students. Ohinata and
Van Ours (2013) find mild foreign peer effects on Dutch students. However, Ballatore
et al. (2018) find negative foreign peer effects on maths and science performance of
second graders.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
To fix ideas here we present a simple framework of student admission, spill-overs in
grade production and peer determined effort costs.14 Imaging that there is a mass H
and I of home and international students,15 that we call cohort sizes. Every student is
characterized by her educational achievement up to higher education (w), that we call
ability, and whether she is home or international. Ability for home and international
students has distribution FH and FI and common support [0, 1].
4.2.1 Admission
Every institution chooses cut-off grades, wH and wI , above which all students receive
an offer that accept with probability αH(w), αI(w). The chosen cut-off grade is such
that it maximizes the following constrained optimization problem16
max
wH ,wI
H
∫
wH
ψ(w)αH(w)dFH(w) + I
∫
wI
ψ(w)αI(w)dFI(w) (4.1)
s.t.
H
∫
wH
αH(w)dFH(w) ≤ c1 (4.2)
H
∫
wH
αH(w)dFH(w) + I
∫
wI
αI(w)dFH(w) ≤ c2 (4.3)
wH , wI ≥ 0 (4.4)
14We leave the analysis of foreign peers effects through relative grades to section 4.6.3 where we
also provide a test for it.
15At minimal risk of confusion we also use H and I to refer to home and international students.
16This framework is inspired on Bhattacharya et al. (2017). A caveat about (4.1) is that universi-
ties do not take into account the effect of peers, thus we assume that universities ignore the existence
of peer effects. This assumption may not be as restrictive as it sounds. If peer effects were to be
well know it would be hard to motivate the extensive literature on peer effects (see Sacerdote 2011).
Nonetheless, ultimately, we make this assumption for simplicity.
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Where ψ(w) is the weight that the university puts on a student of ability w. For
example, this can reflect expected outcomes of a student of ability w. However, our
only assumption about ψ is that it is monotonically increasing on ability. The first
constraint in (4.2) reflects the funding cap for home students, British and EU, so
it doesn’t apply to international students. The second constraint in equation (4.3)
reflects the capacity constraint of the university and, as such, it applies to both home
and international students.17
We work under the condition that, for all universities, there is always a home cut-
off small enough but larger than zero such that the funding constraint binds.18 Then
depending on the level of the restrictions, the ability distributions and the supply of
home and international students, we have three candidates of the optima that we use
to classify universities.
Selective Universities are able to select the best home and international stu-
dents and they set a common entry ability cut-off, wH = wI = w for both. This entry
cut-off is such that the capacity constraint, (4.3), binds and it must be the case that
the following inequality holds
c2 − c1 < I
∫
w
αI(w)dFI(w) (4.5)
Equation 4.5 is quite illustrative. Selective universities must be able to attract
international students. Otherwise, if αH(w) = 0 ∀w, the necessary condition in (4.5)
will only hold if the capacity constraint is smaller than the funding constraint. What
seems a rather odd situation. In the opposite direction, universities which offers are
always accepted, αH(w) = 1 ∀w, are the best candidates to be of selective type. Under
this later condition, the difference between the funding and the capacity constraint
needs to be smaller than the number of international students with ability w or higher,
i.e. c2 − c1 < I(1− FI(w)).19
In Non-Selective Universities both the funding and the capacity constraint
bind. Moreover, home and international students have different ability cut-offs. To
understand why, it is illustrative to note that the shadow price of the funding con-
straint is ψ(wH)−ψ(wI). Given that we assume ψ′(w) > 0, this implies the necessary
condition wH > wI . This is intuitive. If the home cut-off were to be smaller than the
international one, the university could be better off by increasing the home cut-off.
This will cut the number of home students accepted and will allow the university to
increase the number of international students, therefore, increasing the ability of the
marginal student. Thus, non-selective universities use international students to fill
capacity and, for this, they need to set a lower cut-off for international students, as
compared with natives.
Supply Constrained Universities are not able to fill capacity using interna-
tional students and cannot enrol more home students because they are already at the
17For example, given by availability of space and teachers.
18This reduces the number of candidates for optimal points and leaves our cases of interest.
19The cut-off w must also be such that the funding constraint for home students doesn’t bind.
4.2. Theoretical Framework 95
funding constraint. This leads to different cut-off grades for home and international
students. The cut-off grade for home is such that the funding constraint holds with
equality and the cut-off grade for international students is wI = 0. Thus supply con-
strained universities send offers to all international students. Furthermore, in supply
constrained universities the following inequality holds
I
∫
wI
αI(w)dFI(w) < c2 − c1 (4.6)
This necessary condition is similar to the selective university counterpart. How-
ever, in this case those universities that are most-likely to be supply constrained are
those that face small international student supplies, i.e. αH(w) ≈ 0. Imaging the
opposite, if all international students were to accept offers from supply constrained
universities we will have the necessary condition in (4.7). This means that the uni-
versity would have to have capacity to take in the whole immigrant cohort plus c1
natives. This is highly unlikely.
c2 − c1
I
> 1 (4.7)
4.2.2 Cohort Size, Number of Students Enrolled and their Ability
The effect of international peers on the number of enrolled home students is hetero-
geneous across and within university types. From (4.8), where h(wH) is the number
of home students enrolled, it follows that international students only have a negative
effect on the number of enrolled home students in selective universities. For the other
universities, the home ability cut-off does not move with the cohort size of interna-
tional students and (4.8) is zero. In other words, the demand of home students only
depends on the supply of international students for selective universities. In addition,
within selective universities, the displacement of home students by enrolled interna-
tional students can be heterogeneous. For example, consider two selective universities
that set the same cut-off, but the first one faces a larger home demand than the sec-
ond, i.e. α1H(wH) > α
2
H(wH). Then the displacement of home students is larger for
the first, more demanded, university.
dh(wH)
dI
= −HαH(wH)fH(wH)dwH
dI
(4.8)
On the other hand, the effect of increasing cohort size on the distribution of ability
and average ability is similar for selective and non-selective universities. In these uni-
versities increasing the cohort size of either home or international students pushes the
mass of the ability distribution towards the top. This can be seen in equation (4.9),
where G is the distribution of ability for enrolled students and the equivalence follows
from defining φK(1, w) =
∫ 1
w αK(ω)dFK(ω) and using the fact that selective and non-
selective universities always fill their capacity. However, the mechanism driving this
positive effect on ability of enrolled students is different for selective and non-selective
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universities. In selective universities, increasing the cohort size of international stu-
dents rises the ability cut-off for both home and international students. This reduces
the number of enrolled home students and increases the ability of the marginally
enrolled student. In non-selective universities, however, increasing the cohort size of
international students only increases the ability cut-off of international students. This
implies that neither the number of enrolled international nor home students changes,
but the marginally enrolled international students is of higher quality. Therefore,
the share of international students enrolled stays constant but the ability of interna-
tional students increases, resulting in a push of the ability mass towards the top of
its distribution.20
dG(w|wH , wI)
dK
=−
∫ 1
w αK(ω)dFK(ω)
H
∫
wH
αH(ω)dFH(ω) + I
∫
wI
αI(ω)dFI(ω)
≡− φK(1, w)
c2
< 0, K = H, I
(4.9)
dE(w|wH , wI)
dK
=
∫ 1
wK
[w − wK ]αK(w)dFK(w)
c2
> 0, K = I,H (4.10)
In supply constrained universities the effect of increasing the cohort size of home
students on the ability of enrolled students is analogous to the effect experience by
selective and non-selective universities.21 However, the effect of increasing the cohort
size of international students is undetermined. Increasing the size of the international
cohort will push the ability mass towards the bottom of the distribution and, there-
fore, decrease the average ability of enrolled students if the stochastic dominance
relation in (4.11) is met. But nothing guarantees that (4.11) is going to be met. For
example, imaging that international students have higher ability in the population,
in a first order stochastic dominance sense, and have the same supply as native stu-
dents, i.e. αI(w) = αH(w) ∀w. Then increasing the size of the international cohort
can have a heterogeneous effect. We represent this situation in figure 4.5. What
happens is that, in supply constrained universities, an increase on the international
cohort size increases the share of international students enrolled but keeps constant
their ability distribution. This increases the mass of enrolled students bellow the
home cut-off, independently of whether international students are of higher or lower
ability. However, if international students are of higher ability, as assumed in figure
4.5, increasing the cohort size of international students will also increase the number
of students towards the top of the distribution. Thus condition (4.11) is not met all
across the ability distribution. Which of this two effects is the strongest will deter-
mine whether the average ability of enrolled students increases or decreases with the
20A similar discussion holds for increasing the cohort size of home students.
21With the caveat that the number of enrolled students is smaller than the capacity con-
straint. In (4.9) and (4.10) one needs to substitute c2 with the number of enrolled students, i.e.
H
∫ 1
wH
αH(ω)dFH(ω) + I
∫ 1
0
αI(ω)dFI(ω).
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cohort size of international students.
dG
dI
> 0⇔ φI(w, 0)
φI(1, 0)
>
φH(w,wH)
φH(1, wH)
(4.11)
4.2.3 Effort Provision
Once enrolled, students choose how much effort, e, and leisure, l to consume by
solving the following problem
max
e
f(w¯)eσ − eC (w, w¯)
s.t. e+ l = T
(4.12)
Where f(w¯)eσ is the expected grade given effort level e and G is the distribution
of ability of enrolled students. The grade production function in (4.12) is similar to
Moretti (2004) in that it allows spill-over effects given by the average quality of peers.
The cost function, on the other hand, is inspired by the work of Elsner and Isphording
(2017) and Murphy and Weinhardt (2018), showing that within school rank has a
positive effect on students outcomes. Therefore, we assume that ∂C/∂w < 0. Based
on the findings of Elsner and Isphording (2017) and Murphy and Weinhardt (2018) we
interpret this negative effect of own ability on the marginal cost of effort as reflecting
improved self-esteem. Assuming an interior solution, the optimal allocation of effort
is given in (4.13) and we are interested on the effects that increasing cohort sizes have
on it, i.e. equation (4.14).
e∗ =
(
c
fσ
) 1
σ−1
(4.13)
K ≡ d log(e
∗)
dK
=
1
1− σ
[
1
f
∂f
∂w¯
dw¯
dK
− 1
c
dC
dK
]
(4.14)
To learn more about the possible direction of the effect in (4.14) we introduce peer
ability as an effort augmenting technology, see equation (4.15). For the cost function
we introduce two specifications. In the first one, equation (4.16), individuals compare
themselves with the average peer. This induces that top students are the ones whose
marginal effort cost increases the most with average peer ability. We interpret this
as the impact on self-esteem from increasing peer ability been the highest for top
ability students. In our second cost specification, equation (4.17), students compare
themselves with all other students, thus their marginal effort cost depends on their
ranking within the peer group. In this case, those that suffer the most from a larger
cohort of students are those towards the bottom of the ability distribution. This is
because a large fraction of the additional students have ability equal or higher than
them. High ability students, on the other hand, do not suffer much as only a small
fraction of the new students will be of higher ability than them.
f(w¯) ≡ w¯σ (4.15)
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C1 (w, w¯) ≡ a1 − a2w
w¯
(4.16)
C2 (w, w¯) ≡ b1 − b2G(w) (4.17)
Given our assumptions, the peer effect on effort productivity is constant across
the ability distribution. However, the effect on the marginal effort cost varies across
ability. These movements across the ability distribution have the potential to make
peer effect heterogeneous, as we illustrate it in figure (4.1). Using a beta distribu-
tion that resembles the empirical distribution of ability and assuming an exponential
supply of students,22 we simulate the effect of increasing the cohort of international
students on the effort provision of students in a selective university. The two cost
functions in equations (4.16) and (4.17) produce two different peer effects. The linear
on rank marginal effort cost, produces a peer effect that is negative for low ability
students and positive for high ability. This is because increasing the average ability
of peers has the same effort productivity effect on all students, but those students
at the bottom suffer large self-esteem costs derived from being pushed further to-
wards the bottom by international students. If instead costs are a linear function
of student ability relative to average peer ability, we obtain the opposite behaviour.
The intuition, however, is similar. The effort productivity effect is still constant, but,
under cost specification (4.16), those students that suffer the most from international
students pushing up the average ability of peers are those at the top of the ability
distribution. This creates a positive effect for low ability students and a negative one
for high ability.
These already possibly heterogeneous peer effects could be made even more flex-
ible if we were to allow the effect on effort productivity to vary across the ability
distribution. For example, imaging that own and peer ability are substitutes. In such
case the effect on effort productivity from increasing average peer ability is strongest
for low ability students. This creates a tension if students compare themselves with
all peers instead of the average one. With this cost function the self-esteem of low
ability individuals suffers the most and they receive the largest increase on marginal
effort cost. However, under substitution between own and peer ability, low individual
students are also the ones that benefit the most in terms of effort productivity from
improved ability of peers. Which of these two dominates is, given the assumptions
we have made, unknown.
22We assume that αK(w) = λ exp(−λw). This can be interpreted as an approximation to logistic
supplies when the number of universities is large (see Card, Cardoso, et al. 2018).
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Figure 4.1: Simulated International Peer Effect
On Effort Provision
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Notes: Simulated effects from increasing international cohort size on effort provision. Black line
uses linear cost on student rank. Grey line uses linear cost on relative to average peer ability.
Summing up, our framework clearly delimits the effects that increasing cohort sizes
of international and home student has on the number of enrolled students and their
average ability. In selective universities, increasing the cohort size of international
students increases the ability of the marginal enrolled student and decreases the
number of enrolled home students. In non-selective universities increasing the cohort
size of international students does not crowd-out home students, although it increases
the average ability of enrolled students through the marginally enrolled international
student having a higher ability. In supply-constrained universities that are not able
to fill capacity, increasing the international cohort size has an ex-ante undetermined
effect.
In contrast, the effect of increasing the cohort size of international students has a
heterogeneous effect on effort provision. We show that, even with restrictive assump-
tions on the effects of peers on effort productivity and cots, the peer effect on effort
provision can be heterogeneous across the ability distribution.
4.3 Empirical strategy
We estimate peer effects using a reduced form framework where outcome (y) is deter-
mined by a linear combination of foreign status (z), other individual characteristics
(x),23 the share of foreigners in the group defined by x (E[z|x]) and unobserved
characteristics ()
23Including those defining group belonging.
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y = β0 + β1E[z|x] + x′β2 + zβ3 +  (4.18)
This reduced form can be obtained by following the linear peer effect model intro-
duced by Manski (1993), where reduced form parameters are functions of individually
non-identified structural parameters. Particularly, the peer effect β1 is a combination
of the contextual (individual outcomes varying with group characteristics) and en-
dogenous (individual outcomes varying with group outcomes) effect without further
capacity to distinguish one from the other (see Manski 1993).
In our set-up, reflection (Manski 1993) is not a problem since the characteristics
giving the peer effect are fixed. However, correlated peer characteristics could risk
causal interpretation of our estimates. Given that our interest is on the effect of
foreign peers on natives, we fix zi for all individuals (i) in our population of interest.
This creates a clear cut between our subjects and the peers influencing their outcomes
that helps differentiating peer effects from correlated own characteristics (Angrist
2014; Carrell, Hoekstra, et al. 2018). Although this comes at the cost of neither
identifying the effect of being a foreigner on outcomes nor possible heterogeneity in
peer effects for foreigners and natives.
The unobserved component () in (4.18) includes characteristics that are hardly
measurable, such as institution studying facilities. Our identification strategy relies
on us controlling for these through a comprehensive set of fixed effects. For example,
those UK universities that provide higher quality or a more valuable signal might be
more attractive to foreign students. If university quality also affects the outcomes of
native students we will have an omitted variable bias, as correlated effects induce a
positive relation between natives outcomes and the share of foreign students.
In our linear set up, correlated effects given by institution or major characteristics
can be easily controlled for by introducing institution and major fixed effects into
(4.18). These fixed effects leave variation across cohorts within majors or institutions
to identify the peer effect. However, using this variation to identify the causal effect
of foreign peers would introduce rather stringent correlation conditions. For example,
one could think of labour market shocks that shift returns to specific majors, therefore,
modifying incentives for natives to enrol and put effort into their studies. At the same
time, if immigrants plan to stay in the British labour market or the shocks are global,
labour market shocks will drive the choices of foreigners and, thus, the immigrant
composition of the peer group. This leads to an spurious correlation between foreign
student shares and natives’ outcomes that would bias our estimates. We follow the
literature (see Sacerdote 2011) and use a comprehensive set of institution-major,
institution-cohort and major-cohort fixed effects that difference out correlated shocks.
This leads to the following estimating equation
yihmc = β0 + β1z¯hmc + x
′
iβ2 + τhm + υmc + ωhc + ihmc, (4.19)
where h is higher education institution, m is major, and c is cohort defined by
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year of enrolment in the undergraduate course. It follows that identification of the
peer effect relies on E[z¯|τ, υ, ω] = 0 and we identify peer effects from variation on
foreign shares across cohorts within the same institution and major.
Thus, our strategy follows the literature on peer effects which has mainly relied on
quasi-random variation across cohorts within a unit, that could be a school or a firm,
to analyse a vast range of outcomes.24 More specifically, our specification is similar
to Cornelissen et al. (2017), where they include fixed effects for occupations within
firms and is more flexible than some specifications in the literature that account only
for institution fixed effects and institution-specific linear time trends (e.g. Geay et al.
2013; Hanushek et al. 2003).
4.4 Data and sample
We use administrative data from the Student Record provided by the Higher Educa-
tion Statistical Agency (HESA). This contains information on the whole population
of students that enrolled in a higher education institution in the UK in academic
years 2001/02 to 2010/11.
In our analysis, we define as population of interest the sub-population of students
that are enrolled in a three year undergraduate course, that at the time of enter-
ing higher education are 18-21 years old and come from high school, without any
prior experience at higher education. We do this selection to avoid possible selec-
tion concerns from students that might have had some previous experience in higher
education or the labour market and to limit heterogeneity in terms of the type of
education students are getting. At the same time, selecting young students also elim-
inates possible heterogeneity due to different educational motives between young and
mature students.
To construct the peer group we use the whole population of students enrolled in a
first year undergraduate course, without any age restriction,25 and define peer groups
as all students that are enrolled in the same higher education institution and major.
For each peer group we compute foreign exposure as the share of foreign peers over
native students, where we define native status by looking at whether a student was
domiciled in the UK prior to enrolment into higher education.26 A major benefit of
defining natives and migrants by place of domicile prior to higher education instead of
nationality is that students who were residing in the UK before enrolling into higher
education have, most likely, received secondary education in the UK. Thus, they are
comparable in terms of the previous education and incentives they had for enrolling
in certain majors and institutions.
24For a comprehensive literature review see Sacerdote (2011).
25We impose the 18-21 age restriction on focal students only.
26A popular definition for native in the literature (e.g. Dustmann, Frattini, et al. 2013; Manacorda
et al. 2012) is whether the individual was born in the country. However, we have no information
about country of birth.
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A feature of our data is that some students participate in multiple groups, for ex-
ample there are students that are simultaneously enrolled in business and economics,
or philosophy and education. To construct peer groups, we count every individual in
every major she participates, and compute z¯ in (4.19) as
Ê[z|x] = z¯hmc =
∑
j∈FPhc 1[j participates in major m]∑
j∈Shc:j 6=i 1[j participates in major m]
(4.20)
where Shc are all students of cohort c in university h and FPhc is the subset of
them that are foreigners. When computing foreign shares in 4.20, we assume that
students enrolled in multiple majors have equal participation in all of them and count
them into each of the majors in which they participate.27
In the estimating sample, we select only those students that are enrolled in a
single major as it is unclear which is the peer group for those that are enrolled in
multiple majors.28 In practice, including also those that are enrolled in multiple
majors creating one observation per major and weighting by the relative importance
of the major in the course as provided by HESA major weights does not affect our
estimates.
We consider two types of outcomes: attainment at higher education and par-
ticipation and performance in the labour market. For higher education outcomes
we observe the universe of all undergraduate students and we investigate whether a
higher share of foreign peers in the same university and major affects the probability
of graduating, graduating with a first degree, graduating with a qualification lower
than a first degree, transitioning from a STEM to a non-STEM major (and vice
versa), and graduating with a first, upper second, lower second, or third grade.
In table 4.1 we provide descriptive statistics of higher education outcomes for
cohorts 2007-2010. We do not use earlier cohorts because only from 2007 onwards
we have measures of pre-higher education attainment and, in section 4.4.2, we show
that one can only treat cross-cohort variation as quasi-random after controlling for
pre-higher education attainment.
In our sub-population of students, 89.8% of them graduate: 86.1% graduate with
a first degree (Graduates Successfully) and 3.7% with a lower qualification (Grad-
uates Lower Qual.); 1.7% of our students fail to graduate and 8.5% drop out. We
differentiate between failing and dropping out by looking at the last course in which
students were enrolled. If a student drops before reaching the third year we classify
her as a dropout, if she arrives to the last year but does not graduate we classify
her educational outcome as a fail. Of those students that did not drop out, 14.4%
graduated with a first, 52.6% with an upper second, 23.4% with a lower second, 3.7%
27In unreported results we computed shares assuming that participation is proportional to major
weights provided by HESA that measure the relative importance of the major inside the course. This
did not change our main results.
28Students enrolled in a single major represent around 80% of the entire population of undergrad-
uate students.
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with a third, 3.7% with a lower qualification and 4% fail to graduate29
Out of 326,997 students that started in a non-STEM major, 1.8% transitioned in
a STEM major. In comparison, a larger proportion, 4.8%, of the 239,322 students
that started in a STEM major transitioned into a non-STEM major.
Table 4.1: Higher Education Outcomes
Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Graduates 458180 0.898 0.303 0.000 1.000
Graduates Succesfully 458180 0.861 0.346 0.000 1.000
Graduates Lower Qual. 458180 0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000
Fails (to graduate) 458180 0.017 0.129 0.000 1.000
Dropout 458180 0.085 0.279 0.000 1.000
To STEM 327000 0.018 0.131 0.000 1.000
To non-STEM 131180 0.048 0.215 0.000 1.000
Graduates with First 416030 0.144 0.351 0.000 1.000
Graduates with Upper Second 416030 0.526 0.499 0.000 1.000
Graduates with Lower Second 416030 0.234 0.424 0.000 1.000
Graduates with Third 416030 0.037 0.190 0.000 1.000
Graduates with Lower Qual. 416030 0.037 0.190 0.000 1.000
Fails to Graduate 416030 0.040 0.197 0.000 1.000
Note: Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit.
To study labour market outcomes, we link the HESA Student Record with the
Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey that collects infor-
mation, at six months after graduation, on the destination of all natives and EU
graduates in the UK that graduated between 2002 and 2012. In the whole data, the
DLHE response rate is about 80% for natives and 60% for EU students, with inter-
national students not included for the period considered. In our estimating sample
we select cohorts 2007-2009. As with higher education outcomes, we do not use co-
horts prior to 2007 because for earlier cohorts we do not have information on ability.
Furthermore, in the DLHE data we drop cohorts that entered education after 2009
because we consider three years courses and the latest graduation year available in
our DLHE data is 2012.
Our native sample for labour market outcomes comprises 146,491 students with
75.41% of our native student sub-population in the student record matched in the
DLHE data. Although this is a very good matching rate, we address remaining
concerns by replicating higher education outcomes estimates using the DLHE matched
29The number of individuals for whom we observe grades is smaller than the proportion of students
that graduate or didn’t drop out. This is because some majors, such as medicine, do not use this
grading system.
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subsample. In section 4.7 we show that our results hold in the DLHE matched sub-
sample.
The labour market outcomes can be divided into activity status: whether em-
ployed or studying; and job attributes: whether working in a professional or graduate
job and earnings. Of the 146,491 graduate students that we have matched in the
DLHE data 59.4% are working, 67% are working or working while studying (Working
(& work+stud.)), 9% are unemployed, 16.8% are studying and 7.3% are doing some-
thing else. When we select only those that are participating in the labour market
(Working vs Unemployed), 88.2% have a job. Of those with a job, 55.9% are in profes-
sional occupations and 33.7% have a graduate job.30 Observed average (log-)earnings
are 9.803, close to average imputed earnings from the Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings (Salary imp.).
Although our labour market outcomes are measured at six months after gradua-
tion, a relatively short-time after exiting education, they are of economic relevance.
The literature has shown that labour market entry conditions largely affect individu-
als’ working trajectories, especially among the population of graduates (Baert et al.
2013; Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos et al. 2012; Raaum and Røed 2006; Von Wachter and
Bender 2006).
Table 4.2: Labour Market Outcomes
Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Working 146490 0.594 0.491 0.000 1.000
Working (& work+stud.) 146490 0.670 0.470 0.000 1.000
Working vs Unemployed 111260 0.882 0.323 0.000 1.000
Unemployed 146490 0.090 0.286 0.000 1.000
Studying 146490 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000
Studying Postgrad 146490 0.091 0.287 0.000 1.000
Studying Undergrad 146490 0.075 0.264 0.000 1.000
Work & Study 146490 0.075 0.264 0.000 1.000
Other 146490 0.073 0.259 0.000 1.000
Professional Occ. 86890 0.559 0.496 0.000 1.000
Graduate Job 77480 0.337 0.473 0.000 1.000
(log)Salary 40940 9.803 0.340 2.079 12.578
(log)Salary imp. 51760 9.835 0.367 2.079 10.597
Note: Observations from years 2007-2008 only. 75.41% of the student record observations are
matched in the DLHE data. Observations rounded to last unit.
30Differences in observation numbers are due to missing items for some individuals in the DLHE
data.
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4.4.1 Source of variation
By inspection of equation (4.19) it follows that identification relies on variation across
cohorts within a university-major, as the fixed effects absorb variation across majors,
universities and cohorts within major and within university.
In our data the average foreign peer share is at 10.5% of students in a major-
university, with 60 students being foreigners on average and a standard deviation of
the share of 10.8 percentage points, see table 4.3. The average EU student share
is 4.1% and non-EU 6.3%, with standard deviations of 4 and 8.3 percentage points.
When we introduce our set of fix effects they, obviously, reduced the amount of vari-
ation available. The standard deviation for foreign peer shares goes from 10.8 to 2.3
percentage points when looking at levels and residuals from fix effects regressions.
For EU student shares standard deviations go from 4 to 1.3 percentage points and
for non-EU from 8.3 to 2. This reduction on variation is desirable because it implies
that we only exploit within group variation. In figure 4.9, we show that international
students are mostly represented (about 20% of the whole undergraduate population)
in Business studies, Engineering and Economics; followed by Maths and Computer
science and Technologies. For EU students the most selected subjects are Economics,
Business, Engineering and Architecture, figure 4.10. The non-homogeneous distribu-
tion of foreign students across majors suggest that there may be substantial differences
in terms of incentives and therefore selection across majors and universities.31 This
makes cross major-university variation not really useful in terms of identification of
the effect of foreign students on natives, as we discussed in section 4.3.
In terms of magnitudes, if we look at variation within major-university between
consecutive cohorts, second panel of table 4.3, the average change is at .4 percentage
points for the foreign share and .2 percentage points for EU and non-EU shares,
with standard deviations of 6 percentage points for changes in foreign shares, 3.5
for EU shares and 5.4 for non-EU. Furthermore, even large increases on the number
of foreign students, as the one following EU enlargement towards Eastern European
countries in 2004 (figure 4.3), induce changes in the share of immigrants that are much
smaller than those observed when comparing shares across majors or universities, see
figure 4.4.32 Thus, from a policy perspective, we are interested in changes that are
of magnitude similar of those across cohorts and much smaller than changes across
majors or higher education institutions.33
31See figure 4.11.
32In unreported results we estimated the effect of A10 students on major-university aggregated
native outcomes in first-differences comparing the year before the accession of A10 countries and the
year after. These estimates return the same picture, small effects that are typically non-statistically
significant.
33If we consider the reduced form effect as a best linear approximation, the closest we are to the
point of interest the better the approximation.
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Table 4.3: Variation
Foreign EU Non-EU
Fix Effects
Standard Deviation 0.023 0.013 0.020
Min -0.335 -0.178 -0.318
Max 0.833 0.303 0.961
First Differences
Standard Deviation 0.053 0.032 0.047
Min -0.824 -0.375 -0.941
Max 0.375 0.333 0.375
Mean 0.004 0.002 0.002
Levels
Average Share 0.105 0.041 0.063
Average Share Standard Deviation 0.108 0.040 0.083
Average Size 59.096 22.620 36.477
Note: Observations from 2007 onwards only.
4.4.2 Validity of Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy relies on exploiting quasi-random variation in foreign peer
exposure across cohorts within the same university and major. If variation across
cohorts within university and major is as good as random, we should not observe
any foreign peer effects on outcomes that pre-date entry into higher education. Here
we use two outcomes that are determined before native students actually meet their
peers: distance between home and chosen institution, and ability. Distance between
home and university is chosen at the moment of applying and accepting an university
offer and as such pre-dates interaction with foreign peer students and should not
be influenced by them. Ability is measured using the UCAS score and as such is
a summary index of pre-higher education educational achievement, therefore, it is
predetermined at the entry in higher education.
In table 4.4 we provide estimates from regressing distance and tariff scores on
foreign shares using the fix effect specification in (4.19). Our estimates show no sig-
nificant effects on distance between home and university location. However, there
are effects on tariffs and number of natives enrolled. Increasing the share of immi-
grants by one percentage point leads to a .177% increase in the tariff and a -1.16%
decrease on the number of enrolled natives. These effects are more strongly driven by
EU students. This matches what we presented in our framework in section 4.2. EU
students are treated by universities as home students and, as such, they put pressure
on the number and the ability of natives across all universities. On the other hand,
non-EU students only compete with natives in certain institutions, those that are
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more selective. This can be seen in table 4.4. On average a one percentage point
increase on the share of EU students lowers the number of natives by 2%. The same
increase on non-EU produces a .93% decrease. However, this changes when we con-
sider specific university groups. In selective universities such as those in the Russell
Group,34 increasing the share of EU and non-EU students has a similar effect. But in
less selection universities, those in the 1994 group and all others, the effect of non-EU
students gets attenuated. In the last column of table 4.4, increasing the share of EU
and non-EU students produces a 1.98% and 2.53% decrease on natives enrolled in
Russell Group universities, the baseline. The effect of non-EU students gets attenu-
ated by 1.49 percentage points in the next most selective university group, i.e. 1994
Group, and by 2.04 percentage points in all other universities.
As we introduced in section 4.2, the asymmetry on the treatment of EU and
non-EU students induces an asymmetry on the effect that this have on the number
and ability of enrolled natives. Furthermore, this asymmetry is heterogeneous across
universities depending on how selective they can be. Therefore, we interpret the
effects on tariffs and course sizes as evidence showing that universities modify the
distribution of student characteristics as a function of the foreign composition of
their prospective students. This means that exploiting variation across cohorts within
university and major cannot extract peer effects.
34See figure 4.12.
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Table 4.4: Placebo
Pre-entry Outcomes
(log-)Distance (log-)Ability (log-)Native Students
Foreign Peers 0.002 0.177 -1.164*
(0.106) (0.109) (0.490)
EU Peers 0.040 0.311* 0.284+ -2.055*** -1.980***
(0.196) (0.152) (0.154) (0.547) (0.546)
non-EU Peers -0.013 0.132 -0.086 -0.923+ -2.523***
(0.126) (0.129) (0.145) (0.533) (0.667)
1994 Grp. * EU -0.279 -0.882
(0.229) (0.669)
Other HEI * EU 0.151 0.210
(0.305) (0.929)
1994 Grp. * non-EU -0.086 1.487+
(0.447) (0.853)
Other HEI * non-EU 0.339 2.043*
(0.227) (0.916)
Observations 447,980 458,160 458,160 4,710 4,710
Note: Sample of undergraduate students enrolled in 2007/10 in all English higher eduction insti-
tutions (HEI). Fixed effects: HEI, year (of enrolment), major, HEI-year, HEI-major, major-year.
Observations are weighted with analytic weights to account for the different contribution of course
size in our estimates. The overall foreign peer estimated is produced from a separate regression.
Standard errors are clustered at HEI level and reported in parenthesis. Observations rounded to last
unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Selection carried by universities at entry would imply that our estimates return the
effect of foreign students given the university selection mechanism. However, we can
improve upon this thanks to the quality of our data. This is because we can control for
ability using the UCAS score. We show that, conditional on individual ability, cross-
cohort variation on foreign peer shares is uncorrelated with a comprehensive set of
predetermined characteristics that are likely predictors of educational performance.35
Particularly, we provide estimates from regressing socio-economic background (figure
4.2), sex, age and private school (figure 4.6); ethnicity (figure 4.7) and disability
(figure 4.8) on the share of EU and non-EU students. Where each of this variables
is used in its own regression with our set of fixed effects and conditioning on ability
score quartile.
In figure 4.2, all socio-economic groups show non significant correlations, at the
95%, with both the share of EU and non-EU peers and point estimates are typically
close to zero. The only exception is the correlation between routine occupations and
non-EU share for which we observe a marginally significant correlation. In figures 4.6,
35This sort of balancing test have a long tradition on the peer effects literature (Anelli and Peri
2017; Chin et al. 2013; Cools et al. 2019; Lavy and Schlosser 2011).
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4.7 and 4.8 we find similar results with most groups having non statistically significant
correlations, and a few: age in months and EU share, Indian ethnicity and EU share,
and mental health disability and non-EU share presenting significant correlations. To
test whether these could drive our estimates, in tables 4.33 and 4.34, we replicate our
baseline higher education estimates introducing controls for all these characteristics.
This does not produce major changes in our estimates.
Finally, from estimates in table 4.4 one may be concerned about estimating a peer
effect that is actually a composite of the foreign peer effect and course size (Angrist
and Lavy 1999; Krueger 2003). This is because in table 4.4 we show that non-EU
peer shares have a zero effect on the number of natives enrolled in certain universities.
We address possible concerns by controlling for course size in all our regressions.
Figure 4.2: Balance Test
Socio-economic Background
non-EU Share
EU Share
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Higer Managerial Lower Managerial
Intermediate Occ. Self-employed
Technical Occ. Semi-routine Occ.
Routine Occ. Never Worked
Unknown
Notes: Estimates from regression including year, major, university, year-major, year-university and
major-university fixed effects plus controls for tariff score and class size. Balance test for age, sex,
school type, ethnicity and disability in figures 4.6 to 4.8.
4.5 Foreign Students and Entry into Higher Education
Our estimates in table 4.4 support the mechanism we introduced in our framework
in section 4.2. This is, treating EU and native students as home students in terms
of funding constraints induces that EU students put pressure on the number of na-
tive students, particularly those of low ability, in all universities. However, non-EU
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students, that are not subject to funding constraints, only put pressure on natives in
selective universities.
In this section we provide further evidence. For this, we estimate a simple model
of major-institution choice. Keeping with the notation that we introduced earlier, an
individual i from cohort c enrols in a major-institution (m,h) according to a threshold
crossing rule
Vmh(xi) + ihmc ≥ Vm′h′(xi) + ih′m′c
∀ (m′, h′) ∈ {1, . . . ,M} × {1, . . . ,H}
(4.21)
Where Vmh(xi) ≡ umh(xi) + τhm + νmc + ωhc and x are individual characteristics
including her cohort. Assume that the set of major-institution pairs can be partitioned
into K disjoint subsets, B1, . . . , BK , such that shocks  are uncorrelated across subsets
but may be correlated within them. Assuming that the distribution of  belongs to
the generalized extreme value family, it is possible to obtain closed form solutions for
the probability of choosing a major and institution that are consistent with the nested
correlation structure (e.g. see Train 2009, chapter 4). In particular, the probabilities
have the nested logit functional form
Phm(x) =
eVmh(x)/λk
(∑
(m′,h′)∈Bk e
Vm′h′ (x)/λb
)λk−1
∑K
k=1
(∑
(m′,h′)∈Bk e
Vm′h′ (x)/λb
)λk (4.22)
In estimation of non-linear functions, such as (4.22), the incidental parameters
problem from fixed effects is more of a concern as sufficient statistics are not always
available (Gary 1980). For estimation, we exploit a convenient property of the nested
logit probabilities. For two major-university pairs (m,h), (m′, h′) ∈ Bk the log of the
ratio of their probabilities is a linear function
log
(
Phm(x)
Ph′m′(x)
)
=Vmh(x)/λk − Vm′h′(x)/λk
= (umh(x)− um′h(x) + τhm − τh′m′
+νmc(x) − νm′c(x) + ωh′c(x) − ωhc(x)
)
/λk
(4.23)
In our application we nest major-institution pairs by major and institution groups.
As in table 4.4, we classify institutions into Russell group, 1994 group and other.
Russell group universities are nationally and internationally well recognized and are
mainly research-focused universities. The 1994 group follows Russell in terms of being
recognized great credentials and in implementing high entry requirements. Institu-
tions in these two groups are, arguably, the most selective ones in the UK.36 Given
36This can be seen in figure 4.12 where we plot the distribution of ability for natives enrolled in
each of these university groups.
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this nesting structure, it follows that, if (m,h), (m′, h′) ∈ Bk, m = m′, the (log-)odds
ratio in (4.23) simplifies to
log
(
Phm(x)
Ph′m′(x)
)
=
(
umh(x)− um′h(x) + τhm − τh′m′ + ωhc(x) − ωh′c(x)
)
/λk (4.24)
The probabilities on the left-hand side of (4.24) can be non-parametrically es-
timated from the data. For example, if x is discrete, one can use a bin estimator.
We divide our sample in cells by cohort, ability quartile, region of domicile, sex and
ethnicity and compute the probability of entering any major-institution pair for each
cell.37 With these probabilities we estimate the effect of foreign students on the
probability of entering a major-institution as
log
(
Pˆhm(x)
Pˆh′m′(x)
)
=β(z¯hmc(x) − z¯h′m′c(x)) + (τ˜hm − τ˜h′m′) + ω˜hkc(x) + ξhmc(x)
(4.25)
Where we have imposed that uhm(x) = βz¯hmc(x) + g(x) and λk = λ ∀ k ∈
{1, . . . ,K}. Moreover, given that, within a cohort, we normalize all alternatives
in a nest with the same baseline alternative we write ω˜hkc(x) ≡
(
ωhc(x) − ωh′c(x)
)
/λ.
In table 4.5, we display estimates of β in (4.25). One should be careful when
interpreting these estimates as they are not the marginal effect of foreign students
on the entry probabilities of natives in (4.26). This is because the scaling parameters
λk are not identified from (4.24),
38 thus we can not estimate ∂Phm(x)/∂Vhm(x) from
estimates obtained from linear odds ratios. Nonetheless, β gives the direction of
the effect and, sometimes, the scale is comparable across different sub-groups. For
example, we can compare the scale of increasing the share of EU and non-EU students,
but the scale across ability quartiles, institutions or any other discrete variable, is not
comparable.39
dPhm(x)
dz¯hmc(x)
=
∂Phm(x)
∂Vhm(x)
β (4.26)
The estimates in table 4.5 report bootstrap standard errors clustered by nest. We
bootstrap to account for additional variation induced by estimation of the left hand
side. In every bootstrap replication, therefore, we re-sample the individual level data,
estimate the entry probabilities using bin estimators and regress the odds ratio on
the foreign student share to estimate β in (4.25). We cluster by nest because the
37For ethnicity we divide students into white and non-white British.
38Without additional restrictions, in the linear transformation there is no variation to identify
the multiplying parameter λ. For identification we will need to know the slope of a covariate or the
variance of ξλ.
39Imaging that we allow for different effects in a selective h and non-selective h′ university. Then
dPhm(x)
dz¯hmc(x)
/
dPh′m(x)
dz¯h′mc(x)
=
∂Phm(x)
∂Vhm(x)
(
∂Ph′m(x)
∂Vh′m(x)
)−1
βh
βh′
.
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odds ratio measurement error ξ is correlated for observations within the same nest
by construction.40
Table 4.5: Probability of Entry Estimates
All All Selective Non-Selective
EU Peers -1.125* -0.856 -0.593 -1.291*
(0.515) (0.566) (0.704) (0.625)
non-EU Peers -0.497 -0.585+ -0.596 -0.483
(0.310) (0.319) (0.475) (0.362)
EU * T(.25,.5] -0.365
(0.319)
EU * T(.5,.75] -0.600
(0.415)
EU * T(.75,1] -0.262
(0.436)
non-EU * T(.25,.5] -0.142
(0.184)
non-EU * T(.5,.75] -0.359*
(0.143)
non-EU * T(.75,1] 0.688***
(0.155)
Observations 125,130 125,130 41,040 84,100
Note: Sample of undergraduate students enrolled in 2007/10 in all English higher
eduction institutions (HEI). Fixed effects: HEI, year (of enrolment), major, HEI-
year, HEI-major, major-year. Bootstrap standard errors from 100 replications
are clustered by nest and reported in parenthesis. Observations rounded to last
unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In the first column of table 4.5 we display the average effect of increasing the share
of EU and non-EU students, where both display a negative effect that, in line with
estimates in table 4.4, is only statistically significant for EU students. In the second
column of table 4.5, where T(l,u] is a dummy for whether the individual’s ability is
between the l and u percentile, we look at these estimates across the distribution
of ability. Our estimates show that EU students have a negative effect everywhere.
Although the increase on the number of parameters drives standard errors up making
point estimates statistically non-significant. For non-EU we find a negative effect for
everyone but those at the top of the ability distribution.
40To construct the odds ratio we take a baseline entry probability of a major-institution pair for
each nest with which we divide all other probabilities in the nest. This induces a correlation among
all observations in the nest because all ξ in the nest are a function of the measurement error of the
baseline estimated probability.
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In the last two columns of table 4.5 we replicate the first column but using the
probabilities of entering major-institutions in the selective group, this is Russell and
1994 group, and other institutions, that we have termed non-selective. Remarkably,
for selective institutions we find that the scale of the effect is homogeneous for both
EU and non-EU students. On the other hand, for non-selective institutions, the effect
displays an asymmetric scale between EU and non-EU. The parameter for EU is 2.67
times the estimate for non-EU. This further supports our findings in table 4.4 and
goes in line with our framework in section 4.2, where we show that treating EU as
home students creates an asymmetry on the effect of increasing the number of EU
and non-EU students in non-selective universities.
4.6 Foreign Peers and Higher Education Outcomes
4.6.1 Baseline Estimates
In this section we present estimates of the effect of foreign peers on natives educational
outcomes. We start estimating foreign peer effects on the probability of graduation
and transition between STEM and non-STEM majors for native students, tables 4.6
and 4.15. In general, estimated effects are rather small, a one percentage point in-
crease in foreign shares typically leads to non-significant changes and point estimates
with magnitudes of .01 percentage points. We estimate negative, albeit small and
not statistically significant, effects on the probability of graduation where this works
through the probability of successful graduation, i.e. graduating with a first degree.
The only graduation outcome for which we observe a larger, although still not statisti-
cally significant, effect is for the effect of EU peers on the probability of transitioning
to a non-STEM major conditional on starting in a STEM, see table 4.15. For this,
we estimate that a one percentage point increase in the share of EU peers leads to
a .20 percentage point increase in the probability of transitioning from STEM to
non-STEM majors.
Anelli, Shih, et al. (2017) report that increasing the share of international peers
by one standard deviation decreases the probability of graduation in a STEM by 3
percentage points. Given that they report a foreign share standard deviation of .041,
this is around a .83 percentage point decrease on the probability of graduating in
STEM per percentage point increase on foreign shares. In column four of table 4.15
we replicate the result in Anelli, Shih, et al. (2017). We find that increasing the share
of EU students by one percentage point lowers the probability of graduating in STEM
by .237 percentage points. This is in the same direction as Anelli, Shih, et al. (2017)
but the effect is smaller. Indeed, the lower 95% confidence bound of our estimate is
at .591 percentage points decrease. Furthermore, we cannot reject a null of equality
to zero.
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Table 4.6: Higher Education Outcomes
Graduation and Transition
Graduates Success Lower Qual. Failure Dropout
Foreign Peers -0.004 -0.017 0.013 0.016 -0.012
(0.027) (0.028) (0.018) (0.012) (0.021)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.002 -0.016 0.010 0.012 -0.010
(0.039) (0.052) (0.038) (0.024) (0.044)
non-EU Peers -0.005 -0.017 0.014 0.017 -0.012
(0.031) (0.034) (0.020) (0.013) (0.023)
Observations 458,160 458,160 458,160 458,160 458,160
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include
tariff controls and fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded
to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In terms of grades, in table 4.7, we present foreign peer effect estimates on the
probability of graduating with a first, upper second, lower second, third, lower qual-
ification and failing to graduate.41 Magnitudes of estimates are similar to those in
tables 4.6 and 4.15. A one percentage point increase in foreign peer shares leads
to changes in magnitudes of .01 percentage points on the probability of the different
classifications. We estimate a negative, albeit not statistically significant, foreign peer
effect from both EU and non-EU peers on the probability of graduating with an first
and a positive non-significant effect on the probability of graduating with a lower
qualification and failing to graduate.
For upper second, lower second and third the direction of the effect changes de-
pending on whether we look at EU or non-EU peers. For EU peers, we find that a one
percentage point increase in EU shares increases the probability of graduating with
a third by .073 percentage points and this change is statistically significant. Still this
effect is rather small, evaluated at the averages in table 4.3 a one percentage point
increase in the share of EU peers maps into five additional EU students and the effect
in table 4.7 leads to this five EU students increasing the number of natives gradu-
ating with a third by less than half of a student. These differences on the effects of
EU and non-EU could be explained by the fact that EU and non-EU students enter
HE through different channels as laid out in previous sections. This means that the
average ability of these two groups of students might differ. Unfortunately, we do
not have a measure of their pre-HE ability. Nevertheless, we can observe that overall
EU students graduate with higher grades than native and non-EU students, see table
4.10. This provides suggestive evidence of EU students having a better academic
41Note that there are some majors, such as medicine, that do not use this classification scheme
and therefore are not included.
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preparation than the two latter groups which could explain why we observe different
directions in the effects of EU and non-EU students on natives’ grades.
Average foreign peer effects are, therefore, mild and typically non-significant. In
the next section, as our framework in section 4.2 suggest, we explore whether this
is due to heterogeneous effects across the ability distribution that compensate each
other returning a zero average effect.42
Table 4.7: Higher Education Outcomes
Grades
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers -0.027 -0.065 0.049 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.025) (0.019) (0.014)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.061 0.001 -0.035 0.073* 0.015 0.006
(0.053) (0.098) (0.082) (0.032) (0.042) (0.026)
non-EU Peers -0.016 -0.088 0.079 -0.006 0.013 0.017
(0.050) (0.065) (0.051) (0.034) (0.022) (0.015)
Observations 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix
effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
4.6.2 Effects Across the Ability Distribution
In our framework we showed that heterogeneous effects across the ability distribution
can appear even under fairly restrictive assumptions. This is supported by existing
evidence in other peer effects. For example, Carrell, Fullerton, et al. (2009) find peer
effects in college achievement that are heterogeneous across the ability distribution.
We explore whether that is the case by regressing our higher education outcomes on
foreign shares interacted with dummies for ability quartiles.
Our estimates in table 4.8 show significant effects on the probability of graduating
and graduating successfully for native students that change across ability quantiles.
For native students at the bottom of the ability distribution, an increase in the share
of foreign peers has a positive effect on the probability of graduation and successful
graduation, although the effect is statistically non-significant. However, the direction
of the effect reverts and becomes significant for native students above the first ability
quartile. For these an increase in the share of foreign students has a negative effect.
42In appendix 4.9.2, we investigate whether our zero effect findings masks some heterogeneity
across different groups of students. For example, ethnic minorities might interact differently with
foreign students compared to white British. We run our analysis separately for these two groups
of native students. However, we do not find that there are significant results with respect to the
ethnicity dimension. The stronger source of heterogeneity is found across the distribution of natives’
ability and so we focus the discussion on this dimension in the next section.
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Although it is rather small in magnitude. A one percentage point increase in the share
of foreign peers decreases the probability of graduation by .014 percentage points for
those in the second quartile, .02 for those in the third quartile and .027 for those at
the top ability quartile. The decrease on the probability of graduation for students
above the bottom ability quartile is mostly compensated by a positive effect on the
probability of dropping out, that is, leaving without graduating before reaching the
last year of the course.
For the effect on the probability of transitioning from non-STEM into STEM, table
4.22, our estimates are typically statistically non-significant and have magnitudes
similar to those in table 4.6. If anything, non-EU students have a marginally negative
effect on the probability of transitioning into non-STEM majors that changes sign for
students in the second ability quartile.
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Table 4.8: Graduation Effects Across Ability
Graduates Success Lower Qual. Failure Dropout
Foreign Peers 0.040 0.053 -0.013 0.033* -0.073*
(0.034) (0.038) (0.023) (0.015) (0.031)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.054* -0.069* 0.015 -0.023+ 0.077*
(0.025) (0.031) (0.017) (0.013) (0.031)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.060** -0.101*** 0.041* -0.027+ 0.087**
(0.023) (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.067** -0.116** 0.049* -0.021+ 0.088**
(0.024) (0.036) (0.022) (0.012) (0.029)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.099 0.090 0.003 -0.009 -0.090
(0.062) (0.089) (0.060) (0.032) (0.067)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.197** -0.184* -0.009 0.042+ 0.156*
(0.068) (0.085) (0.056) (0.025) (0.072)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.046 -0.060 0.020 0.015 0.030
(0.079) (0.096) (0.057) (0.029) (0.079)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.174* -0.178+ 0.007 0.039 0.135+
(0.081) (0.095) (0.057) (0.035) (0.071)
non-EU Peers 0.016 0.038 -0.019 0.050** -0.065
(0.040) (0.053) (0.027) (0.018) (0.041)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.007 -0.020 0.025 -0.051** 0.044
(0.035) (0.050) (0.023) (0.019) (0.045)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.060+ -0.112* 0.049+ -0.046* 0.106**
(0.031) (0.046) (0.026) (0.022) (0.039)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.028 -0.094 0.064* -0.045* 0.072+
(0.036) (0.058) (0.029) (0.019) (0.043)
Observations 458,160 458,160 458,160 458,160 458,160
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and
fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In terms of grades we observe a negative effect of foreign peer shares on the
probability of graduating with a first for native students at the bottom of the ability
distribution. This effects attenuates as we move up on the ability distribution and
becomes positive for natives in the third ability quartile. Furthermore, the effect is
mostly driven by EU peers. A one percentage point increase in the EU share reduces
the probability of graduating with a first by .162 percentage points for those at the
bottom of the ability distribution and increases it by .014 percentage points for native
students in the third ability quartile. In comparison the effect from non-EU peers are
never greater than .09 and are always non statistically significant.
Where we find stronger effects is on the probability of graduating with an upper
or lower second. On the probability of graduating with an upper second, a one
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percentage point increase in the share of foreign students produces a .105 increase
for those at the lower ability quartile. The sign of the effect changes when we look
at those right above in the ability distribution, for whom a one percentage point
increase in the foreign share decreases the probability of graduating with an upper
second by .004 percentage points. The effect increases further, to a .138 percentage
point decrease, for those at the third quartile and even further, to a .196 percentage
point decrease, for those at the top of the ability distribution. Exactly in the opposite
direction, we observe that foreign peers have a negative, though non significant, effect
on the probability of graduating with a lower second for natives at the bottom ability
quartile. This effect changes sign as we move up on the ability distribution, leading
to a one percentage point increase in foreign shares increasing the probability of
graduating with a lower second by .131 percentage points for natives at the top of
the ability distribution. Both effects on upper and lower second are most strongly
driven by the effect of non-EU peers.
On the probability of graduating with a third we find no significant effects other
than on the effect of EU peers on natives for which a one percentage point increase in
the EU share increases the probability of graduating with a third by .099 percentage
points. For lower qualification we find that foreign peers, driven by non-EU, increase
the probability of graduation with a lower qualification for those at the third and
top ability quartiles. Finally, on the probability of failing to graduate we find that
increasing the share of foreign peers increases the probability of failing by .034 per-
centage points for each percentage point increase in the share, although the effect
becomes almost zero for natives at the second ability quartile and up.
To conclude, overall, foreign peers affect natives at the higher tail of the ability
distribution. These effects are generally negative, although their magnitude is modest
to negligible. As already seen in the previous section, some effects are driven by EU
students and others by non-EU students.
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Table 4.9: Effects on Grades Across Ability
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers -0.097 0.105+ -0.041 0.024 -0.024 0.034+
(0.059) (0.054) (0.054) (0.027) (0.028) (0.017)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.071 -0.109* 0.047 -0.010 0.026 -0.025+
(0.072) (0.052) (0.033) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.111* -0.243*** 0.124* -0.017 0.055* -0.030+
(0.046) (0.042) (0.056) (0.012) (0.027) (0.016)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.096+ -0.301*** 0.172*** -0.008 0.065* -0.023+
(0.053) (0.055) (0.051) (0.015) (0.030) (0.012)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.162+ 0.071 -0.001 0.099* 0.014 -0.021
(0.090) (0.132) (0.119) (0.045) (0.073) (0.035)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.045 -0.010 -0.009 -0.064 -0.014 0.051+
(0.106) (0.123) (0.111) (0.041) (0.068) (0.029)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.176+ -0.015 -0.131 -0.052 0.003 0.019
(0.102) (0.131) (0.134) (0.042) (0.070) (0.033)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.170 -0.183 -0.041 0.011 -0.001 0.044
(0.130) (0.160) (0.135) (0.044) (0.071) (0.040)
non-EU Peers -0.076 0.123 -0.058 -0.006 -0.039 0.055**
(0.076) (0.079) (0.077) (0.039) (0.035) (0.020)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.082 -0.152+ 0.072 0.012 0.043 -0.056**
(0.099) (0.078) (0.052) (0.020) (0.031) (0.020)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.086 -0.332*** 0.223** -0.003 0.076* -0.050*
(0.063) (0.057) (0.076) (0.022) (0.037) (0.023)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.070 -0.354*** 0.256*** -0.012 0.090* -0.050*
(0.072) (0.072) (0.068) (0.027) (0.039) (0.019)
Observations 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects. Observa-
tions from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In the appendix, tables 4.23 to 4.31, we present further heterogeneity results by
university groups. In Russell group universities increasing the share of EU students
has a negative effect on the probability of graduating for students in the third and
forth quartile. This works through decreasing the probability of successful graduation
and increasing the probability of failing. In 1994 universities, however, we only ob-
serve a statistically significant effect for top ability students and this works through
an increase on the probability of dropping out, rather than failing. Finally, in the
rest of universities we observe that increasing the share of foreign peers decreases the
probability of graduating and successful graduation for all native students, but most
strongly those at the top of the ability distribution. These effects are compensated by
positive foreign peer effects on the probability of graduating with a lower qualification
and dropping out before graduation.
The effect on grades is also heterogeneous across universities. For example, in
Russell Group universities increasing the foreign share has very small effects on the
probability of obtaining a first. Although this hides substantial heterogeneity from
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EU and non-EU. EU peers decrease the probability of obtaining a first for natives
at the third and fourth quartile. Non-EU peers, on the other hand, increase the
probability of graduating with a first for the same group of native students. In 1994
universities and other universities we find no statistically signifiant effects on the
probability of graduating with a first, other than a marginally significant negative
effect of EU peers on top ability natives in 1994 universities. Finally, the foreign peer
effect pushing high ability natives from upper to lower second is mostly driven by the
effect of foreign peers on natives in other universities.
4.6.3 Grading on a Curve
Our results in section 4.6.2 show that foreign peers displace native students across
grades and that the effect depends on the position of the student in the ability dis-
tribution. This could be explained by two main channels, through interaction among
natives and foreign students and through grading on a curve. The first channel em-
bodies several mechanisms laid out in the introduction and in section 4.2. Grading
on a curve, on the other hand, consists on teachers grading with a curve in mind,
leading to mechanical foreign peer effects on grades that are given by differences be-
tween foreign and native student quality alone. It is important to disentangle these
two channels as the first one means that foreign students affect human capital accu-
mulation of natives, while the second, grading on a curve, is purely mechanical.
We do not have any information on the type of interaction that students have,
but we can formally test the grading on the curve mechanism. This allows us to
make inference on the effect of foreign students in the actual acquisition of human
capital of natives. Let us explore this point by introducing a simple model. In
a group with a foreign share pi, true grades (X) follow a distribution FX(X) =
FX(X|Native)(1−pi)+FX(X|Foreign)pi. Teachers have some target in mind of how
the distribution of grades should look (FY ) and instead of reporting true grades they
report a transformation that has the desired distribution, i.e. Y ≡ FY (F−1X (X)).
A straight forward implication of the grading on a curve mechanism is that changes
in the distribution of true grades do not modify the distribution of reported grades.
However, if we condition on being a native, grading on a curve leads to a mechanical
effect on reported grades of natives. This implies that one can easily test whether
the effect on grades is driven by a grading on a curve mechanism by testing if the
effect of foreign shares in the whole population, including foreign students, is zero.43
However, we cannot produce this test because we lack information on pre-higher
education ability for foreigners and there is selection at entry in terms of ability (see
section 4.4.2) and heterogeneous peer effects on grades across the ability distribution
(see section 4.6.2). Instead, we explore the grading on a curve mechanism to provide
us with further implications that we can test with our data.
43A stronger test will seek rejection of the null of no effects on multiple moments, not just the
first one.
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Let’s build from what we have. In the data, we only observe a categorization of the
grade; a student is awarded a first if her reported grade is above 70%, an upper second
if between 60-70%, a lower second if between 50-60%, a third if in 40-50%, a lower
qualification if below 40% but not too far away and fails to graduate otherwise. Then
we can easily recast the implications of grading on a curve in terms of probabilities
of grades that we can estimate from the data. For example, the probability of been
awarded a first for a native at the top ability quartile, T(.75,1], is
Pr(First|Native, T(.75,1]) =
∫
.7
dFY (y|Native, T(.75,1])
= 1− FX
(
F−1X (FY (.7))|Native, T(.75,1]
)
implying that the effect of increasing the share of foreigners when there is grading
on a curve is
∂ Pr(First|Native, T(.75,1])
∂pi
= −fX
(
F−1X (FY (.7))|Native, T(.75,1]
) ∂F−1X (FY (.7))
∂pi
∂F−1X (FY (.7))
∂pi
= −FX
(
F−1X (FY (.7))|Foreign
)− FX (F−1X (FY (.7))|Native)
fX
(
F−1X (FY (.7))
)
(4.27)
At first sight this expression may seem helpless in terms of testable implications,
as we do not know or can directly infer the distribution of true grades. However,
closer inspection reveals that actually we can learn the direction of the effect from
our data. The direction is determined by the difference in cumulative distributions
between foreigners and natives at the transformed threshold, or more simply, the
difference between the observed probability of graduating with a first for native and
foreign students
∂ Pr(First|Native, T(.75,1])
∂pi
=
fX
(
F−1X (FY (.7))|Native, T(.75,1]
)
fX
(
F−1X (FY (.7))
)
× [Pr(First|Native)− Pr(First|Foreign)]
(4.28)
This determination of the sign of the effect by the differences in observed proba-
bilities happens for the top (first) and lower (fail) classifications. For classifications
in between, e.g. upper second, the direction of the effect also depends on the density
of true grades and there can be changes on the direction across ability quartiles44
44Or any other conditioning.
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∂ Pr(UpperSecond|Native, T(.75,1])
∂pi
=− fX
(
F−1X (FY (.7))|Native, T(.75,1]
)
fX
(
F−1X (FY (.7))
)
× [Pr(First|Native)− Pr(First|Foreign)]
+
fX
(
F−1X (FY (.6))|Native, T(.75,1]
)
fX
(
F−1X (FY (.6))
)
× [FX(F−1X (FY (.6))|Foreign)− FX(F−1X (FY (.6))|Native)]
Given that we cannot directly learn the distribution of true grades, foreign ef-
fects on probabilities of grades between first and failure are uninformative in terms
of whether the mechanism is grading on a curve. However, we can test the implica-
tions of the grading on a curve mechanism by looking at foreign peer effects on the
probabilities of obtaining a first and failing to pass the course.
In table 4.10, we present the distribution of grades for natives, foreigners and
foreigners differentiating between EU and non-EU. Foreign students are over repre-
sented at the top of the grade distribution, 14.4% of natives graduate with a first
while the probability of graduation with a first for natives is 16.4%, rising to 20.3%
if we consider EU alone and falling just below the native probability if we consider
non-EU only. This over-representation of foreign students at the top of the grading
distribution holds for both STEM and non-STEM majors, although non-EU are only
over-represented in non-STEM. These differences are all statistically significant, al-
though, in the case of the average probability of graduating at the top, the difference
with non-EU is only significant at the 90% level.
On average, foreigners have a lower probability of failing, but this changes if
we look at STEM and non-STEM majors. For STEM majors, foreigners, both EU
and non-EU, have a lower probability of failure than natives and the differences
are statistically significant. For non-STEM the probability of failing is higher for
foreigners, although differences are only significant, at 90%, for non-EU.
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Table 4.10: Distribution of Grades
Distribution P-value
Null of Equality
UK Foreign EU Non-EU Foreign EU Non-EU
All
First 0.144 0.164 0.203 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.097
Upper Second 0.526 0.449 0.476 0.432 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Second 0.234 0.269 0.220 0.299 0.000 0.000 0.000
Third 0.037 0.068 0.047 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Qual 0.040 0.033 0.039 0.030 0.000 0.320 0.000
Fail 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.044 0.019 0.437
Non-STEM
First 0.160 0.186 0.221 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.057
Upper Second 0.477 0.378 0.406 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Second 0.246 0.283 0.244 0.303 0.000 0.791 0.000
Third 0.047 0.089 0.063 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Qual 0.046 0.038 0.042 0.036 0.000 0.224 0.000
Fail 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.101 0.745 0.070
STEM
First 0.137 0.155 0.197 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.000
Upper Second 0.545 0.478 0.499 0.463 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Second 0.230 0.263 0.211 0.298 0.000 0.000 0.000
Third 0.034 0.059 0.041 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Qual. 0.038 0.032 0.038 0.028 0.000 0.830 0.000
Fail 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.000 0.005 0.009
Note: Observations from 2007 onwards only.
Using our previous discussion and the evidence in 4.10, it follows that, if the effect
is only given by grading on a curve, then we should see that foreign students lower
the probability of graduating with a first for natives in both STEM and non-STEM
degrees and that the effect is stronger for EU than non-EU. For the probability of
failing we should observe a positive effect in STEM and a negative effect in non-STEM
that should be larger for non-EU.
In table 4.11 we find a positive effect of foreign peers on the probability of failing
to graduate that is strongest for those at the bottom of the ability distribution.
Furthermore, this positive effect is driven by non-EU peers alone: a one percentage
point increase in the non-EU foreign peer share increases the probability of failing to
graduate by .06 percentage points for native students at the bottom of the ability
distribution, .003 percentage points for those in the second ability quartile, .012
percentage points for those in the third quartile and .007 percentage points for those
124
Chapter 4. Foreign Peer Effects in Higher Education: Joint work with Greta
Morando
at the top of the ability distribution. This positive effect is inconsistent with the
grading on a curve mechanism, non-EU students in non-STEM majors have a larger
probability of failure than natives and, therefore, should decrease the probability of
failing for native students, not increase it.
Additionally, if we look at the effects of EU peers on the probability of graduating
with a first in non-STEM majors, we observe that EU students have a negative effect
at the bottom of the ability distribution that decreases for students at the second and
top ability quartile and becomes positive for native students in the third quartile. This
crossing in terms of direction of the effect is not consistent with the grading on a curve
mechanism. If we inspect (4.28) it is clear that the magnitude of the effect can change
across different groups of natives but the direction must be always the same.
Table 4.11: Effects on Grades
Non-STEM
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers -0.101 0.092 -0.036 0.025 -0.020 0.040*
(0.069) (0.063) (0.067) (0.032) (0.031) (0.017)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.056 -0.078 0.050 -0.015 0.015 -0.028*
(0.075) (0.049) (0.038) (0.013) (0.026) (0.013)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.103* -0.222*** 0.121+ -0.019 0.049+ -0.032+
(0.049) (0.049) (0.066) (0.014) (0.029) (0.016)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.098+ -0.266*** 0.153* -0.013 0.056+ -0.029**
(0.056) (0.057) (0.061) (0.015) (0.031) (0.011)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.168+ 0.090 -0.063 0.087+ 0.070 -0.016
(0.094) (0.152) (0.151) (0.047) (0.074) (0.036)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.082 -0.036 0.002 -0.043 -0.053 0.049
(0.106) (0.131) (0.126) (0.044) (0.077) (0.032)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.197+ 0.011 -0.110 -0.048 -0.062 0.013
(0.111) (0.142) (0.155) (0.044) (0.078) (0.035)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.230 -0.145 -0.042 -0.003 -0.081 0.042
(0.144) (0.180) (0.151) (0.053) (0.075) (0.042)
non-EU Peers -0.075 0.098 -0.031 0.000 -0.056 0.064**
(0.089) (0.087) (0.097) (0.047) (0.042) (0.021)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.044 -0.099 0.073 -0.003 0.046 -0.061**
(0.102) (0.072) (0.065) (0.023) (0.038) (0.020)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.065 -0.312*** 0.211* -0.008 0.095* -0.052*
(0.068) (0.065) (0.097) (0.026) (0.038) (0.023)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.049 -0.319*** 0.232* -0.014 0.110** -0.057**
(0.076) (0.082) (0.089) (0.031) (0.042) (0.018)
Observations 297,840 297,840 297,840 297,840 297,840 297,840
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects. Observa-
tions from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Inspection of the foreign effects on grade probabilities for those in STEM majors
(table 4.12) produces no evidence to reject the grading on a curve hypothesis. Given
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the probabilities of graduating with a first and failing in table 4.10, we should ob-
serve that foreign peers decrease the probability of graduating with a first, with the
negative effect driven by EU students while non-EU students have an effect on the
opposite direction. Furthermore, both non-EU and EU students should increase the
probability of failing. Instead, we observe non-significant effects for both the prob-
ability of graduating with a first and failing across all ability quartiles and foreign
student region of origin. This is not inconsistent with the grading on a curve mecha-
nism as it could be the case that the density ratio in (4.28) multiplying the difference
in probabilities attenuates the magnitude of the effect leading to differences that are
not strong enough to be picked by the significance test.
For students in STEM majors, we observe a positive effect on the probability of
graduating with an upper second for natives at the bottom of the ability distribution
that attenuates as we move up on the ability distribution and becomes negative
for top ability students. For the probability of graduating with a lower second we
observe the opposite pattern: a negative effect for those at the bottom of the ability
distribution that attenuates as we move up on the ability distribution and becomes
positive for top ability students. Given the information we have, these effects at the
middle of the grade distribution do not produce evidence to reject the grading on a
curve hypothesis. Form (4.6.3) it is evident that without knowing the density of true
grades the direction of the effect at the middle of the grade distribution is ex-ante
unclear.
In addition, the evidence in table 4.26 is also inconsistent with the grading on a
curve mechanism. Our estimates in table 4.26 show that increasing the share of foreign
peers has a negative effect on the probability of failing for low ability native students,
for whom a one percentage point increase on the share of foreign peers decreases
the probability of failing by .039 percentage points. However, for all other ability
groups a one percentage point increase on the share of foreign students increases the
probability of failing by around .032 percentage points. This crossing on the direction
of the effect is inconsistent with the grading on a curve mechanism.
Therefore, the evidence we provide rules out that grading on a curve is the only
mechanism behind the effects we estimate. However, this is not to say that there
is no grading on a curve. Our evidence would be consistent with a situation where
grading on a curve and foreign peers affecting the human capital accumulation of
natives coexist.
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Table 4.12: Effects on Grades
STEM
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers -0.058 0.428** -0.309** -0.018 -0.064 0.022
(0.104) (0.159) (0.102) (0.046) (0.056) (0.045)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.158 -0.352*** 0.104 0.018 0.073* -0.001
(0.099) (0.078) (0.071) (0.036) (0.031) (0.025)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.148 -0.413*** 0.218** -0.006 0.065+ -0.013
(0.091) (0.100) (0.067) (0.045) (0.036) (0.024)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.104 -0.562*** 0.358*** 0.001 0.090* 0.009
(0.090) (0.108) (0.076) (0.040) (0.040) (0.025)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.073 0.471+ -0.195 0.077 -0.393*** -0.033
(0.221) (0.268) (0.246) (0.098) (0.115) (0.100)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.130 -0.144 0.090 -0.146+ 0.234* 0.096
(0.202) (0.184) (0.203) (0.084) (0.112) (0.074)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.092 -0.264 -0.160 -0.062 0.334** 0.061
(0.201) (0.252) (0.245) (0.098) (0.113) (0.081)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.027 -0.572* 0.071 0.027 0.383** 0.065
(0.234) (0.281) (0.302) (0.092) (0.125) (0.089)
non-EU Peers -0.089 0.416* -0.328** -0.042 0.009 0.034
(0.116) (0.187) (0.123) (0.049) (0.052) (0.046)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.232 -0.407*** 0.103 0.061 0.037 -0.025
(0.140) (0.092) (0.075) (0.039) (0.028) (0.030)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.155 -0.451*** 0.324*** 0.005 -0.002 -0.031
(0.138) (0.125) (0.084) (0.051) (0.040) (0.037)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.118 -0.557*** 0.437*** -0.012 0.017 -0.004
(0.131) (0.121) (0.081) (0.044) (0.037) (0.039)
Observations 118,170 118,170 118,170 118,170 118,170 118,170
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects. Obser-
vations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
4.7 Foreign Peers and Labour Market Outcomes
Here we present estimates of foreign peer effects on early labour market outcomes
obtained from the destination of leaver from higher education (DLHE) survey. The
DLHE survey contacts students six months after graduation and asks a set of ques-
tions about current status, including labour market participation and characteristics
of job if the student is working.
Even though the survey does quite well in terms of response, with 80% response
rate on average, 75% in our selected sub-population; one may be concerned about the
representativeness of the sample. We address possible representativeness concerns by
producing estimates of the effect of foreign peers on the distribution of grades using
the DLHE matched and non-matched sub-samples.45 The estimates we obtain from
45As the DLHE survey is about graduates only, our estimates are conditional on having successfully
graduated from an undergraduate degree.
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both sub-samples, tables 4.16 and 4.17, display similar coefficients with significant ef-
fects always in the same direction and similar magnitudes. We take this as supporting
evidence for the representativeness of the matched sub-sample.
In terms of labour market outcomes, in table 4.13 we display estimates of for-
eign peer effects on the probability of labour market participation. In general the
magnitude of the estimated effects is similar to the ones we find for higher education
outcomes. For example, there is a negative effect on the probability of working af-
ter graduation that becomes positive for native students at the third and top ability
quartile, implying that a one percentage point increase in foreign shares increases the
probability of working for students at the top of the ability quartile by .064 percent-
age points. These effects are most strongly driven by EU students for those natives
at the middle of the ability distribution and by non-EU peers for natives at the top
of the ability distribution. Furthermore, the effect works mostly through decreasing
the probability of continuing studying rather than the probability of employment.
This is clear from the third column in table 4.13 where we estimate the effect on the
probability of working conditional on entering the labour market and the effect dis-
sipates. Or even clearer in table 4.18, where we estimate that a one percentage point
increase in foreign shares decreases the probability of studying by .044 percentage
points for those at the top of the ability distribution and the effect works by reducing
the probability of going into postgraduate studies.
These results are consistent with those on educational outcomes. Foreign peers
negatively affect the performance of natives in their degree and this negatively affects
the probability of natives of keep studying in postgraduate courses and induce them
to enter the labour market. Also, those native students at the middle-top of the
ability distribution are those driving the results, again consistent with the findings
on higher eduction outcomes.
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Table 4.13: Labour Market Participation
Working Working (& work.+stud.) Working vs. Unemployed Unemployed
Foreign Peers -0.044 -0.085 0.015 -0.003
(0.114) (0.108) (0.085) (0.067)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.045 0.013 0.020 -0.015
(0.036) (0.060) (0.030) (0.023)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.102* 0.085 -0.001 0.015
(0.044) (0.064) (0.034) (0.025)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.084 0.097 0.034 -0.018
(0.062) (0.103) (0.045) (0.029)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.322 -0.267 -0.125 0.116
(0.219) (0.233) (0.185) (0.144)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.242+ 0.293* 0.180+ -0.122
(0.128) (0.127) (0.107) (0.086)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.459** 0.367* 0.122 -0.063
(0.152) (0.165) (0.137) (0.113)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.347+ 0.257 0.125 -0.084
(0.184) (0.161) (0.147) (0.121)
non-EU Peers 0.061 -0.002 0.069 -0.047
(0.133) (0.142) (0.102) (0.079)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.042 -0.105 -0.047 0.030
(0.060) (0.085) (0.039) (0.031)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.040 -0.031 -0.054 0.048
(0.061) (0.088) (0.056) (0.042)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.026 0.019 -0.008 0.011
(0.088) (0.132) (0.070) (0.049)
Observations 146,460 146,460 111,230 146,460
Note: Sample of undergraduate students enrolled in 2007/8 in all English higher eduction institutions (HEI). Controls: tariff score
and size of course. Fixed effects: HEI, year (of enrolment), major, HEI-year, HEI-major, major-year. Observations are weighted
with analytic weights to account for the different contribution of course size in our estimates. Standard errors are clustered at HEI
level and reported in parenthesis. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Finally, in table 4.14, we present estimates of the effect of foreign peers on job
characteristics of those that work. We observe that, conditional on working, increasing
the share of foreign students by one percentage point leads to .28 percentage point
increase in the probability of working in a professional occupations.46 With this effect
mostly driven by non-EU students: a one percentage point increase in the non-EU
share leads to a .352 percentage point increase in the probability of working in a
professional occupation.
Across the other job attributes we consider, i.e. graduate job and earnings, we do
not find any significant effect of foreign peers. Only by looking at EU and non-EU
peers separately we find that a one percentage point increase in non-EU share has a
marginally significant effect on the probability of working in a graduate job, and EU
shares increase log wages by, around, .17% per percentage point increase for those at
the third and top ability quartiles, although the effect is only significant for those at
46The effect increases for those above the lower quantile but the increase is not statistically sig-
nificant.
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the third quartile. Thus, as in the case of higher education outcomes, there are only
mild effects of foreign students on native labour market outcomes.
Table 4.14: Job Attributes
Professional occ. Graduate job (log)Salary (log)Salary imp.
Foreign Peers 0.273 0.166 -0.188 -0.015
(0.174) (0.147) (0.114) (0.143)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.038 -0.051 -0.010 0.047
(0.096) (0.074) (0.043) (0.039)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.103 -0.054 0.064 0.100
(0.092) (0.104) (0.064) (0.074)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.102 0.052 0.113+ 0.145+
(0.088) (0.108) (0.063) (0.079)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.283 -0.270 -0.356 -0.077
(0.276) (0.295) (0.243) (0.244)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.089 0.114 -0.116 0.151
(0.174) (0.162) (0.122) (0.143)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.644** 0.271 0.226 0.207
(0.226) (0.224) (0.137) (0.164)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.500* 0.308 0.376* 0.355+
(0.235) (0.273) (0.173) (0.195)
non-EU Peers 0.438* 0.299+ -0.151 0.012
(0.182) (0.154) (0.123) (0.157)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.009 -0.120 0.029 0.001
(0.128) (0.106) (0.066) (0.070)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.103 -0.177 0.004 0.053
(0.122) (0.135) (0.086) (0.118)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.054 -0.047 0.023 0.067
(0.125) (0.159) (0.090) (0.121)
Observations 86,860 77,430 40,880 51,710
Note: Sample of undergraduate students enrolled in 2007/8 in all English higher eduction institutions (HEI).
Controls: tariff score and size of course. Fixed effects: HEI, year (of enrolment), major, HEI-year, HEI-major,
major-year. Observations are weighted with analytic weights to account for the different contribution of course
size in our estimates. Standard errors are clustered at HEI level and reported in parenthesis.Observations rounded
to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
4.8 Conclusion
With the number of international students steadily rising, understanding what is the
effect of foreign peers on native students is key to get the full picture of immigrant
effects.
We use data on the universe of English higher education and exploit cross-cohort
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variation within university and major to estimate the effect of foreign peers on ed-
ucational and early labour market outcomes of native students. We show that this
cross-cohort variation on foreign shares correlates positively with average ability of
incoming native students, with the effect driven by EU students. This is because of
both native and EU students being subjected to the same funding constraint caps
in higher eduction.47 Furthermore, we show that this asymmetry in the treatment
of international students causes that increasing the share of non-EU shares rises the
total number of students while increasing the share of EU does not modify group
size. However, this changes for selective universities in which both EU and non-EU
students displace natives. We show that this follows from imposing asymmetric fund-
ing constraints on EU and non-EU students. In selective universities, both EU and
non-EU students display natives because these universities select the best British,
EU and non-EU students. Non-selective universities, on the other hand, use non-EU
students to fill capacity once their funding constraint for EU and British binds. Thus
increasing the number of non-EU does not displace native students.
Student selection by universities in terms of ability as a function of the number
of international students creates a challenge for identification of the effect of foreign
peers on native students. However, we are able to eliminate the selection effect
by controlling for pre-higher education ability. For this, we use the UCAS tariff
score, which is what universities observe in students UCAS application and the main
characteristic that they use when selecting among the pool of prospective students.
To support that controlling for ability gives us quasi-random variation, we show that
cross-cohort variation on peer-shares is uncorrelated with a comprehensive set of pre-
determined individual characteristics after controlling for ability.
In general, we find mild effects. A one percentage point increase in foreign shares,
typically, doesnt change the probability of an outcome by more than half of a per-
centage point. Even more, for the average student we find no significant effects on
any of our higher education outcomes: graduating, dropping out, changing between
STEM and non STEM majors, graduating with a first, graduating with an upper
second, graduating with a lower second, graduating with a third, graduating with a
lower qualification or failing to graduate.
When we look at foreign effects across the distribution of ability, we find that
foreign peers decrease the probability of graduating for native students that are not
at the bottom of the ability distribution. For these students, a one percentage point
increase in the share of foreign peers decreases the probability of graduating by .014-
.027 percentage points, depending on where in the ability distribution the student
is. This change on the probability of graduating works mostly through foreigners
increasing the probability of dropping out for natives above the bottom quartile of
ability. For these, a one percentage point increase in foreign shares increases the
probability of dropout by .004-.015 percentage points.
47While non-EU students are only subjected to visa and university capacity restrictions.
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Moreover, we also estimate a heterogeneous effect across the ability distribution
on grades, where the strongest effects are on the probabilities of graduating with an
upper or lower second. Increasing the share of foreign students increases the proba-
bility of graduating with a lower second and decreases the probability of graduating
with an upper second for native students at the second ability quartile and up. By
comparing the grade distribution for native and foreign students in STEM and non-
STEM majors, we show that our estimated effects are not consistent with a grading
on a curve mechanism. This is of policy relevance as, under grading on a curve,
differences in the quality of foreign and native students mechanically displace native
grades. Therefore, rejection of the grading on a curve hypothesis suggest that foreign
students cause mild changes on the human capital acquisition of native students.
Finally, we explore whether these changes translate into effects on labour market
outcomes six months after graduation. We find mild effects. Increasing the foreign
share by a one percentage point increases the probability of working by .064 percent-
age points for native students at the top of the ability distribution. Mostly by driving
them out of postgraduate education. In terms of job attributes, we find that foreign
peers increase the probability of working in a professional occupation for all native
students, have no effect on the probability of holding a graduate job and increase
earnings for natives at the third and top ability quantiles by around .17%. Although
the effect is only statistically significant for those at the third ability quartile.
Overall, we do not find that migration in the context of higher eduction impor-
tantly affects the educational outcomes of natives. Similar to some effects of immi-
grants on the labour market, we find that there are only effects for certain groups
of natives, which usually are those sharing similar characteristics to migrants (Dust-
mann, Frattini, et al. 2013; Peri and Sparber 2009). Indeed, in our case, foreign
students, that show higher educational performances, affect mainly natives at the top
of the ability distribution.
Our paper is the first, as we are aware of, in shedding light on foreign peer effects in
higher education by considering the whole universe of undergraduate students. Other
papers (Anelli, Shih, et al. 2017; Chevalier et al. 2019) focus on single universities and
courses. Despite providing richer information compared to what we can do in terms
of mechanisms underlying the results, there may be external validity concerns. We
add to them as we provide the overall effect of foreign students on higher education.
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4.9 Appendix
4.9.1 EU A10 Accession
Figure 4.3: A10 Students Evolution
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Figure 4.4: A10 Students Evolution
Between Cohorts Changes
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4.9.2 Additional Tables
Table 4.15: STEM and non-STEM Transitions
To STEM Graduates non-STEM To non-STEM Graduates STEM
Foreign Peers 0.006 -0.009 -0.007 0.021
(0.029) (0.041) (0.045) (0.072)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.028 0.037 0.201 -0.237
(0.053) (0.069) (0.136) (0.181)
non-EU Peers 0.018 -0.025 -0.061 0.087
(0.032) (0.047) (0.051) (0.073)
Observations 326,990 326,990 131,170 131,170
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and
fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.16: Grades
(DLHE Matched Sub-Sample)
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual.
Foreign Peers -0.189+ 0.183 -0.019 0.057 -0.032
(0.108) (0.132) (0.131) (0.061) (0.037)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.053 -0.176** 0.122+ -0.028 0.029
(0.072) (0.056) (0.066) (0.037) (0.025)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.124 -0.383*** 0.245+ -0.022 0.035
(0.081) (0.101) (0.130) (0.023) (0.027)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.085 -0.381*** 0.280** -0.022 0.039
(0.089) (0.097) (0.106) (0.035) (0.025)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.550** 0.385 0.174 0.070 -0.078
(0.196) (0.280) (0.232) (0.091) (0.103)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.122 0.233 -0.251 -0.093 -0.012
(0.113) (0.179) (0.189) (0.079) (0.083)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.311* -0.036 -0.261 -0.009 -0.005
(0.157) (0.250) (0.253) (0.070) (0.082)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.261 -0.166 -0.168 0.059 0.013
(0.202) (0.269) (0.259) (0.081) (0.078)
non-EU Peers -0.075 0.164 -0.113 0.047 -0.023
(0.132) (0.152) (0.175) (0.074) (0.046)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.022 -0.349*** 0.284** -0.002 0.046
(0.103) (0.099) (0.103) (0.058) (0.033)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.051 -0.527** 0.451* -0.025 0.051
(0.107) (0.157) (0.179) (0.044) (0.033)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.018 -0.487** 0.465** -0.046 0.051
(0.117) (0.145) (0.153) (0.053) (0.033)
Observations 145,450 145,450 145,450 145,450 145,450
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix
effects. Observations from 2007-2008. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001
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Table 4.17: Grades
(DLHE Non-Matched Sub-Sample)
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual.
Foreign Peers 0.103 -0.126 -0.020 0.141 -0.098
(0.099) (0.208) (0.135) (0.117) (0.121)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.008 -0.204** 0.161 -0.034 0.069
(0.064) (0.062) (0.111) (0.078) (0.063)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.101+ -0.197*** 0.108 -0.122 0.110
(0.057) (0.055) (0.066) (0.078) (0.067)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.083 -0.362*** 0.225*** -0.091 0.144+
(0.059) (0.065) (0.065) (0.082) (0.082)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.048 -0.374 0.440 0.034 -0.148
(0.255) (0.329) (0.348) (0.201) (0.243)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.080 -0.114 0.409* -0.065 -0.150
(0.145) (0.242) (0.202) (0.131) (0.202)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.022 0.530* -0.140 -0.225 -0.187
(0.219) (0.254) (0.291) (0.168) (0.196)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.282 0.081 -0.322 -0.073 0.032
(0.272) (0.319) (0.264) (0.153) (0.205)
non-EU Peers 0.108 -0.023 -0.137 0.164 -0.111
(0.098) (0.225) (0.162) (0.149) (0.147)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.047 -0.251* 0.057 -0.020 0.167*
(0.121) (0.119) (0.168) (0.116) (0.082)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.130 -0.459*** 0.189 -0.086 0.226*
(0.088) (0.122) (0.124) (0.119) (0.090)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.031 -0.535*** 0.389** -0.090 0.205*
(0.098) (0.133) (0.116) (0.119) (0.103)
Observations 46,780 46,780 46,780 46,780 46,780
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix
effects. Observations from 2007-2008. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001
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Table 4.18: Studying after Graduation
Studying Studying postgrad. Studying undergrad. Work. & Stud. Other
Foreign Peers 0.079 -0.019 0.104* -0.041 0.008
(0.054) (0.050) (0.047) (0.078) (0.062)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.042 -0.007 -0.044+ -0.032 0.044
(0.028) (0.021) (0.023) (0.037) (0.062)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.093** -0.035 -0.060*** -0.017 -0.007
(0.030) (0.030) (0.016) (0.036) (0.029)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.123** -0.037 -0.085*** 0.012 0.044
(0.045) (0.035) (0.021) (0.053) (0.050)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.006 -0.025 0.043 0.055 0.145
(0.159) (0.119) (0.104) (0.146) (0.121)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.080 -0.069 -0.008 0.051 -0.090
(0.085) (0.066) (0.067) (0.074) (0.078)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.224* -0.141 -0.078 -0.091 -0.081
(0.111) (0.091) (0.075) (0.065) (0.086)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.120 -0.020 -0.109 -0.090 -0.053
(0.105) (0.095) (0.081) (0.099) (0.093)
non-EU Peers 0.092 -0.027 0.124* -0.063 -0.042
(0.074) (0.062) (0.053) (0.085) (0.070)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.025 0.021 -0.057 -0.063 0.100
(0.051) (0.040) (0.036) (0.055) (0.085)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.044 0.005 -0.054+ 0.009 0.027
(0.050) (0.042) (0.029) (0.054) (0.045)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.115+ -0.034 -0.078* 0.045 0.085
(0.065) (0.055) (0.038) (0.078) (0.063)
Observations 146,460 146,460 146,460 146,460 146,460
Note: Sample of undergraduate students enrolled in 2007/8 in all English higher eduction institutions (HEI). Controls: tariff score
and size of course. Fixed effects: HEI, year (of enrolment), major, HEI-year, HEI-major, major-year. Observations are weighted with
analytic weights to account for the different contribution of course size in our estimates. Standard errors are clustered at HEI level
and reported in parenthesis. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.19: Labour Market Participation
Controlling for Grades
Working Working (& work.+stud.) Working vs. Unemployed Unemployed
Foreign Peers -0.051 -0.092 0.027 -0.014
(0.119) (0.110) (0.083) (0.065)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.047 0.016 0.020 -0.016
(0.036) (0.059) (0.028) (0.023)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.107* 0.091 0.005 0.009
(0.045) (0.063) (0.027) (0.021)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.084 0.098 0.041 -0.026
(0.063) (0.101) (0.038) (0.024)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.335 -0.284 -0.082 0.077
(0.218) (0.237) (0.189) (0.145)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.253* 0.301* 0.160 -0.100
(0.126) (0.126) (0.105) (0.084)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.465** 0.370* 0.095 -0.040
(0.157) (0.167) (0.134) (0.111)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.348+ 0.259 0.119 -0.076
(0.182) (0.161) (0.145) (0.119)
non-EU Peers 0.055 -0.007 0.071 -0.048
(0.141) (0.145) (0.103) (0.080)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.043 -0.105 -0.038 0.019
(0.059) (0.083) (0.035) (0.030)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.035 -0.023 -0.034 0.031
(0.061) (0.086) (0.048) (0.037)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.026 0.021 0.006 -0.004
(0.087) (0.129) (0.062) (0.044)
Observations 145,450 145,450 110,460 145,450
Note: Sample of undergraduate students enrolled in 2007/8 in all English higher eduction institutions (HEI). Controls: tariff score
and size of course. Fixed effects: HEI, year (of enrolment), major, HEI-year, HEI-major, major-year. Observations are weighted
with analytic weights to account for the different contribution of course size in our estimates. Standard errors are clustered at HEI
level and reported in parenthesis. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.20: Studying After Graduation
Controlling for Grades
Studying Studying postgrad. Studying undergrad. Work. & Stud. Other
Foreign Peers 0.089 -0.009 0.102* -0.041 0.017
(0.059) (0.055) (0.047) (0.078) (0.062)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.041 -0.007 -0.042 -0.032 0.041
(0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.035) (0.062)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.091* -0.036 -0.057*** -0.016 -0.009
(0.035) (0.036) (0.017) (0.033) (0.028)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.116* -0.034 -0.081*** 0.014 0.043
(0.049) (0.040) (0.020) (0.050) (0.050)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.050 0.007 0.053 0.051 0.157
(0.154) (0.116) (0.105) (0.144) (0.121)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.106 -0.087 -0.017 0.048 -0.095
(0.083) (0.063) (0.068) (0.073) (0.076)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.251* -0.163+ -0.083 -0.095 -0.079
(0.114) (0.094) (0.075) (0.060) (0.085)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.125 -0.025 -0.109 -0.089 -0.058
(0.100) (0.093) (0.082) (0.095) (0.093)
non-EU Peers 0.089 -0.025 0.118* -0.062 -0.034
(0.077) (0.066) (0.052) (0.086) (0.070)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.012 0.028 -0.052 -0.062 0.098
(0.048) (0.043) (0.038) (0.052) (0.085)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.031 0.013 -0.048 0.012 0.023
(0.051) (0.048) (0.029) (0.050) (0.045)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.102 -0.027 -0.072* 0.047 0.085
(0.066) (0.059) (0.036) (0.075) (0.063)
Observations 145,450 145,450 145,450 145,450 145,450
Note: Sample of undergraduate students enrolled in 2007/8 in all English higher eduction institutions (HEI). Controls: tariff score
and size of course. Fixed effects: HEI, year (of enrolment), major, HEI-year, HEI-major, major-year. Observations are weighted with
analytic weights to account for the different contribution of course size in our estimates. Standard errors are clustered at HEI level
and reported in parenthesis. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.21: Job Attributes
Controlling for Grades
Professional occ. Graduate job (log)Salary (log)Salary imp.
Foreign Peers 0.278 0.168 -0.178 -0.021
(0.179) (0.145) (0.123) (0.146)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.049 -0.048 -0.014 0.039
(0.080) (0.059) (0.046) (0.039)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.122+ -0.043 0.064 0.095
(0.073) (0.081) (0.074) (0.077)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.122+ 0.066 0.111 0.139+
(0.070) (0.092) (0.071) (0.082)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.222 -0.202 -0.300 -0.066
(0.275) (0.287) (0.261) (0.239)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.053 0.061 -0.145 0.122
(0.161) (0.170) (0.119) (0.141)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.600** 0.201 0.181 0.194
(0.217) (0.214) (0.145) (0.156)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.459* 0.261 0.339+ 0.347+
(0.220) (0.265) (0.178) (0.184)
non-EU Peers 0.422* 0.277+ -0.156 -0.001
(0.189) (0.150) (0.137) (0.162)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.040 -0.094 0.035 0.001
(0.109) (0.093) (0.068) (0.071)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.058 -0.134 0.021 0.052
(0.103) (0.110) (0.097) (0.121)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.010 -0.009 0.036 0.063
(0.107) (0.145) (0.101) (0.123)
Observations 86,230 76,870 40,500 51,300
Note: Sample of undergraduate students enrolled in 2007/8 in all English higher eduction institutions (HEI).
Controls: tariff score and size of course. Fixed effects: HEI, year (of enrolment), major, HEI-year, HEI-major,
major-year. Observations are weighted with analytic weights to account for the different contribution of course size
in our estimates. Standard errors are clustered at HEI level and reported in parenthesis. Observations rounded
to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.22: Higher Education Outcomes
STEM transitions
To STEM Graduates non-STEM To non-STEM Graduates STEM
Foreign Peers 0.015 0.031 -0.064 0.065
(0.031) (0.045) (0.070) (0.108)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.014* -0.045+ 0.089 -0.074
(0.007) (0.024) (0.060) (0.064)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.005 -0.056* 0.098 -0.108
(0.008) (0.023) (0.088) (0.099)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.019 -0.060* 0.069 -0.028
(0.012) (0.027) (0.092) (0.107)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.016 0.120 0.142 -0.151
(0.059) (0.086) (0.208) (0.274)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.036 -0.171* -0.037 -0.041
(0.027) (0.075) (0.168) (0.220)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.015 0.006 0.083 -0.183
(0.024) (0.080) (0.241) (0.292)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.005 -0.178+ 0.145 -0.108
(0.034) (0.093) (0.248) (0.299)
non-EU Peers 0.025 -0.003 -0.116+ 0.119
(0.035) (0.054) (0.063) (0.095)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.005 0.010 0.120* -0.080
(0.011) (0.035) (0.050) (0.064)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.001 -0.074* 0.095 -0.082
(0.014) (0.034) (0.093) (0.081)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.025 -0.019 0.042 -0.000
(0.019) (0.043) (0.087) (0.093)
Observations 326,990 326,990 131,170 131,170
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects.
Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Estimates by University Group
Table 4.23: Graduation Estimates
Russell Group
Graduates Success Lower Qual. Failure Dropout
Foreign Peers 0.034 -0.040 0.073 -0.031+ -0.003
(0.131) (0.091) (0.064) (0.015) (0.130)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.013 0.076 -0.088 0.060* -0.047
(0.125) (0.079) (0.066) (0.023) (0.129)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.106 -0.038 -0.067 0.064** 0.042
(0.126) (0.080) (0.060) (0.018) (0.129)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.080 -0.014 -0.065 0.061** 0.020
(0.116) (0.073) (0.066) (0.019) (0.121)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.667+ 0.768* -0.120 -0.288+ -0.379
(0.343) (0.328) (0.210) (0.158) (0.314)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.659** -0.665* 0.023 0.245 0.415+
(0.198) (0.240) (0.163) (0.185) (0.213)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.690+ -0.782* 0.111 0.322+ 0.368
(0.342) (0.328) (0.173) (0.154) (0.328)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.718* -0.817* 0.116 0.302+ 0.416
(0.343) (0.321) (0.181) (0.154) (0.322)
non-EU Peers -0.111 -0.229 0.120* 0.030 0.081
(0.138) (0.149) (0.044) (0.042) (0.130)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.131 0.241+ -0.113* 0.020 -0.150
(0.145) (0.119) (0.053) (0.042) (0.147)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.026 0.131 -0.107+ 0.005 -0.031
(0.126) (0.127) (0.052) (0.029) (0.130)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.065 0.169 -0.107+ 0.006 -0.070
(0.114) (0.120) (0.055) (0.031) (0.118)
Observations 133,650 133,650 133,650 133,650 133,650
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls
and fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.24: Graduation Estimates
1994 Group
Graduates Success Lower Qual. Failure Dropout
Foreign Peers 0.045 0.070 -0.026 0.004 -0.048
(0.070) (0.081) (0.038) (0.034) (0.052)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.010 -0.023 0.014 -0.035 0.045
(0.051) (0.048) (0.030) (0.034) (0.027)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.020 -0.024 0.006 -0.029 0.049
(0.053) (0.042) (0.026) (0.033) (0.034)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.006 -0.018 0.012 -0.033 0.039
(0.064) (0.060) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.151 0.199 -0.053 0.003 -0.153
(0.188) (0.306) (0.140) (0.109) (0.142)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.215 -0.210 -0.001 0.012 0.203
(0.186) (0.327) (0.145) (0.110) (0.141)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.153 -0.168 0.019 -0.018 0.171
(0.135) (0.246) (0.118) (0.106) (0.101)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.296+ -0.326 0.031 0.050 0.247*
(0.142) (0.270) (0.147) (0.092) (0.089)
non-EU Peers 0.016 0.025 -0.007 -0.004 -0.011
(0.086) (0.083) (0.036) (0.062) (0.033)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.081 0.061 0.021 -0.056 -0.025
(0.140) (0.172) (0.040) (0.071) (0.087)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.043 0.044 -0.000 -0.036 -0.008
(0.122) (0.143) (0.025) (0.062) (0.085)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.127 0.123 0.004 -0.072 -0.055
(0.113) (0.137) (0.029) (0.063) (0.067)
Observations 36,720 36,720 36,720 36,720 36,720
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls
and fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.25: Graduation Estimates
Other Universities
Graduates Success Lower Qual. Failure Dropout
Foreign Peers -0.021 0.041 -0.063 0.053* -0.033
(0.049) (0.068) (0.044) (0.025) (0.048)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.071* -0.095* 0.025 -0.032* 0.103*
(0.033) (0.044) (0.021) (0.014) (0.040)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.079* -0.140*** 0.061** -0.038 0.117**
(0.031) (0.037) (0.020) (0.023) (0.035)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.095* -0.177*** 0.082*** -0.028+ 0.123**
(0.035) (0.048) (0.023) (0.014) (0.040)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.098 0.077 -0.181 0.025 0.073
(0.191) (0.236) (0.129) (0.075) (0.195)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.127 -0.150 0.023 -0.008 0.135
(0.181) (0.224) (0.126) (0.047) (0.183)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.077 0.068 0.024 0.004 -0.081
(0.232) (0.250) (0.110) (0.070) (0.226)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.052 0.039 0.014 -0.018 -0.034
(0.249) (0.268) (0.123) (0.099) (0.218)
non-EU Peers -0.005 0.042 -0.047 0.062* -0.057
(0.044) (0.074) (0.043) (0.026) (0.051)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.049 -0.074 0.025 -0.041 0.090
(0.058) (0.086) (0.041) (0.025) (0.072)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.134+ -0.212** 0.073* -0.053 0.186*
(0.068) (0.076) (0.035) (0.040) (0.075)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.144 -0.249* 0.105* -0.031 0.175+
(0.087) (0.105) (0.043) (0.036) (0.093)
Observations 123,220 123,220 123,220 123,220 123,220
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and
fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.26: Grade Effects
Russell Group
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers 0.018 -0.144 -0.061 0.141+ 0.085 -0.039*
(0.107) (0.171) (0.083) (0.078) (0.066) (0.016)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.066 0.313** -0.226* -0.122 -0.102 0.071*
(0.098) (0.098) (0.089) (0.073) (0.070) (0.025)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.026 0.136 -0.020 -0.140+ -0.078 0.075**
(0.076) (0.142) (0.084) (0.073) (0.062) (0.020)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.018 0.087 0.035 -0.133 -0.077 0.071**
(0.074) (0.169) (0.083) (0.079) (0.069) (0.021)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.749 0.730 -0.577 -0.406* -0.145 -0.350+
(0.499) (0.585) (0.626) (0.178) (0.228) (0.180)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.761 -0.503 0.623 0.304 0.040 0.296
(0.520) (0.573) (0.536) (0.256) (0.179) (0.206)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -1.063+ -0.429 0.573 0.405+ 0.134 0.381*
(0.552) (0.561) (0.649) (0.203) (0.190) (0.176)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -1.055+ -0.425 0.502 0.479* 0.141 0.358+
(0.509) (0.577) (0.657) (0.181) (0.198) (0.178)
non-EU Peers -0.098 -0.396 0.053 0.263** 0.142** 0.036
(0.164) (0.242) (0.129) (0.084) (0.049) (0.047)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.254+ 0.496** -0.417*** -0.219* -0.134* 0.020
(0.138) (0.160) (0.102) (0.082) (0.056) (0.046)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.279+ 0.262 -0.153 -0.265** -0.127* 0.005
(0.136) (0.210) (0.131) (0.087) (0.057) (0.033)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.268+ 0.199 -0.066 -0.277** -0.128* 0.004
(0.135) (0.233) (0.139) (0.093) (0.059) (0.035)
Observations 127,050 127,050 127,050 127,050 127,050 127,050
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects. Observa-
tions from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.27: Grade Effects
1994 Group
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers 0.195+ -0.405* 0.086 0.147 -0.029 0.006
(0.089) (0.150) (0.099) (0.080) (0.043) (0.039)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.022 0.359+ -0.206** -0.108 0.017 -0.039
(0.064) (0.174) (0.060) (0.093) (0.034) (0.038)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.006 0.239+ -0.094+ -0.125 0.007 -0.033
(0.043) (0.123) (0.043) (0.084) (0.030) (0.037)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.025 0.246 -0.081* -0.117 0.015 -0.038
(0.082) (0.145) (0.035) (0.085) (0.036) (0.037)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.297 -1.090* 0.815* 0.044 -0.060 -0.007
(0.192) (0.368) (0.267) (0.247) (0.164) (0.124)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.044 1.256*** -1.121*** -0.118 0.003 0.024
(0.218) (0.236) (0.226) (0.245) (0.167) (0.125)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.077 1.317** -1.154** -0.103 0.024 -0.008
(0.156) (0.285) (0.246) (0.250) (0.139) (0.121)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.216 1.085*** -0.967** -0.008 0.043 0.063
(0.148) (0.198) (0.243) (0.221) (0.170) (0.107)
non-EU Peers 0.141+ -0.147 -0.199 0.211* -0.009 0.002
(0.074) (0.118) (0.127) (0.085) (0.040) (0.071)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.010 -0.044 0.203 -0.105+ 0.023 -0.066
(0.103) (0.140) (0.125) (0.054) (0.048) (0.082)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.046 -0.249* 0.385** -0.136+ -0.000 -0.046
(0.084) (0.098) (0.104) (0.072) (0.033) (0.072)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.062 -0.143 0.327* -0.165+ 0.003 -0.085
(0.129) (0.159) (0.118) (0.088) (0.036) (0.072)
Observations 34,680 34,680 34,680 34,680 34,680 34,680
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects. Obser-
vations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.28: Grade Effects
Other Universities
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers -0.038 -0.049 0.008 0.097* -0.078 0.059*
(0.101) (0.099) (0.093) (0.040) (0.052) (0.029)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.035 -0.050 0.083+ -0.009 0.044 -0.033*
(0.050) (0.046) (0.047) (0.018) (0.026) (0.014)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.051 -0.263*** 0.168* -0.005 0.088** -0.039
(0.050) (0.044) (0.072) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.055 -0.391*** 0.238*** 0.013 0.112*** -0.028+
(0.074) (0.059) (0.039) (0.017) (0.028) (0.014)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.059 0.107 -0.102 0.208** -0.178 0.025
(0.173) (0.242) (0.239) (0.072) (0.165) (0.087)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.036 0.158 -0.071 -0.065 0.024 -0.009
(0.144) (0.191) (0.210) (0.083) (0.158) (0.054)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.169 0.116 -0.259 -0.021 -0.005 0.001
(0.212) (0.248) (0.253) (0.070) (0.145) (0.080)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.371 -0.524 0.148 0.026 0.003 -0.025
(0.330) (0.383) (0.240) (0.082) (0.157) (0.110)
non-EU Peers -0.027 -0.038 -0.008 0.075+ -0.070 0.069*
(0.110) (0.096) (0.101) (0.041) (0.057) (0.027)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.034 -0.123 0.137* 0.011 0.051 -0.042
(0.071) (0.079) (0.061) (0.026) (0.055) (0.025)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.011 -0.394*** 0.316** 0.002 0.119* -0.054
(0.076) (0.090) (0.113) (0.032) (0.049) (0.041)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.051 -0.349** 0.271** 0.010 0.149* -0.029
(0.095) (0.101) (0.081) (0.029) (0.058) (0.038)
Observations 109,360 109,360 109,360 109,360 109,360 109,360
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects. Obser-
vations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.29: STEM transitions
Russell Group
To STEM Graduates non-STEM To non-STEM Graduates STEM
Foreign Peers 0.037 0.004 0.040 -0.041
(0.034) (0.127) (0.121) (0.210)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.019 0.022 0.094 -0.163
(0.029) (0.155) (0.058) (0.180)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.018 -0.069 0.043 -0.124
(0.022) (0.132) (0.072) (0.185)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.044+ -0.032 -0.022 0.003
(0.023) (0.116) (0.078) (0.203)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.012 1.099* -0.311 0.361
(0.104) (0.427) (0.232) (0.677)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.000 -1.042** 0.063 -0.088
(0.107) (0.337) (0.164) (0.578)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.053 -0.997* 0.463* -0.603
(0.101) (0.401) (0.219) (0.639)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.056 -1.044* 0.532** -0.587
(0.107) (0.421) (0.171) (0.611)
non-EU Peers 0.049 -0.290 0.093 -0.105
(0.039) (0.185) (0.141) (0.197)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.024 0.295 0.107 -0.185
(0.034) (0.210) (0.065) (0.212)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.009 0.171 -0.041 -0.026
(0.023) (0.166) (0.085) (0.155)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.041 0.229 -0.140 0.130
(0.027) (0.148) (0.097) (0.182)
Observations 90,110 90,110 43,540 43,540
Note: Notes: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix
effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001
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Table 4.30: STEM transitions
1994 Group
To STEM Graduates non-STEM To non-STEM Graduates STEM
Foreign Peers 0.047 -0.030 0.253+ 0.168
(0.034) (0.069) (0.111) (0.249)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.035+ 0.012 -0.299* -0.008
(0.019) (0.051) (0.129) (0.278)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.026 -0.008 -0.435* 0.182
(0.021) (0.056) (0.160) (0.224)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.027 -0.010 -0.376+ 0.351
(0.018) (0.065) (0.189) (0.223)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.059 0.088 0.706 -0.112
(0.108) (0.245) (0.462) (0.581)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.073 -0.205 -0.255 -0.278
(0.101) (0.297) (0.338) (0.379)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.106 -0.133 -0.403 -0.014
(0.099) (0.233) (0.478) (0.307)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.091 -0.320 -0.276 0.018
(0.108) (0.225) (0.517) (0.374)
non-EU Peers 0.091 -0.060 -0.035 0.350
(0.059) (0.136) (0.182) (0.322)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.082+ 0.106 -0.316* 0.140
(0.045) (0.186) (0.114) (0.332)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.084 0.050 -0.452* 0.301
(0.047) (0.171) (0.160) (0.254)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.078 0.128 -0.422* 0.529+
(0.046) (0.157) (0.157) (0.275)
Observations 25,290 25,290 11,430 11,430
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects.
Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.31: STEM transitions
Other Universities
To STEM Graduates non-STEM To non-STEM Graduates STEM
Foreign Peers -0.062 0.062 -0.178 0.125
(0.086) (0.112) (0.168) (0.241)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.018 -0.052+ 0.086 -0.045
(0.012) (0.030) (0.127) (0.143)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.007 -0.069* 0.125 -0.149
(0.010) (0.030) (0.198) (0.258)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.008 -0.091* 0.171 -0.182
(0.015) (0.041) (0.253) (0.278)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.192 0.171 -0.116 -0.253
(0.246) (0.305) (0.491) (0.611)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.088 -0.081 0.280 -0.118
(0.070) (0.189) (0.384) (0.471)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.115+ 0.208 0.612 -0.550
(0.058) (0.219) (0.543) (0.737)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.128 -0.041 0.492 -0.325
(0.116) (0.284) (0.659) (0.768)
non-EU Peers -0.053 0.058 -0.164 0.170
(0.069) (0.088) (0.147) (0.190)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.006 -0.041 0.015 -0.016
(0.017) (0.060) (0.081) (0.142)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.029 -0.162* -0.063 0.012
(0.020) (0.070) (0.111) (0.128)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.031 -0.106 0.037 -0.111
(0.034) (0.099) (0.135) (0.174)
Observations 89,770 89,770 33,450 33,450
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects.
Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.32: Grade Distribution
By University Group
Distribution P-value
Null of Equality
UK Foreign EU Non-EU Foreign EU Non-EU
Russell Group
First 0.186 0.184 0.248 0.160 0.529 0.000 0.000
Upper Second 0.621 0.500 0.544 0.484 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Second 0.147 0.239 0.160 0.268 0.000 0.020 0.000
Third 0.020 0.054 0.026 0.065 0.000 0.002 0.000
Lower Qual 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.097 0.017 0.573
Fail 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.067 0.700 0.052
1994 Group
First 0.154 0.155 0.205 0.117 0.932 0.000 0.000
Upper Second 0.593 0.440 0.492 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Second 0.197 0.299 0.244 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000
Third 0.023 0.074 0.036 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Qual 0.015 0.016 0.011 0.020 0.496 0.105 0.023
Fail 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.020 0.663 0.082 0.380
Other Universities
First 0.127 0.149 0.189 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.083
Upper Second 0.471 0.417 0.467 0.380 0.000 0.601 0.000
Lower Second 0.280 0.291 0.231 0.336 0.033 0.000 0.000
Third 0.044 0.078 0.053 0.097 0.000 0.013 0.000
Lower Qual. 0.055 0.046 0.042 0.048 0.000 0.001 0.037
Fail 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.117 0.091 0.520
Note: Observations from 2007 onwards only.
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Higher Education Outcomes Estimates with Full Set of Controls
Table 4.33: Graduation Estimates
Controls for Individual Characteristics
Graduates Success Lower Qual. Failure Dropout
Foreign Peers 0.041 0.055 -0.014 0.032* -0.072*
(0.034) (0.038) (0.022) (0.015) (0.032)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.051* -0.067* 0.015 -0.023+ 0.074*
(0.025) (0.031) (0.017) (0.013) (0.031)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.059* -0.101*** 0.042* -0.026 0.086**
(0.023) (0.029) (0.019) (0.016) (0.028)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.064* -0.115** 0.051* -0.020 0.084**
(0.025) (0.037) (0.022) (0.012) (0.030)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.096 0.089 0.001 -0.011 -0.085
(0.061) (0.086) (0.059) (0.032) (0.066)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.191** -0.179* -0.008 0.043+ 0.148*
(0.066) (0.082) (0.056) (0.025) (0.070)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.037 -0.053 0.023 0.018 0.019
(0.077) (0.093) (0.058) (0.028) (0.077)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.160* -0.166+ 0.010 0.042 0.119+
(0.078) (0.091) (0.057) (0.035) (0.068)
non-EU Peers 0.018 0.041 -0.020 0.049** -0.067
(0.040) (0.053) (0.027) (0.018) (0.041)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.008 -0.020 0.025 -0.051** 0.043
(0.035) (0.049) (0.022) (0.019) (0.045)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.063* -0.115* 0.050+ -0.045* 0.108**
(0.031) (0.046) (0.026) (0.022) (0.040)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.029 -0.097+ 0.066* -0.044* 0.073+
(0.036) (0.057) (0.028) (0.019) (0.044)
Observations 458,160 458,160 458,160 458,160 458,160
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and
fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.34: Grade Effects
Controls for Individual Characteristics
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers -0.089 0.114* -0.051 0.020 -0.025 0.032+
(0.057) (0.054) (0.051) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.066 -0.118* 0.056+ -0.007 0.027 -0.024+
(0.067) (0.055) (0.030) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.104* -0.253*** 0.134** -0.013 0.056* -0.029+
(0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.012) (0.026) (0.016)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 0.084+ -0.314*** 0.188*** -0.003 0.066* -0.022+
(0.047) (0.054) (0.044) (0.015) (0.029) (0.012)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.140 0.087 -0.027 0.089* 0.012 -0.022
(0.090) (0.131) (0.119) (0.045) (0.072) (0.035)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.029 -0.022 0.011 -0.057 -0.012 0.052+
(0.102) (0.126) (0.108) (0.041) (0.068) (0.029)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.151 -0.034 -0.100 -0.041 0.004 0.020
(0.099) (0.130) (0.127) (0.042) (0.071) (0.033)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.133 -0.208 0.003 0.027 -0.000 0.046
(0.129) (0.161) (0.130) (0.044) (0.070) (0.040)
non-EU Peers -0.073 0.129 -0.063 -0.008 -0.040 0.054**
(0.072) (0.081) (0.074) (0.040) (0.035) (0.020)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 0.081 -0.158+ 0.076 0.014 0.043 -0.056**
(0.093) (0.084) (0.049) (0.021) (0.030) (0.020)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 0.087 -0.338*** 0.225** -0.001 0.077* -0.050*
(0.056) (0.057) (0.069) (0.023) (0.036) (0.023)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.067 -0.361*** 0.262*** -0.010 0.092* -0.049*
(0.063) (0.074) (0.061) (0.028) (0.038) (0.020)
Observations 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010 416,010
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects. Observa-
tions from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.35: STEM Transitions and Ability
To STEM Graduates non-STEM To non-STEM Graduates STEM
Foreign Peers 0.015 0.031 -0.064 0.065
(0.031) (0.045) (0.070) (0.108)
Foreign Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.014* -0.045+ 0.089 -0.074
(0.007) (0.024) (0.060) (0.064)
Foreign Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.005 -0.056* 0.098 -0.108
(0.008) (0.023) (0.088) (0.099)
Foreign Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.019 -0.060* 0.069 -0.028
(0.012) (0.027) (0.092) (0.107)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.016 0.120 0.142 -0.151
(0.059) (0.086) (0.208) (0.274)
EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.036 -0.171* -0.037 -0.041
(0.027) (0.075) (0.168) (0.220)
EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.015 0.006 0.083 -0.183
(0.024) (0.080) (0.241) (0.292)
EU Peers * T.75 − T1 0.005 -0.178+ 0.145 -0.108
(0.034) (0.093) (0.248) (0.299)
non-EU Peers 0.025 -0.003 -0.116+ 0.119
(0.035) (0.054) (0.063) (0.095)
non-EU Peers * T.25 − T.5 -0.005 0.010 0.120* -0.080
(0.011) (0.035) (0.050) (0.064)
non-EU Peers * T.5 − T.75 -0.001 -0.074* 0.095 -0.082
(0.014) (0.034) (0.093) (0.081)
non-EU Peers * T.75 − T1 -0.025 -0.019 0.042 -0.000
(0.019) (0.043) (0.087) (0.093)
Observations 326,990 326,990 131,170 131,170
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix effects.
Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Heterogeneity Across Ethnic Groups
Driven by evidence showing that different ethnic groups perform differently in the
UK (Dustmann, Machin, et al. 2010), we explore whether there are heterogeneous
foreign peer effects across ethnic groups. In Tables 4.36 to 4.39, we replicate the
foreign peer effects on graduation and STEM transitions in Table 4.6 for white and
non-white British. As the average effect estimates reported in the main paper, all
estimates in Tables 4.36 to 4.39 have moderate magnitudes and are typically non
statistically significant. The largest effect is that of EU peers on the probability of
transitioning from STEM into non-STEM majors for white British students. Where
a one percentage point increase in EU peer shares leads to a .21 percentage point
increase in the probability of STEM to non-STEM transition. Although, it is not
statistically significant. We only find statistically significant effects on the probability
of failing for white British. For whom a one percentage point increase on the foreign
peer share increases the probability of failing by .027 percentage points and the effect
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is driven by both EU and non-EU peers. For non-white British, we find, marginally,
significant effects on the probability of graduating and dropping out. Particularly, a
one percentage point increase on the foreign student share increases the probability
of graduation by .096 percentage points and decreases the probability of dropping out
by .086 percentage points.
Moreover, in tables 4.40 and 4.41, we report estimates of the effect of foreign peers
on grades of white and non-white British students. As with the other outcomes we
do not find much of an effect. If anything, increasing the share of foreign students
increases the probability of failing to graduate for white British, as already reported
in table 4.36, and increases the probability of graduating with a lower second for
non-white British.
Therefore, across ethnic groups, foreign peer effects are similar to the average peer
effects in section 4.6.1, both in terms of magnitudes and significance.
Table 4.36: Graduation
White British
Graduates Success Lower Qual. Failure Dropout
Foreign Peers -0.038 -0.053 0.015 0.027* 0.011
(0.028) (0.033) (0.018) (0.013) (0.023)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.026 -0.023 -0.003 0.037+ -0.011
(0.053) (0.051) (0.041) (0.019) (0.051)
non-EU Peers -0.042 -0.063 0.021 0.024+ 0.018
(0.030) (0.038) (0.020) (0.014) (0.025)
Observations 364,950 364,950 364,950 364,950 364,950
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include
tariff controls and fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded
to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.37: Transitions
White British
To STEM To non-STEM
Foreign Peers 0.004 0.002
(0.035) (0.044)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.040 0.210
(0.061) (0.128)
non-EU Peers 0.019 -0.045
(0.042) (0.057)
Observations 259,980 104,970
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard
errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix
effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Obser-
vations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4.38: Graduation
Non-White British
Graduates Success Lower Qual. Failure Dropout
Foreign Peers 0.096+ 0.087 0.011 -0.010 -0.086+
(0.057) (0.056) (0.035) (0.024) (0.047)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.082 0.060 0.013 -0.027 -0.055
(0.075) (0.101) (0.061) (0.045) (0.082)
non-EU Peers 0.103 0.098 0.010 -0.002 -0.100+
(0.074) (0.070) (0.040) (0.026) (0.058)
Observations 93,140 93,140 93,140 93,140 93,140
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All in-
clude tariff controls and fix effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations
rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.39: Transitions
Non-White British
To STEM To non-STEM
Foreign Peers 0.018 -0.077
(0.034) (0.122)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.015 0.159
(0.077) (0.212)
non-EU Peers 0.032 -0.168
(0.040) (0.129)
Observations 66,980 26,160
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard
errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix
effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Obser-
vations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4.40: Grades
White British
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers 0.000 -0.038 -0.003 -0.004 0.016 0.029*
(0.047) (0.054) (0.050) (0.025) (0.020) (0.014)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers -0.067 0.071 -0.090 0.059* -0.007 0.034
(0.059) (0.099) (0.076) (0.029) (0.043) (0.022)
non-EU Peers 0.022 -0.074 0.026 -0.025 0.024 0.028+
(0.061) (0.073) (0.062) (0.035) (0.022) (0.016)
Observations 332,730 332,730 332,730 332,732 332,730 332,730
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix
effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.41: Grades
Non-White British
First Upper Second Lower Second Third Lower Qual. Fail
Foreign Peers -0.077 -0.115 0.156+ 0.049 0.006 -0.019
(0.064) (0.085) (0.084) (0.053) (0.039) (0.029)
EU vs Non-EU
EU Peers 0.004 -0.144 0.062 0.091 0.030 -0.043
(0.094) (0.174) (0.180) (0.071) (0.073) (0.050)
non-EU Peers -0.112 -0.103 0.197* 0.030 -0.004 -0.009
(0.078) (0.107) (0.099) (0.068) (0.043) (0.032)
Observations 83,210 83,210 83,210 83,210 83,210 83,210
Note: Higher education institution clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All include tariff controls and fix
effects. Observations from 2007 onwards only. Observations rounded to last unit. + p < .1 * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
4.9.3 Plots outside main body
Figure 4.6: Sex, Age and School
non-EU Share
EU Share
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Figure 4.5: Simulated Ability Distribution
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Figure 4.7: Ethnicity
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Figure 4.8: Disability
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Figure 4.9: Share of international students by major, 2001/2010
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Figure 4.10: Share of EU students by major, 2001/2010
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Figure 4.11: Share of Foreign students by type of HEI
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Figure 4.12: Ability Density
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Figure 4.13: Evolution of Foreign Students Inflows
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